Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption Mireya Jurado
- Slides: 36
Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith November 11, 2019 CCSW 2019: Cloud Computing Security Workshop Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption
Challenge • We want to store sensitive data remotely • Encrypted databases aim to balance security and functionality Diabetes Xq 2 g. ZZ Measles pg 73 Qq Stroke w 5 KL 2 z Diabetes Xq 2 g. ZZ Measles pg 73 Qq Question: How do you measure information leakage of deterministic encryption? Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 1 of 10
Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) Secret input X System Observable output Y Diabetes Xq 2 g. ZZ Measles pg 73 Qq Stroke w 5 KL 2 z Diabetes Xq 2 g. ZZ Measles pg 73 Qq The database column of diseases, drawn independently according to some prior distribution δ on diseases The deterministic encryption of the column, modeled as a random permutation (the “ideal object”) Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 2 of 10
probability Quantitative Information Flow Concepts n Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 3 of 10
probability Quantitative Information Flow Concepts Prior vulnerability: Adversary’s probability of accomplishing goal given only δ n Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 3 of 10
Quantitative Information Flow Concepts Posterior vulnerability: probability Adversary’s probability of accomplishing goal given δ and output Y Prior vulnerability: Adversary’s probability of accomplishing goal given only δ n Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 3 of 10
Quantitative Information Flow Concepts Posterior vulnerability: Adversary’s probability of accomplishing goal given δ and output Y Leakage: probability The difference between prior and posterior vulnerability Prior vulnerability: Adversary’s probability of accomplishing goal given only δ n Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 3 of 10
Intuition of Model Disease a b c Xq 2 g. ZZ pg 73 Qq w 5 KL 2 z Xq 2 g. ZZ pg 73 Qq Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption c b a 4 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Prior Vulnerability: When n = 1: Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption ? 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Prior Vulnerability: When n = 1: ? When n is large: ? ? ? ? Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Posterior Vulnerability: When n is large: ? ? ? Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Posterior Vulnerability: When n is large: c grows to 1 b a Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Bayes Scenario Goal: guess the entire secret in one try Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 5 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Posterior Vulnerability: ? Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption Seeing the blocks does not help 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Prior Vulnerability: ? ? ? Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Posterior Vulnerability (free): ? Goes up to 1 Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Posterior Vulnerability (forced): ? Grows slower Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 6 of 10
Leakage Depends on Prior and Operational Scenario Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 7 of 10
Leakage Depends on Prior and Operational Scenario Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 7 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 8 of 10
Results: Single Index Scenarios Goals: (1) free to guess any patient’s disease and (2) forced to guess a specified patient’s disease Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 8 of 10
An In Depth View • 19 possible block structures Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 9 of 10
An In Depth View • 19 possible block structures • Dots: the best guess and her probability of being correct Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 9 of 10
An In Depth View • 19 possible block structures • Dots: the best guess and her probability of being correct • Line: the probability the block structure will occur Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 9 of 10
An In Depth View • 19 possible block structures • Dots: the best guess and her probability of being correct • Line: the probability the block structure will occur Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 9 of 10
An In Depth View • 19 possible block structures • Dots: the best guess and her probability of being correct • Line: the probability the block structure will occur Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 9 of 10
An In Depth View • 19 possible block structures • Dots: the best guess and her probability of being correct • Line: the probability the block structure will occur • Posterior vulnerability: ~0. 813 Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 9 of 10
Contributions Revealed that there are scenarios where deterministic encryption is not safe even under a uniform prior. Demonstrated a novel security framework by coupling the provable security approach of modern cryptography with QIF theory. Illustrated that there is no one ‘right’ way to quantify leakage. Information flow depends on the operational scenario. Mireya Jurado and Geoffrey Smith || Quantifying Information Leakage of Deterministic Encryption 10 of 10
Mireya jurado
Marco antonio pineda jurado
María del rocío trinidad mohedano jurado
Quantify the uncountable noun
Quantifying credit risk
Quantifying location privacy
Everyone's an influencer quantifying influence on twitter
When quantifying country risk:
Touch current vs leakage current
Smacna duct leakage calculator
Chassis leakage current
Cable signal leakage causes
Pericatheter leakage
Spectral leakage
Leakages of multiplier meaning
Schottky mosfet
Dcm305
Leakage point
Spectral leakage
Tank muzzle brake
The air leakage rate for a combination vehicle
Elcb advantages
Define revenue leakage
Tspc d flip flop
Analogy between electric and magnetic circuit
Claims leakage control
Nfpa 99 leakage current limits
Gate induced drain leakage
Microshock and macroshock
Iec 60601 leakage current limits
Merselene
Leakage current and temperature relationship
Subthreshold leakage current equation
Deterministic and stochastic inventory models
Deterministic cross device tracking
Pda vs dpda
Non deterministic turing machine
