Decision Making Models Lsn 5 Agenda Rational actor

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Decision Making Models Lsn 5

Decision Making Models Lsn 5

Agenda • • • Rational actor Bureaucratic process Organizational process Small group Elitist Pluralist

Agenda • • • Rational actor Bureaucratic process Organizational process Small group Elitist Pluralist Social constructivism Prospect Poliheuristic Case Study: Cuban Missile Crisis

Decision-making • Why understanding decision-making is difficult… – No single decision-making process exists –

Decision-making • Why understanding decision-making is difficult… – No single decision-making process exists – Decisions are seldom final and tend to lack concrete beginning and ending points – There is an imperfect link between the policy process and the policy outcome • Thus any decision-making model is likely to oversimplify the problem • Still models offer analytical tools which can be combined to provide useful insights

Rational Actor Model • Foreign policy is viewed as a calculated response to the

Rational Actor Model • Foreign policy is viewed as a calculated response to the actions of another actor • That causes a calculated response from the first actor which leads to reevaluation and readjustment by the second actor • Throughout this process, the state is seen as unitary and rational – Domestic politics, governmental organization, and personalities are discounted

Rational Actor Model • Goals are clearly stated and ranked in order of preference

Rational Actor Model • Goals are clearly stated and ranked in order of preference • All options are considered • The consequences of each option are assessed • A value-maximizing code is made • A very useful tool during the Cold War

Rational Actor Model Factor COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 COA 5

Rational Actor Model Factor COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 COA 5 Factor Total

Rational Actor Model Cost USM U of M State JCJC PRCC Major Social Life

Rational Actor Model Cost USM U of M State JCJC PRCC Major Social Life Close to home Total

Rational Actor Model • In the rational actor model, decisions are based on the

Rational Actor Model • In the rational actor model, decisions are based on the pursuit of national interests at reasonable costs or risks • It’s attractiveness is that it places few informational demands on the observer • It’s criticism is based on the same fact and the realization that decision-making is much more complicated than just weighing external factors – Domestic, personality, and organizational influences all have an impact

Rational Actor Model • The model assumes “important events have important consequences” – Downplays

Rational Actor Model • The model assumes “important events have important consequences” – Downplays the role of chance, accident, and coincidence – Clausewitz’s “fog of war” – In reality goals are seldom clearly stated and rank ordered, and options are often not fully evaluated

Rational Actor Model • Nonrational factors – Threat perception • Determining threat capabilities and

Rational Actor Model • Nonrational factors – Threat perception • Determining threat capabilities and intents • Dangers of “worst-case analysis” and “wishful thinking” – Specific and cumulative historical experiences – Xenophobia – Personal present circumstances • “Where you stand depends on where you sit” – Groupthink

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Bureaucratic politics is the “process by which people inside government

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Bureaucratic politics is the “process by which people inside government bargain with one another on complex public policy questions” • This model sees decisions as being the product of conflict-resolution rather than problem solving

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Power is shared • The individuals who share power disagree

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Power is shared • The individuals who share power disagree on what should be done because they are located at different places in the government and see different aspects of the problem – The Secretary of State may view a problem primarily from the diplomatic perspective while the Secretary of Defense has a different view because his troops may be used while the President must also concern himself with domestic fallout

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Rarely do problems enter or leave the policy process in

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Rarely do problems enter or leave the policy process in a clearly definable manner • They get entangled with other issues • Not everyone participates in every problem

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Therefore some underlying concept of national interest is not how

Bureaucratic Politics Model • Therefore some underlying concept of national interest is not how decisions are made • How the problem first surfaces and how it interacts with other issues greatly determines how the decision will be made

Organizational Politics Model • Because time is short to do a lot of bargaining,

Organizational Politics Model • Because time is short to do a lot of bargaining, many decisions are based on existing organizational standard operating procedures (SOPs) • Governments are complex entities consisting of large organizations among which responsibilities for particular areas are divided

Organizational Politics Model • Governments are not monolithic – They are merely constellations of

Organizational Politics Model • Governments are not monolithic – They are merely constellations of loosely allied organizations on top of which the government leaders sit – The constellation acts only as component organizations perform routines • In order to coordinate the behaviors of large numbers of individuals performing these routines, SOPs are used

Organizational Politics Model • Therefore decisions within the organization are largely determined by routines

Organizational Politics Model • Therefore decisions within the organization are largely determined by routines established by SOPs before the particular instance or problem even occurs • To ensure predictable performance, the “standards” are often limited, unduly formalized, and sluggish • They may also be inappropriate

Organizational Politics Model • The inflexible and blunt nature of these routines and procedures

Organizational Politics Model • The inflexible and blunt nature of these routines and procedures reinforces the tendency to accept change only around the margins • If the problem is non-standard an existing SOP is not available, the organization is forced to undergo the painful search for a new SOP

Small Group Model • Many decisions are made by neither an individual or a

Small Group Model • Many decisions are made by neither an individual or a large organization • Advantages over the bureaucratic model might include – Fewer opinions to reconcile and therefore fewer significant conflicts – A free and open exchange because there will be no organizational interests to protect – Swift and decisive action – Possible innovation and experimentation – The possibility of maintaining secrecy

Small Group Model • Types of small groups – Informal group that meets regularly

Small Group Model • Types of small groups – Informal group that meets regularly but lacks a formal institution base – An ad hoc group created to respond to a specific problem – A permanent group with an institutional base created to perform a series of specified functions

Small Group Model • Dangers of the small group model – Groupthink: the “deterioration

Small Group Model • Dangers of the small group model – Groupthink: the “deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment” that increases the likelihood of the group’s making a potentially defective decision – Tips to avoid groupthink • Encourage impartial and wide-ranging discussions of alternatives • Establish multiple groups for the same task • Appoint a “devil’s advocate” • Schedule a “second chance” meeting to reconsider decisions one final time

Elite Model • Vitally concerned with the identities of those who make foreign policy

Elite Model • Vitally concerned with the identities of those who make foreign policy and the underlying dynamics of national power, social myth, and class interests

Elite Model • Foreign policy is made as a response to demands generated by

Elite Model • Foreign policy is made as a response to demands generated by the economic and political system – Not all demands receive equal attention and those that receive the most attention serve the interests of only a small sector of society – Special interests are transformed into national interests John Conyers and other members of the Congressional Black Caucus had a significant impact on President Clinton’s decision to intervene in Haiti

Elite Model • Those outside of the elite are relatively powerless • Public reactions

Elite Model • Those outside of the elite are relatively powerless • Public reactions are often “orchestrated” by the elite rather than being expressions of independent thinking • Stresses the ties that bind policy makers together rather than the issues that separate them

Pluralism Model • Power is fragmented and diffused • Many groups in society have

Pluralism Model • Power is fragmented and diffused • Many groups in society have power to participate in policy making • No one group is powerful enough to dictate policy • An equilibrium among groups is the natural state of affairs • Policy is the product of bargaining between groups and reflects the interest of the dominant group(s) • The government acts as an umpire, supervising the competition and sometimes compelling a settlement.

Pluralism Model • Power resources are not evenly distributed throughout society and merely possessing

Pluralism Model • Power resources are not evenly distributed throughout society and merely possessing the attributes of power does not necessarily equate to actually possessing power itself – Power resources may be substituted for one another • Numbers can offset wealth • Leadership can offset numbers • Commitment can overcome poor leadership • etc

Social Constructivism • Seeks to understand how it was possible to imagine certain courses

Social Constructivism • Seeks to understand how it was possible to imagine certain courses of action and relationships as being possible in the first place • What social practices enabled people to act, frame policies as they did, and wield power as they did How did Manuel Noriega become redefined from an anticommunist ally to a drug dealer, thus making the invasion of Panama possible?

Prospect • Individuals do not weigh all outcomes and select the strategy that will

Prospect • Individuals do not weigh all outcomes and select the strategy that will offer the highest expected utility • Instead they tend to value what they have more than what they do not have – Leads them to value the status quo and be risk adverse with respect to gains and risk accepting when it comes to losses • Take more risks to defend the state’s international position than to enhance it • After a loss, take excessive risks to recover their position

Poliheuristic • Policy makers adopt more than one decision rule in making foreign policy

Poliheuristic • Policy makers adopt more than one decision rule in making foreign policy decisions • Begin with an “avoid a major loss principle” that stresses the importance of domestic considerations in surveying initial options • Then evaluate the remaining options in terms of what offers the best net gain in terms of values they hold to be most important

Integration • As an analytical tool, models can be combined by: – Shifting from

Integration • As an analytical tool, models can be combined by: – Shifting from model to model as the focus of the analysis changes • Pluralist and bureaucratic models help explain why policy makers act as they do once they are “in place, ” but tell us little about how they got there • Elitist and rational actor would offer better insights on how the actors arrived at the values they bring to bear in addressing a problem

Integration (cont) • As an analytical tool, models can be combined by: – Recognizing

Integration (cont) • As an analytical tool, models can be combined by: – Recognizing that some models are more appropriate for analyzing some problems or issue areas than others • The more open the policy process and the longer the agenda is on the policy agenda, the more useful will be the bureaucratic and pluralistic models • The more closed the process and quicker the response, the more useful will be the rational actor, elite, and small group models

Integration (cont) • As an analytical tool, models can be combined by: – Shifting

Integration (cont) • As an analytical tool, models can be combined by: – Shifting from one model to another as the policy develops over time • Rational actor to analyze US entry into Vietnam • Bureaucratic to analyze key decisions during the course of the war • Pluralist to analyze the decision to withdraw – Picking the model based on the values that guide one’s analysis • Be careful about assumptions though

Case Study Cuban Missile Crisis

Case Study Cuban Missile Crisis

Fidel Castro • In 1959 Fidel Castro was able to mobilize the disaffected rural

Fidel Castro • In 1959 Fidel Castro was able to mobilize the disaffected rural peasants in Cuba and topple Fulgencio Batista’s USsupported anticommunist regime • Castro assumed dictatorial powers and announced his goal was to create a society based on Marxist principles A Cuban crowd listens to Castro after his takeover

Bay of Pigs • The US could not accept the presence of a revolutionary

Bay of Pigs • The US could not accept the presence of a revolutionary Marxist government so close to its borders and President Eisenhower authorized planning for a force of anti-Castro Cubans to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro • When Kennedy became president he authorized the invasion but stipulated that the US not be involved in the landing itself

Bay of Pigs • The invasion took place at the Bay of Pigs in

Bay of Pigs • The invasion took place at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and proved to be a disaster • Instead of rallying to the invaders, the local population supported the Castro government • The failure embarrassed the US and weakened President Kennedy in the eyes of the Soviet Union – However, it strengthened Kennedy’s personal resolve to act more vigorously in any future crisis Castro helping to repel the invasion

Cuban Missile Crisis • Castro feared the US would try again to overthrow him

Cuban Missile Crisis • Castro feared the US would try again to overthrow him and he called for additional support from the Soviet Union • Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev responded by sending medium-range bombers and missiles to Cuba to help defend Castro and threaten the US • In Oct 1962, US spy planes discovered missile sites under construction in Cuba Map used to brief the range of missiles and bombers being deployed to Cuba.

Kennedy’s Response • Kennedy responded decisively, demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles and

Kennedy’s Response • Kennedy responded decisively, demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles and bombers or face their destruction by air strikes or invasion • He also imposed a naval “quarantine” of Cuba

Quarantine The US destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy stops, boards, and inspects a dry-cargo ship

Quarantine The US destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy stops, boards, and inspects a dry-cargo ship of Lebanese registry under Soviet charter to Cuba on Oct 26, 1962

US Victory • On Oct 28, Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles • “Eyeball

US Victory • On Oct 28, Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles • “Eyeball to eyeball, they blinked first. ” – Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State • It was a major Cold War victory for the US and a major loss of face for the Soviet Union and Khrushchev 1962 British cartoon showing Kennedy and Khrushchev arm wrestling on top of nuclear weapons

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Rational Actor Model – Kennedy considered six

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Rational Actor Model – Kennedy considered six options • Do nothing • Diplomatic pressures • A secret approach to Castro • Invasion • Surgical air strike • Blockade

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • After considering the pros and cons of each

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • After considering the pros and cons of each action, Kennedy chose the blockade because it had the comparative advantages of: – Being a middle course between inaction and attack– aggressive enough to communicate firmness of intention, but not so precipitous as a strike – It placed the burden of choice as to the next step squarely on Khrushchev

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – No possible military confrontation could be more acceptable

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – No possible military confrontation could be more acceptable to the US than a naval confrontation in the Caribbean – By flexing its conventional muscle, the US could exploit the threat of subsequent nonnuclear steps in each of which the US would have significant superiority

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Organizational Process Model – Many describe the

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Organizational Process Model – Many describe the Soviet placement of missiles on Cuba as an “intelligence failure” for the US – The available intelligence was the product of established routines and procedures of the organizations that constitute the US intelligence community

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – On Sept 19 the US Intelligence Board (USIB)

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – On Sept 19 the US Intelligence Board (USIB) concluded that the Soviet Union would not introduce offensive missiles to Cuba – In fact, on Sept 12 a CIA agent had observed the rear profile of a strategic missile, but transmission time to Washington of such information routinely took 9 to 12 days and was not available for the USIB to consider • Decreasing the transmission time would impose severe cost in terms of danger to subagents, and communication networks

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – On Oct 4, the decision was made to

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – On Oct 4, the decision was made to conduct a special flight over west Cuba • The USAF and the CIA squabbled over who should perform the flight • The USAF argued that the increased danger of the U-2 being shot down necessitated a uniformed rather than a CIA pilot • The CIA countered that as an intelligence flight, the operation lay within its jurisdiction and its U-2 s had been modified in ways the USAF’s planes had not been in order to decrease their likelihood of being shot down

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – The State Dept joined the argument suggesting less

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – The State Dept joined the argument suggesting less risky alternatives such as drones – After 10 days it was finally decided that USAF pilots would be trained to fly the CIA planes and conduct the mission

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Organizational Process Model also impacted the discussion

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Organizational Process Model also impacted the discussion of options – The Navy saw issue as implementing the blockade without meddling and interference from political leaders – The President wanted to manage the pace of operations in order to give the Soviets time to see, think, and blink

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – Trying to slow the Navy down in response

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – Trying to slow the Navy down in response to President Kennedy’s concerns, Secretary of Defense Mc. Namara asked Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson a series of “what if? ’ questions – Anderson picked up the Manual of Navy Regulations, waved it in Mc. Namara’s face, and shouted, “It’s all in there. ” – Mc. Namara replied, “I don’t give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done; I want to know what you are going to do, now. ” – The argument concluded with Anderson saying, “Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your office the Navy will run the blockade. ”

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Elite Model – Cuba was Kennedy’s “political

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • The Elite Model – Cuba was Kennedy’s “political Achilles heel” – The Bay of Pigs had left Kennedy looking weak – Khrushchev had directly challenged Kennedy where he knew the President was most vulnerable after assuring him he wouldn’t • “He can’t do that to me!” – Republican Congressional leaders had already announced that Cuba would be “the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign” – All these factors made the “do nothing” option personally unpalatable for Kennedy

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • Small Group Model – President Kennedy convened the

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • Small Group Model – President Kennedy convened the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM) to advise him on the Cuban Missile Crisis – The EXCOMM was formally established by National Security Action Memorandum 196 on Oct 22, 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • National Security Council Members – John Kennedy President

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • National Security Council Members – John Kennedy President – Lyndon Johnson, Vice President – Dean Rusk, Secretary of State – C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury – Robert Mc. Namara, Secretary of Defense – Robert Kennedy, Attorney General – Mc. George Bundy, National Security Advisor – John Mc. Cone, Director of Central Intelligence – Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • Other members – George Ball, Under Secretary of

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making • Other members – George Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs – Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassadior to the Soviet Union – Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense – Ted Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – Robert Kennedy recalled, “The fourteen people involved were

Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making – Robert Kennedy recalled, “The fourteen people involved were very significant… If six of them had been President of the US, I think that the world might have been blown up. ”

Next • Traditional Actors and Other Actors

Next • Traditional Actors and Other Actors