HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION OF QUANTUM DATA Christian Schaffner joint

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION OF QUANTUM DATA Christian Schaffner (joint work with Yfke Dulek and Florian Speelman) http: //arxiv. org/abs/1603. 09717 Colloquium Kd. VI, Uv. A, Wednesday 5 April 2017

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING Classical homomorphic encryption: Gentry [2009] CAPITOL WASHINGTON What about quantum? CAPITOL WASHINGTON

QUANTUM CLOUD COMPUTING

1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 2. PREVIOUS RESULTS: CLIFFORD SCHEME 3. NEW SCHEME

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION KEY GENERATION public key secret key evaluation key ENCRYPTION + (secure) EVALUATION DECRYPTION x ↦ x + x ↦ CAPITOL f(x) + CAPITOL f(x) Classical homomorphic encryption: Gentry [2009]

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION KEY GENERATION quantum ENCRYPTION (secure) EVALUATION DECRYPTION public key secret key evaluation key ↦ + + ↦

1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 2. PREVIOUS RESULTS: CLIFFORD SCHEME 3. NEW SCHEME

CLASSICAL ONE-TIME PAD See explanations on black board

QUANTUM BITS + basis £ basis Measurements: with prob. 1 yields 1 0/1 with prob. ½ yields 0 0/1 with prob. ½ yields 1

H Y T CNOT P CNOT X CNOT Q CIRCUITS AND PAULI GROUP

QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD

QUANTUM HOMOMORPHIC ENC compactness security Not encrypting Quantum circuits yes no Quantum OTP no yes append evaluation description Quantum circuits Complexity of Dec 
prop to (# gates) yes Clifford Scheme Clifford circuits yes computational H T CNOT Y CNOT P CNOT X CNOT Quantum one-time pad: pick a, b ∈R {0, 1} |��� ↦ Xa. Zb |��� CNOT homomorphic for

THE CLIFFORD GROUP

CLIFFORD SCHEME Ingredient 1: quantum one-time pad a, b encryption: pick a, b ∈R {0, 1} |�� ⟩ ↦ Xa. Zb |�� ⟩ = |�� ⟩ a, b decryption: Xa. Zb |�� ⟩ ↦ |�� ⟩ Ingredient 2: classical homomorphic encryption (as black box) [AMTW 00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS’ 00 [Gentry 09] C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC’ 09

CLIFFORD SCHEME a, b ( a, b H ) = HXa. Zb|�� ⟩ = = H b, a H|ψ� b, a Folklore, last formalized by [BJ 15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

CLIFFORD SCHEME Classical homomorphic encryption Quantum one-time pad a, b UPDATE FUNCTION b, a (x, y) ↦ (y, x) H b, a Folklore, last formalized by [BJ 15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

CLIFFORD SCHEME: CNOT a, b c, d 2 qubit a, b c, d CNOT UPDATE FUNCTION Folklore, last formalized by [BJ 15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE TZ=ZT TX=PXT | ψ� 1, b | ψ� 0, b a, b T T error! T|ψ� 0, b P ( |ψ� 1, b T ) how to apply correction P-1 iff a = 1?

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW homomorphic for compactness security Not encrypting Quantum circuits yes no Quantum OTP No yes inf theoretic append evaluation description Quantum circuits Complexity of Dec 
prop to (# gates) yes Clifford Scheme Clifford circuits yes computational [BJ 15]: AUX QCircuits with constant T-depth yes computational [BJ 15]: EPR Quantum circuits Comp of Dec is prop to (#T-gates)^2 computational [OTF 15] QCircuits with constant #T-gates yes inf theoretic Our result QCircuits of polynomial size (levelled FHE) yes computational (comparison based on Stacey Jeffery’s slides) [BJ 15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015 [OTF 15] Y. Ouyang, S-H. Tan, J. Fitzsimons. Quantum homomorphic encryption from quantum codes. arxiv: 1508. 00938

1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 2. PREVIOUS RESULTS: CLIFFORD SCHEME 3. NEW SCHEME

ERROR-CORRECTION ‘GADGET’ a, b c, d a a=decrypt( , ) = 1 a, b c, d GADGET

EXCURSION 1 Quantum Information Theory: Quantum Teleportation

EPR PAIRS [Einstein Podolsky Rosen 1935] prob. ½ : 0 prob. ½ : 1 EPR magic! prob. 1 : 0 n n n “spukhafte Fernwirkung” (spooky action at a distance) EPR pairs do not allow to communicate (no contradiction to relativity theory) can provide a shared random bit

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION [Bennett Brassard Crépeau Jozsa Peres Wootters 1993] ? [Bell] ? n n ? Bob’s qubit is encrypted with quantum one-time pad Bob can only recover the teleported qubit after receiving the classical information ¾

EXCURSION 2 Theoretical Computer Science: Barrington’s Theorem

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM f : {0, 1}n x {0, 1}n → {0, 1} computes some Boolean function f(x, y) list of instructions: permutations of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 0: π ∈ S 5 xi 1: σ ∈ S 5 0: π’∈ S 5 yj 1: σ’∈ S 5 … 0: π’’∈ S 5 xk 1: σ’’∈ S 5 output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° π ⇒ f(x, y) = 0 id (fixed) cycle ⇒ f(x, y) = 1 length: # of instructions

EXAMPLE PBP OR(x, y) length 4: x 0 0 1 y 0 1 0 OR(x, y) 1 1 1 0 1 1 OR(0, 0) OR(0, 1) OR(1, 0) OR(1, 1) id 0 (14235) 1 0: (12345) x 1: id 0: (12453) y 1: id 0: (54321) x 1: id 0: (15243) y 1: (14235) output:

BARRINGTON’S THEOREM (1989) Theorem (variation): if f : {0, 1}n x {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is in NC 1, then there exists a width-5 permutation branching program for f with length polynomial in n. NP P L NC 1 Classical homomorphic decryption functions happen to be in NC 1… [BV 11] [Barrington 89] Bounded-Width Polynomial-Size Branching Programs Recognize Exactly Those Languages in NC 1, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 38 (1): 150– 164, 1989 [BV 11] Z. Brakerski, V. Vaikuntanathan. Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from (standard) LWE. FOCS 2011

ERROR-CORRECTION GADGET a, b GADGET a = decrypt( , ) = 1 a c, d has a poly-size PBP c, d

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET PBP for a a=decrypt( , ) P-1 iff permutation ≠ id a, b { { { reverse PBP for GADGET a a=decrypt( , ) P-1 P-1

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET a Branching program for decrypt( , ) a j … a l 0: π’ 1: σ’ teleportation measurements 0: π’’ 1: σ’’ EPR pairs 0: π’’’ 1: σ’’’ teleportation measurements … k EPR pairs … i 0: π 1: σ

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET a, b gadget structure Update key depending on teleportation outcomes & gadget structure c, d PBP for a a=decrypt( , ) P-1 iff permutation ≠ id a, b { { { reverse PBP for GADGET a a=decrypt( , ) c, d P-1 P-1

SECURITY All quantum information: quantum one-time pad (perfectly secure if classical info is hidden) Gadget structure, each ‘connection’: Random choice out of 4 Bell states (perfectly secure if classical info is hidden) All classical information: classical homomorphic scheme Security of classical scheme is the only assumption a, b

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW KEY GENERATION classical keys gadgets ENCRYPTION apply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a, b EVALUATION CNOT H P after / / : classically update keys T after : use DECRYPTION classically decrypt pad keys remove quantum one-time pad c, d

APPLICATIONS Delegated quantum computation in two rounds No memory needed on Alice’s side ”Low-tech” generation of gadgets Gadget generation on demand Circuit privacy

FUTURE WORK non-leveled QFHE? verifiable delegated quantum computation quantum obfuscation? …

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