Part I 15 mins Anatol Rapoport Part I

Part I: 15 mins? Anatol Rapoport!

Part I: 20 mins Anatol Rapoport!

Part 2: 10 mins Douglas Roche!

Culture of Peace Contributions of R & R

Introduction to Rapoport’s Game Theory • Game theory rationally and dispassionately examines the strategic behavior of nations • Game theoretical models illuminate the underlying structure of conflict • Game models can explain and describe situations; they can also be used to prescribe

Rapoport’s Contributions I. logic of the games of ‘Chicken’ and ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ II. proposed strategies for dealing with adversaries: • trust • verify • change the payoffs • Tit for Tat

The Attraction of Game Theory: Why is Game Theory Still So Enticing? • Racy terms • Innocuous quasimathematical language • As Rapoport taught me, the language conceals the horror of the underlying realities

Why is Game Theory Important to IR, Strategic Studies AND Peace Research? • Illuminates the logic of structural relations • Based on shared ideas and concepts which contribute to language/jargon in International Relations (IR) • Illuminates the abstractions of strategizing and underlying assumptions of Strategic Studies • Clarifies assumptions about rationality which underlie military & economic thinking • Helps generate options and alternative strategies such as “Tit for Tat” these help cooperation emerge in a world without central authority (e. g. anarchy)

Important Concepts: • matrix (1 box) • matrices (more than 2 boxes) • payoff (A or B’s payoff) • outcome (A & B’s payoffs) • row (B’s choices & payoffs) • column (A’s choices & payoffs) A’s choices (column) Choice 01 B’s choices (row) Choice 01 Choice 02 + 10 - 10 + 10 - 100

“Chicken” or Deterrence Game Ivan (column) Sam (row) Swerve (cooperate) Don’t swerve (threaten) + 10 - 10 + 10 - 100

Chicken Matrix • Sam = United States • Ivan = Russia • developed by Anatol Rapoport (and Daniel Ellsberg, RAND thinktank? ) • based on teenage game • first driver who swerves ‘loses’ • both drivers are losers if they collide!

What Should Sam and Ivan Do? • Make a decision • Consider all the worst possible consequences of each choice • Choose so as to avoid the worst conceivable outcome (this is called the ‘mini-max’ principle)

Mini-max Principle: look for the payoff where my minimal payoff is maximal (i. e. look to make the decision which makes the best of the worst behaviour of my opponent) If Sam and Ivan choose according to the mini-max principle, they will both decide to swerve so as to avoid the worst pay-off = a perfectly ‘rational’ solution

Logical Conclusion: If the United States and the Soviet Union choose according to the mini-max principle, they will both decide not to rely on a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction so as to avoid any possibility of destructive nuclear war!

Strategists’ Problem: Given that the US (and Europe) would back down because of the risks of nuclear war, a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) wasn’t credible; indeed, the Soviet Union might threaten a conventional or limited nuclear attack knowing that the US wouldn’t go to the brink for the sake of Berlin.

Game Theoreticians’ Major Preoccupation How can we credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons so as to make deterrence work? • Led to considerable game theoretical analysis • work by Anatol Rapoport, Thomas Schelling, Bernard Brodie, et al • Doomsday machine

Rank Ordering Possible Outcomes : [1] 4 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome 3 = ‘next best’; next-preferred outcome 2 = ‘next worst’ outcome 1 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome [1] I try to remember by saying, “ 4 is more”. But sometimes game theoreticians switch the rank order around so that 1 = best outcome.

NATO versus Serbia in the Chicken Game Serbia (column) Withdraw Serbian Retain Serbian claim over Kosovo control over Kosovo Blockade Serbia 3 4 Compromise (3, 3) Serbia victory NATO defeat (2, 4) NATO (row) 3 Wipe out Serbian resistance with air strikes 2 2 1 NATO victory Serbia defeat (4, 2) 4 War (1, 1) 1

George Bush versus Saddam Hussein December 1990 Hussein (column) 4 ‘best’, most-preferred outcome Withdraw from Kuwait 3 Blockade Iraq ‘next best’; next-preferred outcome 2 ‘next worst’ outcome Bush (row) 1 ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome Retain Iraqi forces in Kuwait 3 4 Compromise (3, 3) Iraq victory US defeat (2, 4) 3 Wipe out Iraqi resistance with air strikes 2 2 1 US victory Iraq defeat (4, 2) 4 War (1, 1) 1

Those in favour of unilateral first-strikes (air strikes, etc. ) tend not to appreciate the potential interplay of both players’ choices. They also tend to forget that the other ‘player’ may more highly value another outcome (e. g. Chairman Nikita Khruschev may have more highly valued keeping the missiles in Cuba than withdrawing them). Commonsense! Why not simply refrain from making threats where the probable costs of carrying out the threatened punishment could outweigh the possible benefits obtained from going to the brink?

Prisoner’s Dilemma • Illustrates how the structure of the situation can lead to insecurity on both sides/lead to both sides going to the brink • Illuminates why we continue to wonder about how we can issue credible threats • Demonstrates we are caught in a dilemma due to structural imperatives and worst-case thinking

A or Sam’s Choices (Sitting Alone in Prison!) • if I choose to be silent (-10) and Ivan chooses to be silent, we’ll both get 1 year in jail • if I’m silent and Ivan confesses, then I get 10 years and he gets 3 months • if I confess and Ivan doesn’t, then I get only 3 months and he gets 10 years • if we both confess, then we both get 5 years

The worst-case outcome is 10 years in jail. If both make the same calculations based on their desire to avoid serving 10 years (worst-case outcome), then both will tattle and both are jailed for 5 years.

Lesson of Prisoner’s Dilemma: Despite the existence of a mutually preferable outcome (CC box = 3 months), the rational calculations of both prisoners in favour of their own self-interest dictate that in avoiding the worst-case outcome (DD box = -10 years), they are both worse-off (-5 years).

Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates: • why arms spirals can develop • why sanctions may be undermined • why the arms industry thrives • why nuclear technology proliferates

Lessons for Peace Research: Prisoner’s Dilemma shows how we can become caught in dilemmas due to our desire to avoid the worst-case scenario at all costs. It is based on our unwillingness to risk the costs of cooperating if the other guy doesn’t cooperate.

In this simple Prisoner’s Dilemma model, the two players need not be the obvious ones – the United States versus Russia. The parties could be India versus Pakistan; North Korea versus South Korea; or the Serbians versus Kosovar. Albanians.

Prisoner’s Dilemma also describes many conceivable scenarios other than arms races. The choices facing Group A or Group B could be between: • Cooperating with other countries to impose sanctions against a violator country (e. g. cooperating to impose sanctions on Serbia) – or defecting from an international agreement to impose sanctions (e. g. loosening trade restrictions with Burma’s military regime). • Cooperating with other countries to limit weapons stockpiles (e. g. ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention) – or choosing to export certain weapon systems (e. g. exporting ‘dual-use’ weapons systems to Turkey)

Prisoner’s Dilemma can apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as businesses cooperating together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, governments seeking to control landmines, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for peacekeeping. The choices could be between: • cooperating with an adversary to reduce forces and military equipment (e. g. cooperating with Russia to reduce NATO’s weapons arsenal in Europe) – or reneging from serious arms limitation talks (e. g. failing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) • cooperating with the general trends of arms control agreements (e. g. the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) - or choosing to modernize weapon systems (e. g. erecting a ground- or space-based defence system).

In all these cases there are great advantages to being the only one to defect, however, if both or all parties defect, it works out to everyone’s disadvantage. Thus, Prisoner’s Dilemma starkly illustrates how spirals of insecurity can develop. It shows how parties can be trapped in security dilemmas - not because of stupid or irrational calculations - but because of thinking patterns or ‘decision rules’ where each group seeks to avoid the worst-case scenario at all costs, and where each player is unwilling to risk the costs of cooperating if the other player also does not cooperate.

Game Theory’s Contribution to Generating Solutions How can we encourage leaders/countries to promote cooperation? What strategies can contribute to cooperation?

Strategies Derived from Game Theory: Develop strategies based on ‘iterated’ Prisoner’s Dilemma • Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation • Anatol Rapoport’s “Tit for Tat” winning strategy Robert Axelrod left, Rapoport right

Anatol Rapoport’s “Tit for Tat” winning strategy 1. Be nice by starting off cooperating 2. Retaliate immediately in the case of defection by defecting once after each defection by another (reciprocate) 3. Forgive if the adversary cooperates again 4. Be clear and transparent

Questions (later in Q & A). • Iterated game (repeated interaction, typical of all nations) • ‘Shadow of the future’ (looming prospect of long-term interaction) • Cooperate but punish transgressions immediately

More Game-Theoretical Concepts? (later)

What time was it during the Cold War? ____ What time is it now? ____ http: //www. thebulletin. org/

IT IS 3 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT

Douglas Roche’s Contribution to the Culture of Peace?

Douglas Roche was elected to the Canadian Parliament four times, serving from 1972 to 1984 and specializing in the subjects of development and disarmament.

He was appointed to the Senate of Canada on September 17 1998. He told PM Chretien he wanted to be an independent Senator – he held no party affiliation.

He was Canada 's Ambassador for Disarmament from 1984 to 1989. He was elected Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Committee, the main U. N. body dealing with political and security issues, at the 43 rd General Assembly in 1988.

Senator Roche has served as President of the United Nations Association in Canada and was elected in 1985 as Honorary President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, the first Canadian to receive this honour

In 1995, Pope John Paul II presented him with the Papal Medal for his service as Special Adviser on disarmament and security matters. In 1998, the Holy See named him a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Gregory the Great.

Senator Roche is an Officer of the Order of Canada. He was the longtime Chair of Pugwash Canada. He is the founder and past Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative, a network of nine international nongovernmental organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament.

He was the founding President of Parliamentarians for Global Action, an international network of 1, 200 parliamentarians in 82 countries;

He helped start countless institutions and centres

He spearheaded hundreds of conferences, roundtables and dinners

He supported so many international diplomats, academics, writers and authors

Doug in the middle chair at Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash Nova Scotia in July 2015. The most amazing person I have ever had the privilege to meet in my entire life!

Culture of Peace Canadians working on Culture for Peace

Culture of Peace Anatol Rapoport, Murray Thomson and Ernie Regehr toiled their entire lives

Culture of Peace Women working on Culture for Peace

Culture of Peace Stalwart Men working on Culture for Peace

Culture of Peace Worldwide People in Peace Movement

Culture of Peace Worldwide Souls in Peace Movement