PSIR 426W 13 Foreign policy of the AKP

PSIR 426/W 13 Foreign policy of the AKP ZİYA ÖNIŞ AND ŞUHNAZ YILMAZ, “BETWEEN EUROPEANIZATION AND EURO-ASIANISM: FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM IN TURKEY DURING THE AKP ERA” PINAR TANK, “THE AKP’S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES AFTER THE ARAB SPRING”

Foreign policy of the AKP �Turkey pursued a relatively passive or reactive foreign policy stance during the Cold War era, yet its post-Cold war foreign policy has been marked by subsequent waves of foreign policy activism. �From a policy of non-intervention in the Middle East pursued by successive secular governments, the AKP has reframed Turkey as a key regional power, seeking to actively play a mediation role.

Foreign policy of the AKP �Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period may be conceptualized in terms of three distinct phases: �an initial wave of foreign policy activism in the immediate post-Cold War context; � a new or second wave of foreign policy activism during the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government era with a strong emphasis on Europeanization; and � the more recent tension between Europeanization and Euro- Asianism.

Foreign policy of the AKP �The AKP era itself has not been homogenous in terms of foreign policy behavior. � There is considerable continuity in terms of foreign policy activism and a multilateral approach to policymaking during the AKP era. �Yet at the same time, a certain discontinuity or rupture may be identified towards the middle of the first AKP government, signifying a shift from a commitment to deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization along with a parallel shift to what may be classified as “soft Euro-Asianism”.

Foreign policy of the AKP �The prominent strategist Brzezinski portrayed Eurasia as a “grand chessboard, ” where both regional and global actors compete arduously to enhance their geostrategic and economic interests. � Turkey is clearly a pivotal country in this grand chessboard, trying to reconcile its long-lasting European orientation with a countervailing trend towards Euro-Asianism.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �The AKP’s emphasis on democratization and the use of soft power is all the more striking in the post. September 11, 2001 context, during which there has been a significant shift away from democratization to “securitization” at the global level. �This process has been expedited by the rise of new challenges, including international terrorism and religious extremism, proliferation of threats coming from nonstate actors, and intensification of globalization.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �The Europeanization process, whose roots can be traced to the mid-1990 s, has been pursued with a high degree of consistency and vigor, especially in the so-called “golden years of the AKP”, the period from November 2002 until the formal opening of EU accession negotiations in October 2005. �The Europeanization process also shaped the AKP’s foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �At this stage, the AKP’s foreign policy style is characterized by greater emphasis on the use of soft power and developing friendly relations with all Turkey’s neighbors. �One significant policy initiative has been targeting “zero problems” with Turkey’s neighbors, signaling a deviation from the classical fixed positions of Turkish foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �This divergence is particularly evident in the context of the Cyprus dispute. The AKP government has displayed considerable willingness to resolve the Cyprus dispute along the lines of the Annan Plan as part of an attempt to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Cyprus issue. �Moreover, in the favorable environment created by Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in 1999 and Bashar al. Assad’s ascendance to power in Syria, there has been a striking improvement in both political and economic relations with Syria.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �This multidimensional approach to foreign policy was very much influenced by Ahmet Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” perspective. �Foreign policy is no longer perceived as a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves but as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements � The major premise of Davutoglu’s argument is that Turkey is a “central country, ” strategically located at the core of the Afro. Eurasian landmass. Thus, Turkey has multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character or a single region, necessitating it to extend its influence simultaneously to Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Mediterranean. � As such, it also needs to go beyond a parochial approach to national security and to become a security and stability provider for the neighboring regions. Consequently, Turkey’s engagements from Central Asia to Africa, from the EU to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as its bid for UN Security Council membership and its quest to become a key player in regional energy politics are all parts of this new foreign policy vision, which while somewhat maintaining Turkey’s traditional Western orientation has a strong Eurasian and Middle East component.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �In the context of this much more proactive approach towards the Middle East and Eurasia, an attempt is being made to develop friendly relations with the Arab world. �A major move in this regard is the participation and leadership role in the OIC. The AKP’s Islamist roots in this context constitute an asset.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements � There has also been a strong, but at the same time more pragmatic, drive to develop diplomatic and economic relations with Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. � The role of Turkey as an important energy corridor is being developed further, and a number of concrete steps are being taken in this direction, building on the achievements of the previous decade. 13 On the one hand, Turkey has substantial dependency on Russian natural gas for its domestic consumption, leading to cooperation and major joint energy projects such as the Blue Stream pipeline. � On the other hand, the push towards turning Turkey into a major energy hub as a transit country has increased competition with Russia over energy issues as clearlyrevealed by the Russian opposition to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, which is strongly backed by the United States.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �In a world of rapidly increasing energy demand, the global struggle over access to and control of energy resources has been intensifying. �The challenging task of transporting landlocked Caspian energy to the international markets further complicates the delicate dynamics among energy producers, energy transit countries, and energy consumers, turning “pipeline politics” into an indispensable part of energy security. � In this respect, Turkey enjoys persistently increasing significance as an energy transit country.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �Emphasis on Turkey’s global role has become much more pronounced during the AKP era. Turkey’s historical legacies and geopolitical position provide considerable advantages that allow that country to play a global role that is more far-reaching and extensive then a typical global power. �Turkey’s role as a bridge between the Christian and the Islamic worlds and as a facilitator of intercultural dialogue has been emphasized at a time of rising tensions and Islamophobia at the societal level in the West in the post-September 11 global environment.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements � With the new discourse in Turkish foreign policy, highlighting the “moral/normative aspect” beyond the confines of narrow “selfinterest” indicative of a pronounced desire to assume a more global role and global responsibility. � Within this framework, Turkey has tried to act within a framework of what Davutoglu named “rhythmic diplomacy, ” pushing for a sustained pro-activism in the field of diplomacy, trying to achieve a more active role in international organizations, and opening up to new areas where Turkish contacts have been limited in the past. � Turkey has hosted NATO and OIC summits. As a result of its opening to Africa, Turkey now has observer status in the African Union.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements � In this period, elations with the United States experienced a dramatic downturn during the early years of the AKP government. � Particularly, the developments in Iraq served as a “critical litmus test” for bilateral relations. On the one hand, the American leadership viewed the war in Iraq as a crucial step to restructuring a new regional and global order after September 11. � On the other hand, Turkey, being a neighbor of Iraq and an integral part of this already very volatile region, perceived the war to be a source of great risks, especially given the ambiguity of American plans concerning post-war conditions in Iraq. Relations have particularly deteriorated after the March 1, 2003 parliamentary decision not to permit the deployment of US troops to Iraq via Turkish territory.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �The rise of across-the-border PKK terrorism originating from northern Iraq after the US invasion further increased the tensions. � The period between March 1, 2003 and November 5, 2007 marked the lowest point in relations since the US arms embargo of 1975– 78, and the reservoirs of trust on both sides have been greatly depleted.

Foreign Policy Activism during the AKP Era: The Distinguishing Elements �There is also a wide range of converging interests, which highlight the persisting significance of trans-Atlantic relations, including achieving peace and stability in Iraq and the Middle East, energy security, enlargement of NATO, collaboration on the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, and the fight against international terrorism. �Hence, significant attempts have been made to reconstruct the relationship, and the Turkey–United States– European Union triangle seems to have paid dividends in terms of securing active US support in the struggle against the PKK in the final months of 2007, putting relations once again on a more constructive path.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �In analyzing Turkey–EU relations during the AKP era, two distinct sub-phases can be identified. The first phase, from the end of 2002 to roughly the end of 2005, corresponds to the Golden Age of Europeanization in Turkey. �During this period, the AKP government built on the foundations laid by the previous coalition government and single-mindedly pushed for Turkey’s full membership and the associated set of economic and democratization reforms.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �The second sub-phase corresponds to a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the government to what was previously the focal point of Turkish foreign policy efforts, namely joining the EU as a full member. �Indeed, one may go further and argue that the foreign policy stance of the AKP government in the post-2005 era deviated from an all-out Europeanization drive to a possible retreat to what could be described as a kind of “loose Europeanization” or “soft Euro-Asianism” strategy.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �“Soft Euro-Asianism” in this context means that foreign policy activism is pursued with respect to all neighboring regions but with no firm EU axis as was previously the case. �What makes it distinct from “hard-Euro-Asianism” is that the Western orientation and the Atlanticist element of Turkish foreign policy continues, but in a looser and more flexible form.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �The increasing questioning of the very basis of Turkish membership and Turkey’s European credentials by influential political figures in the very core of Europe, such as Nicolas Sarkozy in France and Angela Merkel in Germany, created a serious nationalistic backlash in Turkey and strengthened the hands of anti-EU, anti-reform groups within both the state and society at large.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �The negative external environment originating from the EU front was amplified by a process that involved a steady deterioration of relations with the United States, which has traditionally been a key element in Turkey’s relations with the EU. �The growing instability in Iraq and the human costs of the Iraq War were interpreted as a direct consequence of American unilateralism and aggression that contributed to a major increase in anti-American and anti-West sentiments.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �While the negative and ambiguous signals originating from the EU and “the West” in general were of critical importance in swinging the pendulum away from the Europeanization drive, there were also important domestic factors at work. �A key element in this context was the weakening commitment of the AKP leadership to the goal of full EU membership.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �Following the elections of July 2007, with an exaggerated sense of its own power and a diminished sense of the importance of the EU, the party’s focus increasingly shifted towards the promotion of fundamental religious freedoms, such as allowing female students to wear the headscarf in the universities. �The optimistic mood of the immediate post-election era was replaced by a serious repolarization of Turkish society, culminating with the Constitutional Court case involving the closure of the AKP on the grounds of violating the very basis of the secular constitutional order.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �The consequences of these developments for Turkey – EU relations have been quite negative. � �From a European perspective, this set of events appeared to raise fundamental questions about Turkey’s democratic credentials and has clearly empowered elements in European society that are committed to the exclusion of Turkey on the grounds of culture and identity in any case.

Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive: Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”? �The Constitutional Court’s July 30, 2008 decision can be interpreted as an important positive development for the future course of Turkey’s deep Europeanization process. �The court issued a serious warning but refrained from banning the governing party, which had received 47 percent of the popular vote. If, indeed, the party had been closed down then this would have had very serious negative ramifications in terms of its impact on European decision-making circles, possibly resulting in the suspension of negotiations with Turkey altogether.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism �There exist considerable elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War and the AKP eras, as well as within the AKP period itself. �It would be ahistorical to claim that there is a complete rupture in Turkish foreign policy with the AKP government in power in the post-2002 era. � Indeed, the Europeanization and Euro-Asian elements in Turkish foreign policy coexisted during both periods. What seems to be striking is a swing of the pendulum in thedirection of Euro-Asianism in periods of disappointment and weakening of relations with the European Union.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism �The main axis of Turkish foreign policy during the 1990 s was the Turkey–United States–Israel triangle. During the AKP era, the EU has become the principal reference point of Turkish foreign policy. �Turkey has also taken on the role of a benign regional power, based on the use of “soft power” resources. Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” arising from a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies, whereas hard power is “the ability to coerce” based on a country’s military and economic might. �The multilateralist approach and the perceived legitimacy of the policies also enhance soft power.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism � 2008 seen improvement in Turkey’s relations with Syria. �In the 1990 s relationship between these countries was not good due to Syria’s support for the PKK. However, in the period following the capture of Ocalan in 1999, there has been a radical improvement in bilateral relations.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism �In fall 2007 Turkey favored diplomatic channels before resorting to unilateral power in the crisis in northern Iraq over the cross-border operations against PKK terrorists. �Emphasis on multilateralism constitutes a striking feature of the new era. This has been particularly evident in the AKP’s attempts to deal with the Kurdish conflict. A number of important multilateral initiatives preceded the use of “hard power” to deal with the PKK, helping to generate considerable international support for its actions in the process

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism �The political leadership is also attempting to exploit linkages between different dimensions of foreign policy. Turkey’s mediating role in various conflict situations is becoming increasingly important in enhancing its status as a pivotal regional. �The AKP government particularly emphasizes this “mediator” or “facilitator” role within the context of the Greater Middle East.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism �Opening a functional channel of dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Turkey invited Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai to meet in Turkey in May 2007. �The Israeli and Palestinian presidents, Shimon Peres and Mahmud Abbas, met in Ankara before their critical Annapolis meeting in the United States in 2007. Turkey has also facilitated and fostered diplomatic contacts and dialogue between Pakistan and Israel and between Israel and Syria.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role as a Benign Regional Power: The AKP’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Previous Wave of Foreign Policy Activism �In this period, the democratization of foreign policy emerges as a key element under the AKP government. New actors are involved. Foreign policy issues are open to public debate. �Previously fixed positions on a number of key issues have become the focal point of public debate, such as Cyprus, relations with Armenia, and relations with Kurds in northern Iraq.

The AKP’s foreign policy challenges after the Arab Spring � As a consequence of the upheavals following the Arab Spring, Turkey’s neighborhood is beset with problematic neighbors. �The new era in Turkish foreign policy prospered until the coming of the Arab Spring. This was the moment when the rhetoric of regional leadership met the reality of a region in turmoil. �The AKPs foreign policy faltered, due to the difficulty of taking an active stance while advocating “zero problems” with neighbors.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �While the AKP embraced the Egyptian revolution and cautiously fell into line on the intervention in Libya, Syria has been a challenge on several levels. The AKP’s policy towards Syria impacts on Turkey’s relationship to two of its most demanding neighbors, Iraq and Iran.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �After a period of uncertainty the AKP came out in strong support of the Syrian opposition: Turkey was the first country to officially recognize the Syrian National Council, and its headquarters are now in Istanbul. �Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition challenges Iran and its support for the Alawite-led Assad regime. This is a politically negative development in Turkey’s relationship with Iran, which was on the road to improvement prior to the Arab awakening.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �Factional rivalries between Iran and Turkey also play out in Iraq: Turkey is increasingly cooperating with the Kurds (and the Sunni minority), in competition with Iran, which supports the Shia majority.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �Turkey’s relations with the central government of Iraq is equally problematic. Not only has Turkey gradually accepted Kurdish autonomy in the north, it has also actively built ties with Sunni political and business elites, straining relations with the Shia-led government. �Northern Iraq is increasingly engaging in “paradiplomacy” as a sub-state entity seeking diplomatic relations with other sovereign states.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �Despite the formulation of an increasingly more pragmatic relationship to the Iraqi Kurds, the core of Turkey’s concerns with Syria paradoxically lies with Kurdish regional aspirations to statehood. �Turkey’s interest in Syria has historically centered on concerns over Kurdish separatism. In fact, rapprochement between Turkey and Syria that began in 1998 was a result of the latter’s decision to expel Öcalan from Syria.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �However, since the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Turkish foreign policy has returned to its guiding concern: the existential fear of Kurdish separatism. This threat is exacerbated by the current security vacuum in Syria, coupled with the influx of refugees and not least, the involvement of Iraqi Kurds with their Syrian brethren.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �The AKP recognizes that the de facto state structure established in northern Iraq may also be repeated in northern Syria. �In Syria, Kurdish groups have kept a lower profile, biding their time and avoiding confrontation with the regime. �Kurds in the northeast of Syria living in the political vacuum have assumed state functions – providing security, food distribution and operating the bureaucracy. � While it may be too early to speculate on the likelihood of a Kurdish entity in northern Syria, the incremental steps towards greater autonomy have already had an impact on the nationalist aspirations of Turkey’s Kurds.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �Notwithstanding the future status of the Kurds in Syria, for Turkey, the primary concern is that local Kurdish groups will allow the Kurdish separatist organization in Turkey, the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker’s Party – PKK), to operate from Syria and intensify attacks on Turkey. �The two primary Kurdish groups in Syria – the PYD (Democratic Union of Kurdistan) and the KNC (Kurdish National Congress) – have historically been in opposition to one another.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �The PYD has had support from the Syrian regime (as well as the Iranian) and is commonly known as the PKK’s Syrian arm. �Kurdish National Congress meanwhile, has been closer to the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). �However, efforts by Mesud Barzani, the Kurdish regional president in Iraq, have brought the groups closer together, raising concerns in Turkey. Barzani has also confirmed reports in July 2012 of Iraqi Kurds training Syrian Kurds at camps in the Kurdish region.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �While some sources claim that there is Turkish support for this collaboration in the interests of bringing down the regime, it is a development that could spell trouble for Turkey. �For the Kurds meanwhile, recognizing that Syria’s Kurds may be in a vulnerable position at the end of the Syrian civil war, this is not, in itself, an unreasonable precaution. �The Kurds in Iraq and Syria are aware that the downfall of the regime may result in a sectarian war in which they may face retribution from other sectarian actors.

Turkey’s Regional dilemma – Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria �The AKP decided in July 2012 to import oil directly from northern Iraq, bypassing the Iraqi central government. �This is an about-face of Turkey’s long standing policy which sought to prevent Iraqi Kurds from attaining sole authority over the region’s energy resources. �Ironically, it is a soft power move – tying Kurdish economic interests to Turkish political ambitions – that has increased problems with its neighbor, the Iraqi central government.

The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: National repercussions of regional dynamics �According to a report from September 2012 by the International Crisis Group, PKK-related violence has killed 700 people since the summer of 2011 – the highest amount in over a decade. In short, the situation in Syria has reignited the smoldering Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: National repercussions of regional dynamics �From a wider regional perspective, the unresolved Kurdish issue is particularly damaging in the context of the Arab spring. �Advocating the rights of the Arabs while circumscribing Kurdish political participation at home weakens the AKP’s soft power.

The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: National repercussions of regional dynamics �(in 2012) There are six parliamentarians of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in prison facing charges of membership in the Thirty-two mayors are in prison and a further 200 Kurds have been imprisoned as alleged members of the illegal Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). �KCK functions as an executive committee for coordinating all parties and organizations including the PKK in the Kurdish regions.

The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: National repercussions of regional dynamics �A quantitative rise in violence has been instrumental in leading the AKP to negotiation table. �As for the PKK, their willingness to negotiate may arise from a combination of losses they have incurred in 2012 (particularly after the Semdinli assault) and more importantly, the recognition that a window of opportunity may shut with the end of the Syrian civil war. �Should Syria stabilize, even if only in the Kurdish north, then the PKK will have less leverage to negotiate with the Turkish State. Thus, indications of a mutually hurting stalemate, a stage during which “neither side perceives it can win, ” are now coupled with clear incentives to find a solution.

Turkey’s international role after the Arab Spring �Turkish soft power is tarnished by the vast number of oppositional civil society actors – journalists, intellectuals, business leaders – as well as military officers in prison. Some are charged with allegedly plotting to overthrow the government while others await trial and are held for long periods in pre-trial detention.

Turkey’s international role after the Arab Spring �The 2012 report of the Committee to Protect Journalists ranks Turkey as the highest offender (above Iran and Russia) in a year in which a record number of journalists have been imprisoned. As of 1 December 2012, 49 journalists were in prison. �While Turkey is accustomed to regular critical reports from the EU the weaknesses of the justice system are now also being openly questioned by its staunchest ally, the United States.

Turkey’s international role after the Arab Spring �In a briefing to reporters on 7 February 2013, American ambassador Francis Ricciardone criticized the long detention of army officers, scholars and students. �Increasingly, these concerns are raising questions of Turkey’s soft power – its ability to attract other states to its model.

The Gezi protests and its impact on the foreign relations of the AKP �AKP’s handling of the Gezi protests in May 2013 led to an increasing criticism on the West towards AKP’s Turkey. �Thanks to its pro-Islamist, yet “secular, democratic, Western-friendly” government that turned the nation into “a regional powerhouse” (Times, 2011), Turkey was projected as a model for the immature Arab Spring democracies.

The Gezi protests and its impact on the foreign relations of the AKP �However, following the Gezi protests, the AKP by and large lost the support coming from the West as the government’s handling of the events were heavily criticized by the representatives of the EU and the US. �The United States repeatedly cautioned Turkish authorities against seeking to punish any demonstrators merely for exercising their right to free speech during Gezi Park protests.

The Gezi protests and its impact on the foreign relations of the AKP �The attitude held and the rhetoric employed by the government during the Gezi protests led to a serious uneasiness in Washington. �Turkey’s relations with the US become strained since Erdogan’s visit of the White House in May 2013 due to the AKP government’s policy on Syria and Egypt.

The Gezi protests and its impact on the foreign relations of the AKP �In June 2013, the European Parliament approved the ‘Gezi Park’ motion that criticized the handling of Gezi Park protests. �A draft report prepared by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) has criticized the Turkish government over media freedom, citing the limited coverage of Gezi protests and the dismissal of journalists who criticized the government’s reactions to such events. �These statements reveal that Turkey is no more seen as a model democracy for transitioning Middle Eastern countries.