IARTE Philippines of the HR to Typhoons Ketsana

IA-RTE Philippines of the HR to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma debriefing IASC New York 26/02/2010

Index 1. RTE Purpose / process 2. Context 3. Funding 4. Needs and prioritization 5. Response 6. Coordination 7. Support to national capacity 8. Next steps

1) RTE purpose • Provide a snap shot of the current situation including real/time feedback and learning to the UNCT and to the IASC locally. • support of the operational planning of the HCT… • Improve ongoing and similar future responses.

Evaluation process • Desk review • 42 ssi (Government, donors, UN, RC, NGOs) • Workshop hosted by NDCC • Field visit to Laguna, NCR and Rizal (higher D & L) • 30 focus groups and interviews in 10 locations with 200 people affected by the disaster (whole cycle of displacement) • Presentation of initial findings MNL, BKK & GVA comments and validation

2) Context • Archipelagic country • Middle income country on the low end of MDG • 12 th largest population (highest natality rate in Asia), double within 30 Y • HDI 90 th down to 105 th • 43% of the pop lives below the poverty line • Fragmented political environment • Ongoing conflicts

Disaster hot spot • Western Pacific typhoon belt and NW fringes of the Pacific ring of fire • Recurrent slow & fast onset disasters • In areas with high poverty incidence vicious cycle of limited economic opportunity exacerbated by the impact of disasters.

The disasters • Sequential Ketsana, Parma & Mirinae • 963 people killed; 46, 203 houses have been completely destroyed, 10 M people affected • Looses represented 2. 7% of the GDP • Large geographical distribution but different impact (resilience and preparedness).

3) Funding • • Initial funding flows activated the int’l response but did not allow to build up an integrated one. FA 1 / FA revised 37% funded (4 th underfunded) FA timely but overstretched Even if initial consultation (Gov’t/UN), it did not point out critical gaps (considering the ongoing response) Uneven distribution/ gaps Low media coverage, end of FY, donor fatigue, MIC, small pool of donors, simultaneous disasters, PDNA (section of FA integrated), Go. RP capacity to respond, perceived as individual agencies shopping list CERF… 9 th largest recipient?

Funding recommendations • • • “More focused and targeted” HC with OCHA support, develop a UN humanitarian funding strategy (ERF? ) before next DSG visit Global, regional and country level. Clarify division of labor FA/PDNA (recovery). Develop SOP with WB. ERC and OCHA regional / country offices In similar emergencies: (RC with HCT) the preliminary FA should focus essentially on the most critical needs (2 -3 weeks period), revised appeal based on thorough assessment. Present FA in an integrated, prioritized and complementary way

4) Needs assessments, prioritization & planning • Good sharing of info but insufficient analysis & prioritization (Flat figures, flows). • Full picture of needs and gaps missing • NA sectoral conducted in parallel and fragmented (few joint), , # varied. Little consolidation (even within clusters). UNDAC, RDRT… • Assumptions were made about needs rather than consultations • Missing linkages and analysis between needs identified, capacity to respond, presence, coverage and gaps

Conclusion and recommendations Need for more holistic and targeted approach. Before next D. OCHA should support gov’t to improve its’ information management. So that it can promptly identify outstanding needs to prioritize & bridge sectoral and geographic gaps In similar emergencies IASC should carry out more joint assessments and develop standard templates (inter & intra) To avoid duplications do OCHA with CL 4 Ws (who, what, where and when) in a RT fashion (i. e. Myanmar All HCT components should strive to inform people what they will receive (accountability…)

5) Response: • Faster for Parma than for Kestana (overwhelmed, unprepared and UN not timely, RC mobilized through NS, NGOs) as already in Op’l mode. No EWS for the first • It improved the collaboration between the Government and the UN. • The UN managed to mobilize through it’s surge capacity. • Local R swift - int’l often reactive “running behind the challenges”

(ii) response • S&R through ONS • FI (locally procured) & NFI (Hygiene, repair kits distributed) to complement the primary emergency response mainly done by the LGU’s • Logistic support was key to reach areas of difficult access • Challenges in WASH (ECs) - slugging positively dealt with (Manila water). • Emergency and transitional shelter were provided upon EC closure in some areas • Good collaboration with DSW on registration (displacement tracking system). • TA to NDCC - staff and mapping

Response (iii) • FRI and NFRI much appreciated. Supply driven: immediate needs largely met, but not based on consultation. Duplications and uncoordinated assistance reported – particularly at Barangay level • Fragmented, varied by sector and geographically. Different levels of coverage and standards (i. e Marikina & Pasig). Concentrated in EC / affected areas. “Too much food” • Most of the affected population got back to their daily life and places of origin rather fast (coping mechanisms – short emergency). • Still challenge protracted displacement

Conclusions and recommendations • • Today respective CL should support the gov’t to bridge the gaps in shelter, protection and livelihood. In future em. HCT reduced scope and better targeted may increase the quality of outputs and outcomes. Stronger participation is also needed IASC members should adapt standards according to national context and identify suppliers (stand by agreements) CL and OCHA coordinate assistance by sharing information both at national, regional, provincial and local level.

6) Coordination • Place for the international community to “plug in” to the national effort. • Means of coordination improved over time • Surge capacity allowed a quick shift from Dev’t to Emergency- turnover! • Cluster’s role, mandate and mechanisms not sufficiently disseminated to international / national actors • Some actors bypassed the DCCstructure challenging coordination (specially smaller NGOs).

Coordination (ii): Clusters • A total of 8 (12) clusters were activated. Adequate #? • 2 configurations conflict / natural disasters. // systems • Clusters integrated a variety of org. • Some clusters well focused, other too multi-dimensional, no clear mandate, outcome and output. • Cluster coordination present at capital level but lost progressively grip in the field (disconnect) • Limited OCHA presence

Cluster/Sector Government Cluster Lead IASC Cluster Lead Agriculture Department of Agriculture FAO Camp Coordination/Camp Management Department of Social Welfare and Development IOM Child Protection (Protection sub-cluster) Department of Social Welfare and Development UNICEF Coordination National Disaster Coordinating Council OCHA Early Recovery Office of Civil Defense UNDP Education Department of Education UNICEF Food Department of Social Welfare and Development WFP Health Department of Health WHO Livelihoods Department of Social Welfare and Development ILO Logistics & Emergency Telecommunications Office of Civil Defense / National Disaster Coordinating Council Operations Centre WFP Nutrition Department of Health UNICEF Shelter & NFIs Department of Social Welfare and Development IFRC (shelter) and IOM (NFIs) WASH Department of Health UNICEF

Coordination (iii): Clusters • Geographic and sector gaps irregularly addressed • Partnership between the UN/RC and NGOs functioned sporadically • Strategic field coordination and prioritization was mostly absent • Did not act as provider of last resort, quality control absent, impartiality questioned (funding)

Coordination (3): Meetings • Too many, long & centralized. Type of info and no clearly defined agenda and output. • Initially number of participants was high - saw an opportunity for information gathering and funding opportunities. Progressively reduced to implementation partners. • Level of staff and turnover represented a major concern

• • • Conclusions and recommendations In middle income countries clusters focus just on ST emergency (smaller #) All CL Gov and IASC should explain the role, modalities of the clusters before the next disaster One focal point between Government and the UN Clusters should avoid becoming additional layers of the response (activate int’l or use nat’l? ) The challenge is to move coordination beyond the national level (reg/prov/loc) CL pre-plan agenda and output, less meetings, share information more strategically

7) Support to National Capacity • Government responsibility to coordinate and to respond but different levels of capability observed • Level of preparedness in urban settings v. rural areas • Local response often robust through LGU & Barangay – but often uncoordinated • Added value making the international community easier for Go. RP to deal with • Who does what not clear to all

• • • Conclusion and recommendations Opportunity for IASC to support Government’s DM capacity (all levels) UN agencies focus on DRR in UNDAF (05/10 with a more holistic approach (RR integrated with S and E dev. plans), need to coordinate with WB and RC. IASC/HCT develop contingency plan now with Gov. before the next disaster strikes. Who would do what, where, when, with whom and how. Define ‘tipping point’, pre-plan division of labor, responsibilities and ‘nature’ of aid (int’l and national) What would happen without the clusters? Questioning the “business model” More sustainable to reduce risk than respond to emergencies

8) Next steps • Draft report due by 10/03 • Comments IA by 17/03 • Final report by 24/03

Maraming salamat po!