Nuclear power in Japan Fukushima and after Richard

Nuclear power in Japan: Fukushima and after Richard Tanter Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability rtanter@nautilus. org http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications Royal Australian Chemical Institute, Health Safety & Environment Group, at Risk Engineering Society, 1 September 2011

Outline • • What happened at Fukushima? What is the situation at Fukushima now? What will happen from now on? What have been the health and environmental consequences? Why did these events occur? What is the future of nuclear power in Japan? What are the implications beyond Japan? 1

1. What happened at Fukushima? • 2

Nuclear plants and facilities in Japan 3

Nuclear power plants in Japan 4

Unit 4 reactor schematic - NHK 5

Boiling Water reactor System 6

BWR reactor vessel 7

Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP, 11 March Pre-quake: – Units 1, 2, 3 operating; – Units 5 and 6 offline in cold shutdown; – Unit 4 offline; defueled November 2010 14. 46 Magnitude 9 earthquake 135 km offshore at – Automatic shutdown of Units 1, 2, and 3. – Offsite power is lost. – Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) provide coolant power 15. 46 14 metre-tsunami breaches plant seawalls and inundates most of the plant – Emergency generators knocked out – Battery powered pumping system starts; fails by March 12. 19. 30 Fuel assemblies in Unit 1 completely exposed 8

Japanese government report to IAEA: Fukushima “worse than meltdown? ” Source: “'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to IAEA suggests situation worse than meltdown”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 June 2011. 9

Explosions and fires • March 12: – 15. 36 Unit 1 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure exposing fuel pond; 4 workers injured • March 14 – 11. 01 Unit 3 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure exposing fuel pond; 6 workers injured • March 15 – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond – Hydrogen explosion in Unit 2; suspected damage to wet-well in primary containment. – Explosion at Unit 4 spent fuel pond 10

Spent fuel at Fukushima I NPP • March 16 – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond • March 23 – Fire reported at base of heavily damaged Unit 3 Source: Masa Takubo, cited by David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, All Things Nuclear, March 21, 2010 11

Fukushima I NPP, 2004 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 12

Fukushima I NPP, March 12, before explosion of Unit 1 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 13

March 13, after explosion of Unit 1 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 14

March 14, 1 minute before explosion of Unit 3 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 15

March 14, 3 minutes after explosion of Unit 3 Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 16

March 14 17

Seawater pump March 17 Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome. org 18

Flooded electric equipment room, Unit 6, March 17 Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome. org 19

Potential steam production by radioactive afterheat Source: Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, “Containment of a Reactor Meltdown, ” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982 20

BWR nuclear fuel structure 21

2. What is the situation at Fukushima now? 22

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30: a. reactors and spent fuel Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Core and fuel integrity Damaged (core melt* Damaged (core melt No fuels loaded RPV structural integrity Partially damaged and leaking Unknown No damage PCV structural integrity Damage and leaking suspected No damage 292 587 514 Spent fuels in the SFP 1331 Fuel integrity in SFP Unknown Most spent fuels not damaged SFP cooling Function recovered Source: Status of countermeasures for restoring from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 through 4. As of August 30 th, 2011. (Estimated by JAIF) 23

Source: Asahi Shimbun 10 August 2011 24

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30: b. contaminated water leakage and water storage • Contamination of huge volumes of sea-water and freshwater injected and sprayed into containment buildings and spent fuel ponds – Some released to sea – Most stored onsite in turbine building basement, etc. – Some stored on floating barges • Highly radioactive leakages from damaged reactor pressure vessels and containment vessels – into sea and into groundwater 25

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30: c. Site debris and contamination Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011. 26

Key current site operations • Heat exchange of cooling water to CPV/RPV • Decontamination of radioactive water in containment vessel, in flooded areas, and in storage – As of 9 August, 42, 000 tonnes processed, but 120, 000 tonnes remained on site; expected end-year goal of 200, 000 tonnes now unlikely • Reducing/eliminating onsite radioactive hotspots • Covering all four units with steel and plastic to reduce air-borne contamination 27

Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule Source: Fukushima Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule, Nikkei. Net, 17 August 2011 28

3. What will happen from now on? • Units 1 -4 to be decommissioned; Units 5 -6 unclear • New TEPCO “roadmap” presented to JAEC 31 August – Plastic covering for Units 1 -4 to contain airborne radiation matter • • – Cold shut down by January 2012 …. ? – By end-2011 will start building ground shield between Units 1 -4 and sea • 800 metres long and 20 metres deep • possible extension around whole of Units 1 -4 Removal of fuel from spent fuel ponds 1 -4 Removal of spent fuel from reactors 1 -4 Removal of corium from Units 1, 2 and 3 - from RPV and/or CPV – 10 -50 years before attempt at reactor/corium removal possible Decontamination, dismantling and clean-up …. Sometime in the future 29

Model of plastic coverage for Unit 1 Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release 30

Unit 1 plastic cover: before and after Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release 31

Seaward-side water shield plan Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6. 32

Seaward-side water shield - schematic cross-section (piles: 1 metre diameter, 14 -22 mm. thick, 22 -23 metres deep) Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6. 33

Fukushima No. 1 NPP hydrology (pre-quake data) Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7. 34

Cross-section of hydrology model (pre-quake data) Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7. 35

Underground water trajectory modelling schematic Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8. 36

Anticipated underground water levels with seaside-ward water shield in place Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8. 37

The corium issue: corium lava flow at Chernobyl Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http: //quakerad. blogspot. com/2011/04/corium. html 38

The corium issue: corium “elephant’s foot uranium fuel flow in Chernobyl NPP basement Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http: //quakerad. blogspot. com/2011/04/corium. html 39

The corium issue: Three Mile Island NPP Core End. State Configuration Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http: //quakerad. blogspot. com/2011/04/cor ium. html 40

4. What have been the health and environmental consequences? • Immediate injuries and deaths • Longterm radiation illness and mortality • Temporary social disruption from accident consequences – social, economic, psychological • Longterm social consequences – How many former residents can never go back? 41

Schematic of 31 August accident at cesium decontamination equipment: two workers drenched Source: TEPCO, 1 September 2011 42

Ionising radiation maximum permissible dose limits (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) • Average background radiation: 2 -3 m. Sv/y; half due to radon gas • General population: 1 m. Sv – Japan: women regulated at 5 m. Sv over 3 mo – 1 m. Sv/y ~ 0. 11 micro. Sv/h • Radiation workers: – 100 m. Sv over 5 y with no more than 50 m. Sv in any year • ICRP recommendations accidents/emergencies: – In lower part of 1 -20 m. Sv range for public – Workers – 100 m. Sv, ICRP up to 500 for volunteers in emergency rescue operations – Post-Fukushima Japan: • 250 m. Sv/y workers • 20 m. Sv for public including children • Codex Alimentarius Commission food recommendations 43

Fukushima radiation releases, 11 -20 March 2011 (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) Source: AREVA 44

Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011. 45

US Fukushima radiation monitoring, to April 29 (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) 46

Zoning criteria Belarus 1991 k. Bq/m 2 Individual dose (m. Sv) Zone >1480 >5 Priority resettlement 555 -1480 <5 Secondary resettlement 185 -555 >1 Resettlement rights 37 -185 <1 Periodic radiation monitoring ICRP 111, 2009 47

Applying Chernobyl evacuation criteria to Fukushima • • • Red and most yellow is > Chernobyl relocation zone (>1480 k. Bq/m 2) Rest of yellow, green, light blue and some dark blue is > Chernobyl dose reduction zone Cs 137 T 1/2 =30 years (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health) 48

Protective measures • Evacuation for est ext >50 m. Sv – 20 vs 80 km; late – still ongoing to ? end June • Sheltering – for ext est >10 m. Sv, esp 20 -30 km zone • Acceptance increased exposures • Stable iodine – appears not used? – initial evacuation completed by time instruction issued VII-9 GOJ IAEA subm 6. 11) • Food and water monitoring and restrictions • Local monitoring • Remediation – including local initiative eg schools • Long-term health assessment planned – details sparse 49

Killing them softly: radiation exposure limits for workers and children • International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendation for workers: – maximum permissible annual dose of 20 m. Sv averaged over five years – no more than 50 m. Sv in any one year. • Japanese worker exposure standard: – Pre-crisis: 100 m. Sv p. a – Post-crisis “emergency” exposure limits: 250 m. Sv p. a. • Resignation of Kosako Toshiso, Tokyo University, – Appointed Special Advisor to Cabinet, March 16; resigned 29 April – Reported METI now discussing 500 m. Sv emergency exposure limit for workers – Refused to approve promulgation of children’s exposure level at “ 3. 8 µSv per hour” on the basis of “ 20 m. Sv per year” • See Tilman Ruff, Children of Fukushima need our protection, The Age 50

MEXT data on Cesium-137 soil contamination, 29 -30 August “According to a soil contamination map submitted at a study meeting of the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry, six municipalities recorded more than 1. 48 million becquerels of cesium 137 per square meter-the standard used forced resettlement after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. ” Sources: “ 34 spots top Chernobyl evacuation standard”, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 August 2011; original data: MEXT: http: //radioactivity. mext. go. jp/ 51

Social effects • • • Short- and medium-term evacuation Loss of livelihood Damage to deep cultural roots No return zones Compensation 52

Nuclear labour - the return of the nuclear gypsies • Pre-crisis Fukushima NPP 1 labour force – Regular employees (seisha’in 正社員)= 1, 1, 08 – Contract employees (hiseisha’in 非正社員) = 9, 195 [“day labourers”] • 2009 worker radiation exposure at Fukushima No. 1 NPP – “of those who received a dose between 5 and 10 millisieverts (m. Sv), there were 671 contract laborers against 36 regular employees. – “Those who received between 10 and 15 m. Sv were comprised of 220 contract laborers and 2 regular workers, while 35 contract workers and no regular workers were exposed to a dose between 15 and 20 m. Sv” • • Post-crisis nuclear gypsy recruitment – More than 2, 000 workers now onsite; – TEPCO planning to raise to 3, 000 – Recruited by construction company: - jobs advertised for “ 10, 000 yen for three hours work per day” Paul Jobin, “Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract Workers”, Japan Focus, http: //www. japanfocus. org/-Paul-Jobin/3523 53

6. Why did this happen? • Levels of cause • immediate/proximate causes : – Earthquake plus tsunami – Remediation efforts generating new problems (e. g. contaminated water) • Immediate failures in risk assessment and management – E. g. sea-wall height known to be inadequate since 2008 – E. g. subsequent discovery of five active fault lines immediately offshore 54

Distant/ultimate causes • Gradations of strength/salience • Japanese nuclear industrial regulation and safety regimes • TEPCO as a repeat offender/rogue company • Weakness of Japanese political structures 55

7. What is the future of nuclear power in Japan? 56

The forgotten side of Japan as a nuclear power: as many planned NPP as succeeded were abandoned due to widespread and long-lasting local opposition. Source: courtesy Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo 57

Nuclear facilities: actual Source: CNIC, 原子力市民年鑑 2008年 Nuclear projects abandoned 58

Nuclear power plants in operation as of end-August 59

6 months after Fukushima three-quarters of Japan’s nuclear power plants offline or shut-down Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum 60

Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4 September 2011 Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum 61

Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4 September, 2011 Hokkaido Electric Tomari-3 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1 Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5 Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6 Mihama-2 Kansai Electric Power Takahama-2 Takahama-3 Ohi-2 Chugoku Electric Power Shimane-2 Shikoku Electric Power Ikata-2 Kyushu Electric Power Genkai-1 Genkai-4 Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum 62

63

Energy requirements and supply options 64

What is the future of nuclear power in Japan? • • • Expansion of output from remaining thermal and hydroplants. Note only 13 NPP online at present. Great success of energy conservation and efficiency measures in Tokyo and Tohoku – E. g. TEPCO capacity fell from 64, 000 MW to 56, 400 MW; but peak summer demand has been 49, 000 MW • • Spotlight on utility regional monopolies and regional “islands” Alternative energy pathways: – Energy efficiency – Renewable energy – Distributed generation • Note: all three require construction of smart grids 65

The utilities as islands 66

Smart grids 67

Japan effects: nuclear power mortally wounded • • Nuclear politics in Japan – Grassroots opposition – Nuclear alliance - makers, utilities, METI, LDP/DJP – JAEC Revolt – Release of previously suppressed information • Safety • Costs • spent fuel cul de sac – Politicians will never again trust the nuclear alliance to keep them safe – Public trust • likelihood of corruption revelations over Fukushima NPP I – design and construction and operation – the failure of the plutonium project: Rokkasho reprocessing facility and the fast breeder reactors – >> support for “once-through” NPP process as first step. – Non-nuclear energy producers 68

The nuclear alliance, utilities nuclear manufacturers and the bureaucracy • • • TEPCO will be bankrupt before the clean-up is complete Nationalisation as risk displacement onto tax-payers The clean-up bonus for anyone by TEPCO • • Power companies as fiefdoms; power grids as islands • Industry restructuring: – Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Hitachi nuclear division merger – MHI and other nuclear companies also reviewin non-nuclear divisions – Rapid expansion of solar industries. • Export policies and possibilities after Fukushima – Japan in world nuclear industry competition • • – – The Jordan deal The Vietnam deal Cf Korea Cf France Cf China Russia 69

Structure of nuclear safety regulation - pre-Fukushima Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission 70

Oversight process - - pre. Fukushima Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission 71

Nuclear emergency response - on paper Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission 72

Oversight process - - pre. Fukushima Source: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Roles of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission 73

Regulatory changes • Dismissal of senior METI and NISA personnel • Replacement of NISA • Cabinet ratification of reduction of role of nuclear energy in national energy policy • Revision of costing procedures in comparative evaluations of energy sources to include accident compensation, clean-up, and full decommissioning costs. 74

Multiple investigations PM Kan announced investigation principles and goals: • To abide by the three principles of independence, openness and comprehensiveness. • the committee will: 1. be independent of the existing nuclear administration. 2. release all its facts and findings to the public and the international community, and 3. examine not just the accident’s technical aspects, but also the effect of existing systems and institutional cultures in causing it. Japan Atomic Energy Commission: • suspends deliberations on national Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy • Demands accident investigations include 1) efforts to restore control at Fukushima Daiichi, (2) efforts toward regional development, (3) investigations into the cause of the accident, (4) confirmations of safety, and (5) the release of information. 75

Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear state-corporate-scientific complex • GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I and II – – – • TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents – – • • • Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import Japan? 2011: ongoing suppression of faults data More information on suppression of design problems: sesimology Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and industry Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior politicians The Kan government as a break? – ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among government and utility officials. ’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011) 76

Nuclear power plants 2008 - CNIC 77

Public opinion: April-August 2011, Mainichi Shimbun Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 782011

Public opinion: April-August 2011 Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 79 2011

Nautilus Institute early response reports on on Fukushima Available from: http: //www. nautilus. org/about/associates/richardtanter/publications 80

Real world alternative energy pathways • • • Energy efficiency Renewable energy Distributed generation 81

Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear state-corporate-scientific complex • GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I and II – – – • TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents – – • • • Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import Japan? 2011: ongoing suppression of faults data More information on suppression of design problems: sesimology Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and industry Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior politicians The Kan government as a break? – ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among government and utility officials. ’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011) 82

Key questions for Japan • • Five key questions for Japan: Will serious liberalisation of nuclear energy production help? Are the utilities locked into nuclear trajectory? Are the nuclear manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba) locked into nuclear power? Can an elected government gain control of nuclear policy? Can an elected government force the abandonment of the plutonium economy? Can a Japanese government breakthrough politically to direct new energy policy? 83

What does this mean for the rest of us? 84

Collective international regulation for nuclear safety • • Notice international responses from China, Korea and United States – Very slow release of US data and imagery IAEA: Why so silent? – Mission statement: conflict of interest: • Promoting nuclear power • Regulating nuclear power – Capture by major nuclear states and public-private nuclear alliance IAEA lack of effective powers Liability regime limitations – The farce of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 85

Convention on Nuclear Safety • Need for fundamental challenge to nuclear sovereignty embedded in Convention on Nuclear Safety – CNS parties last week deferred Fukushima review meeting till August 2012 • • IAEA on the Convention: “The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention. ” – http: //www-ns. iaea. org/conventions/nuclear-safety. asp 86

Global civil society response ? • Energy and climate change interconnection central: – Need for parallel and inter-linked responses • No energy regime is without costs • Global public right to information and transparency – Intelligence information access. • Rebuilding of transnational networks 87

• Ener. Web. Watch's Special Nuclear Situation in Japan – http: //www. enerwebwatch. eu/webwatch? page=Earth. Quake&id=update 17 • The Fukushima Project: Simply. Info – http: //www. simplyinfo. org/ • Andrew De. Wit and Iida Tetsunari, The “Power Elite” and Environmental-Energy Policy in Japan, Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus – http: //japanfocus. org/-Andrew-De. Wit/3479 • After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (co-author with David Von Hippel, Kae Takase and Peter Hayes), Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, March 17, 2011 – http: //www. nautilus. org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications • The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity System (contributing author with David Von Hippel, Kae Takase and Peter Hayes), Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, April 11, 2011 – http: //www. nautilus. org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications • TEPCO Country after Fukushima, Arena Magazine, June 2011 [footnoted version] – http: //www. nautilus. org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications 88