Nuclear power in Japan Fukushima and after Richard

Nuclear power in Japan: Fukushima and after Richard Tanter Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability rtanter@nautilus. org http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications This PPT at http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richard-tanter/talks University of Melbourne 19 October 2011

Fukushima I NPP, 2004 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 1

Outline • • What happened at Fukushima? What is the situation at Fukushima now? What will happen from now on? What have been the health and environmental consequences? Why did these events occur? What is the future of nuclear power in Japan? What are the implications beyond Japan? 2

Preface • Nuclear power plants: – as a machine – as a socio-technical system • Endemic unsolved issues relevant to all NPPs: – High-level radioactive waste treatment and storage – Operational safety – Nuclear weapon proliferation potential • Post-Fukushima: exposure of workers to resolve loss of coolant accidents • Otherwise, issues specific to particular NPPs and historically specific risk management and operational regimes 3

1. What happened at Fukushima? • 4

A swarm of earthquakes (as of 15 March 2011) Source: United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), “Japan: Earthquakes Swarm (15 Mar 2011), ” Relief Web, 5

Nuclear power plants in Japan 6

Characteristics of Fukushima No. 1 NPP Units 1 - 6 Note: Unit 3 fuel was mixed uranium oxide-plutonium oxide. Source: Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011, Table IV-1 -2. 7

Boiling Water reactor System 8

Unit 4 reactor schematic 9

Fukushima BWR basic design Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Figure 21 (from GE and METI) 10

GE BWR reactor vessel 11

Unit 1 schematic and inundation level Source: Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011; Figure III-24 (a). 12

RPV water levels and coolant injection times Source: John H. Large, Update On The Nuclear And Radiological Situation At Fukushima Dai-Ichi, Large & Associates Consulting Engineers, Nr. R 3196 -AR 2, Greenpeace Germany, May 2011; Data source: TEPCO 13

Unit 1; modelled status of fuel assemblies, melted and slumped Source: Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011; Attachment IV-!, Reactor Core Conditions of Units 1 to 3 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, 14 Figure 3. 1. 9.

Spent fuel at Fukushima I NPP Source: Masa Takubo, cited by David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, All Things Nuclear, March 21, 2010 15

The proximate source: reactor after-heat following insertion of control rods without cooling = meltdown Source: Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, “Containment of a Reactor Meltdown, ” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982 16

BWR nuclear fuel structure 17

Unit 4 spent fuel pond - apparently not significantly damaged Source: “No significant damage to fuel at unit 4”, World Nuclear News, 30 April 2011 18

Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP: 11 March Pre-quake: – Units 1, 2, 3 operating; – Units 5 and 6 offline in cold shutdown; – Unit 4 offline; defueled November 2010 14. 46 Magnitude 9 earthquake 135 km offshore – Automatic shutdown of Units 1, 2, and 3. – Offsite power is lost. – Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) provide coolant power 15. 46 14 metre-tsunami breaches plant seawalls and inundates most of the plant – Emergency generators flooded and short-circuited – Battery powered pumping system starts; fails by March 12. 19. 30 Fuel assemblies in Unit 1 completely exposed 19

Station blackout accident: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System failed with loss off-site and emergency AC power and DC battery power • Off-site power lost in earthquake due to damage to a transformer 10 kms from NPP • 13 emergency diesel generators each “the size of a locomotive”, each 6 MWhr capacity – 8 in the basement of the main turbine hall, two at ground level behind Unit 4 – 12/13 disabled by the tsunami • Batteries supplying DC power exhausted after 9 -12 hours 20

Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP: 12 - 15 March • Oxidation of zirconium cladding by steam → hydrogen – Zr + 2 H 2 O → Zr. O 2 + 2 H 2 • March 12: – 15. 36 Unit 1 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure exposing fuel pond; 4 workers injured • March 14 – 11. 01 Unit 3 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure exposing fuel pond; 6 workers injured • March 15 – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond – Hydrogen explosion in Unit 2; suspected damage to wet-well in primary containment. – Explosion at Unit 4 spent fuel pond: origin possibly Unit 3 RPV 21

Decay curves of short-lived and long-lived isotopes Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Fig. 26. 22

Long half-life fission isotopes Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011. 23

Japanese government report to IAEA: Fukushima “worse than meltdown? ” Source: “'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to IAEA suggests situation worse than meltdown”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 June 2011. 24

Fukushima I NPP, 2004 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 25

March 14 26

Seawater pump March 17 Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome. org 27

Flooded electric equipment room, Unit 6, March 17 Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome. org 28

2. What is the situation at Fukushima now? 29

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of 14 October: a. reactors and spent fuel Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Core and fuel integrity Damaged (core melt* Damaged (core melt No fuels loaded RPV structural integrity Partially damaged and leaking Unknown No damage PCV structural integrity Damage and leaking suspected No damage 292 587 514 Spent fuels in the SFP 1331 Fuel integrity in SFP Unknown Most spent fuels not damaged SFP cooling Function recovered Source: Status of countermeasures for restoring from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 through 4. As of October 14 th, 2011. (Estimated by JAIF) 30

Source: Asahi Shimbun 10 August 2011 31

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of 14 October: b. contaminated water leakage and water storage • Contamination of huge volumes of sea-water and freshwater injected and sprayed into containment buildings and spent fuel ponds – Some released to sea – Most stored onsite in turbine building basement, etc. – Some stored on floating barges • Highly radioactive leakages from damaged reactor pressure vessels and containment vessels – into sea and into groundwater 32

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30: c. Site debris and contamination Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011. 33

Key current site operations • Heat exchange of cooling water to CPV/RPV • Decontamination of radioactive water in containment vessel, in flooded areas, and in storage – As of 9 August, 42, 000 tonnes processed, but 120, 000 tonnes remained on site; expected end-year goal of 200, 000 tonnes now unlikely • Reducing/eliminating onsite radioactive hotspots • Covering all four units with steel and plastic to reduce air-borne contamination 34

Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule Source: Fukushima Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule, Nikkei. Net, 17 August 2011 35

3. What will happen from now on? • Units 1 -4 to be decommissioned; Units 5 -6 unclear • New TEPCO “roadmap” presented to JAEC 31 August – Plastic covering for Units 1 -4 to contain airborne radiation matter • • – Cold shut down by January 2012 …. ? – By end-2011 will start building ground shield between Units 1 -4 and sea • 800 metres long and 20 metres deep • possible extension around whole of Units 1 -4 Removal of fuel from spent fuel ponds 1 -4 Removal of spent fuel from reactors 1 -4 Removal of corium from Units 1, 2 and 3 - from RPV and/or CPV – 10 -50 years before attempt at reactor/corium removal possible Decontamination, dismantling and clean-up …. Sometime in the future … 36

The TEPCO roadmap (as of 17 August 2011) • Basic objective: reactors and nuclear fuel ponds to a stable condition and mitigating release of radioactive materials. • Step 2: – Control of release of radioactive materials – Accelerate processing of water to reduce required volume – then increase rate of water injection by continuous and reinforced circulating injection cooling towards cold shutdown. Source: Summary of Progress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daichi NPP TEPCO, National Nuclear Response Headquarters, 17 August 2011. 37

TEPCO: roadmap implementation “issues” 1. Reactors: confirm functional securiting of water injection system 2. SFP: more stable cooling 3. Accelerate water treatment 4. Groundwater: design shield 5. Atmosphere/soil - steel/plastic covering 6. Measurement of radiation and disclosure 7. Tsunami reinforcement for Unit 4 SNP 8. Living/working environment 9. Radiation control/medical care 10. Staff training Source: Summary of Progress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daichi NPP TEPCO, National Nuclear Response Headquarters, 17 August 2011. 38

Model of plastic coverage for Unit 1 Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release 39

Unit 1 plastic cover: before and after Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release 40

Seaward-side water shield plan Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6. 41

Seaward-side water shield - schematic cross-section (piles: 1 metre diameter, 14 -22 mm. thick, 22 -23 metres deep) Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6. 42

Fukushima No. 1 NPP hydrology (pre-quake data) Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7. 43

Cross-section of hydrology model (pre-quake data) Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7. 44

Underground water trajectory modelling schematic Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8. 45

Anticipated underground water levels with seaside-ward water shield in place Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8. 46

The corium issue • Corium = the liquid or solid slag within or below the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) resulting from a melting of fuel rods, cladding, steel structures, and subsequent chemical reactions and physical events • If the corium melts through the steel RPV to the concrete basemat of the primary containment vessel (PC or PCV), coriumconcrete chemical reactions may include gases including CO, CO 2, H 2 • There is a further possibility of corium passing through the basemat if the PCV is ruptured (e. g. by H 2 explosion) or if melted by the corium 47

Debris bed from core melting at Three Mile Island NPP Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Figure 43. 48

Fukushima BWR basic design Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Figure 21 (from GE and METI) 49

The corium issue: corium lava flow at Chernobyl Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http: //quakerad. blogspot. com/2011/04/corium. html 50

The corium issue: corium “elephant’s foot uranium fuel flow in Chernobyl NPP basement Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http: //quakerad. blogspot. com/2011/04/corium. html 51

The corium issue: Three Mile Island NPP Core End. State Configuration Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http: //quakerad. blogspot. com/2011/04/cor ium. html 52

4. What have been the health and environmental consequences? • Immediate injuries and deaths • Longterm radiation illness and mortality • Temporary social disruption from accident consequences – social, economic, psychological • Longterm social consequences – How many former residents can never go back? 53

Schematic of 31 August accident at cesium decontamination equipment: two workers drenched Source: TEPCO, 1 September 2011 54

Ionising radiation maximum permissible dose limits (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) • NB: Average background radiation: 2 -3 m. Sv/y; half due to radon gas • General population: 1 m. Sv – Japan: women regulated at 5 m. Sv over 3 mo – 1 m. Sv/y ~ 0. 11 micro. Sv/h • Radiation workers: – 100 m. Sv over 5 y with no more than 50 m. Sv in any year • ICRP recommendations accidents/emergencies: – In lower part of 1 -20 m. Sv range for public – Workers – 100 m. Sv, ICRP up to 500 for volunteers in emergency rescue operations – Post-Fukushima Japan: • 250 m. Sv/y workers • 20 m. Sv for public including children 55

Fukushima radiation releases, 11 -20 March 2011 (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) Source: AREVA 56

Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011. 57

US Fukushima radiation monitoring, to April 29 58

Zoning criteria Belarus 1991 k. Bq/m 2 Individual dose (m. Sv) Zone >1480 >5 Priority resettlement 555 -1480 <5 Secondary resettlement 185 -555 >1 Resettlement rights 37 -185 <1 Periodic radiation monitoring Source: ICRP 111, 2009 59

Applying Chernobyl evacuation criteria to Fukushima • Red and most yellow is > Chernobyl relocation zone (>1480 k. Bq/m 2) • Rest of yellow, green, light blue and some dark blue is > Chernobyl dose reduction zone • Cs 137 T 1/2 =30 years (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) 60

Protective measures • Evacuation for est ext >50 m. Sv – 20 vs 80 km; • Sheltering – for ext est >10 m. Sv, esp 20 -30 km zone • Acceptance increased exposures • Stable iodine – appears not used? – initial evacuation completed by time instruction issued VII-9 GOJ IAEA subm 6. 11) • Food and water monitoring and restrictions • Local monitoring • Remediation – including local initiative eg schools • Long-term health assessment planned – details sparse 61

Killing them softly: radiation exposure limits for workers and children • • International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendation for workers: – maximum permissible annual dose of 20 m. Sv averaged over five years – no more than 50 m. Sv in any one year. Japanese worker exposure standard: – Pre-crisis: 100 m. Sv p. a – Post-crisis “emergency” exposure limits: 250 m. Sv p. a. Resignation of Kosako Toshiso, Tokyo University, – Appointed Special Advisor to Cabinet, March 16; resigned 29 April – Reported METI now discussing 500 m. Sv emergency exposure limit for workers – Refused to approve promulgation of children’s exposure level at “ 3. 8 µSv per hour” on the basis of “ 20 m. Sv per year” See Tilman Ruff, “Children of Fukushima need our protection”, The Age, 27 April 2011 62

MEXT data on Cesium-137 soil contamination, 29 -30 August “According to a soil contamination map submitted at a study meeting of the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry, six municipalities recorded more than 1. 48 million becquerels of cesium 137 per square meter-the standard used forced resettlement after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. ” Sources: “ 34 spots top Chernobyl evacuation standard”, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 August 2011; original data: MEXT: http: //radioactivity. mext. go. jp/ 63

Social effects • • • Short- and medium-term evacuation Loss of livelihood Damage to deep cultural roots No return zones Compensation – TEPCO compensation costs for coming year alone expected to reach 3. 6 trillion yen 64

Nuclear labour - the return of the nuclear gypsies • Pre-crisis Fukushima NPP 1 labour force – Regular employees (seisha’in 正社員)= 1, 1, 08 – Contract employees (hiseisha’in 非正社員) = 9, 195 [“day labourers”] • 2009 worker radiation exposure at Fukushima No. 1 NPP – “of those who received a dose between 5 and 10 millisieverts (m. Sv), there were 671 contract laborers against 36 regular employees. – “Those who received between 10 and 15 m. Sv were comprised of 220 contract laborers and 2 regular workers, while 35 contract workers and no regular workers were exposed to a dose between 15 and 20 m. Sv” • Post-crisis nuclear gypsy recruitment – More than 2, 000 workers now onsite; – TEPCO planning to raise to 3, 000 – Recruited by construction company: - jobs advertised for “ 10, 000 yen for three hours work per day” • Source: Paul Jobin, “Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract Workers”, Japan Focus, 2011 65

6. Why did this happen? • Levels of cause • immediate/proximate causes : – Earthquake plus tsunami – loss of coolant accompanied by after-heat = fuel element meltdown – Remediation efforts generating new problems (e. g. contaminated water) • Immediate failures in risk assessment and management – E. g. sea-wall height known to be inadequate since 2008 – E. g. subsequent discovery of five active fault lines immediately offshore 66

The nuclear alliance, utilities nuclear manufacturers and the bureaucracy • • • TEPCO will be bankrupt before the clean-up is complete Nationalisation as risk displacement onto tax-payers The clean-up bonus for anyone by TEPCO • • Power companies as fiefdoms; power grids as islands • Industry restructuring: – Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Hitachi nuclear division merger – MHI and other nuclear companies also reviewin non-nuclear divisions – Rapid expansion of solar industries. 67

Inculcating “a false sense of TEPCO’s competence” “It is not clear why TEPCO chose not to release the key instrumentation records of RPV and fuel core conditions during and immediately following the tsunami strike until 15 May. Certainly, TEPCO would have had access to these records at the time… The role and judgment of NISA in presenting the daily updates of reactor conditions is also questionable, particularly in that it must have been aware that Unit 1, at least, had undergone a full melt within 16 hours or shorter of the earthquake but then, even in this certain knowledge, why it continued to publish its daily but unrelated readings of the RPV shell temperatures is baffling. At best, what must be construed as mismanagement of information has frustrated observers and analysts following progression of the Fukushima Daiichi incident. At worst, the information withheld most likely resulted in ill-informed and incorrect decision-making and management both on and off the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear site. Source: John H. Large, Update On The Nuclear And Radiological Situation At Fukushima Dai-Ichi, Large & Associates Consulting Engineers, Nr. R 3196 -AR 2, Greenpeace Germany, May 2011. 68

Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear state-corporate-scientific complex • GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I and II – Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence – Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import – Japan? • • • TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents March 1, 2011 - TEPCO admitted falsification and suppression of faults data t NISA 1997, and 2009 repression of minority reports on seismology warnings – Huge Jogan earthquake hit Tohoku coastline 869 Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and industry Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior LDP politicians The Kan government as a break? – ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among government and utility officials. ’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011) – Kan: ”Fukushima was a man-made disaster” 69

Distant/ultimate causes • • • Gradations of strength/salience Inadequacies of Japanese nuclear industrial regulation and safety regimes TEPCO as a repeat offender/rogue company Weakness of Japanese political structures Japanese pursuit of energy security via a plutonium economy built around future breeder reactors and reprocessing Japan’s “construction state” and ongoing loss of state system steering capacity – >>> national herd of white elephants – Rokkasho reprocessing plant and Monju breeder reactor as the whitest of white elephants • • • Global acceptance of “nuclear sovereignty” Weakness of global nuclear governance Fantasies of nuclear sustainability 70

7. What is the future of nuclear power in Japan? 71

The forgotten side of Japan as a nuclear power: as many planned NPP as succeeded were abandoned due to widespread and long-lasting local opposition. Source: courtesy Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo 72

Nuclear facilities: actual Source: CNIC, 原子力市民年鑑 2008年 Nuclear projects abandoned 73

6 months after Fukushima three-quarters of Japan’s nuclear power plants offline or shut-down Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum 74

Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4 September, 2011 Hokkaido Electric Tomari-3 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1 Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6 Mihama-2 Kansai Electric Power Takahama-2 Takahama-3 Ohi-2 Chugoku Electric Power Shimane-2 Shikoku Electric Power Ikata-2 Kyushu Electric Power Genkai-1 Genkai-4 Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum 75

What is the future of nuclear power in Japan? • • • Expansion of output from remaining thermal and hydro- power plants. Note only 13 NPP online as at early September Great success of energy conservation and efficiency measures in Tokyo and Tohoku – E. g. TEPCO capacity fell from 64, 000 MW to 56, 400 MW; but peak summer demand has been 49, 000 MW • • Spotlight on utility regional monopolies and regional “islands” Alternative energy pathways: – Energy efficiency – Renewable energy – Distributed generation • Note: all three require construction of smart grids 76

The utilities as islands 77

Japan effects: nuclear power mortally wounded • Release of previously suppressed information – Safety – Costs – spent fuel cul de sac • Politicians will never again trust the nuclear alliance to keep them safe • Public trust – likelihood of corruption revelations over Fukushima NPP I • design and construction and operation • the failure of the plutonium project: Rokkasho reprocessing facility and the fast breeder reactors • >> support for “once-through” NPP process as first step. • Non-nuclear energy producers 78

Regulatory changes • Dismissal of senior METI and NISA personnel • Replacement of NISA • Cabinet ratification of reduction of role of nuclear energy in national energy policy • Cabinet regulation requiring revision of costing procedures in comparative evaluations of energy sources to include accident compensation, clean-up, and full decommissioning costs. • Much now depends on fights over implementation under new Noda administration 79

Public opinion: April-August 2011, Mainichi Shimbun Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 802011

Real world energy alternatives for Japan: Energy efficiency Renewable energy Distributed generation Available from: http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richardtanter/publications Real world energy alternatives • Energy efficiency • Renewable energy • Distributed generation 81

Key questions for Japan • Will serious liberalisation of nuclear energy production help? • Are the utilities locked into nuclear trajectory? • Are the nuclear manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba) locked into nuclear power? – Export future (cf NPP deals with Vietnam and Jordan) • Can an elected government gain control of nuclear policy? • Can an elected government force the abandonment of the plutonium economy? • Can a Japanese government breakthrough politically to direct new energy policy? 82

Collective international regulation for nuclear safety • • Notice international responses from China, Korea and United States – Very slow release of US data and imagery IAEA: Why so silent? – Mission statement: conflict of interest: • Promoting nuclear power • Regulating nuclear power – Capture by major nuclear states and public-private nuclear alliance IAEA lack of effective powers Liability regime limitations – The farce of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 83

Convention on Nuclear Safety • Need for fundamental challenge to nuclear sovereignty embedded in Convention on Nuclear Safety – CNS parties last week deferred Fukushima review meeting till August 2012 • • IAEA on the Convention: “The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention. ” – http: //www-ns. iaea. org/conventions/nuclear-safety. asp 84

Global civil society response ? • Energy and climate change interconnection central: – Need for parallel and inter-linked responses • No energy regime is without costs • Global public right to information and transparency – Intelligence information access. • Rebuilding of transnational networks 85

Nautilus Institute early response reports on on Fukushima Available from: http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richardtanter/publications 86

• Ener. Web. Watch's Special Nuclear Situation in Japan – http: //www. enerwebwatch. eu/webwatch? page=Earth. Quake&id=update 17 • The Fukushima Project: Simply. Info – http: //www. simplyinfo. org/ • Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 5 2011: (see Von Hippel, Suzuki, Takubo, and Lyman) • After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, March 17, 2011 – http: //www. nautilus. org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications • The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity System, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, April 11, 2011 – http: //www. nautilus. org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications • TEPCO Country after Fukushima, Arena Magazine, June 2011 [footnoted version] – http: //www. nautilus. org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications 87

Richard Tanter Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability rtanter@nautilus. org richard. tanter@unimelb. edu. au http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications This PPT at http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richard-tanter/talks 88