ECommerce Security The Security Threats Computer Crime and

  • Slides: 43
Download presentation
E-Commerce Security 范錚強

E-Commerce Security 范錚強

The Security Threats Computer Crime and Security Survey 2002 Source: Computer Security Institute (CSI)

The Security Threats Computer Crime and Security Survey 2002 Source: Computer Security Institute (CSI) 90% computers exposed to security violations 40% computers detected external intrusions 25 % in 2000 85% computers detected virus How do companies protect itselves from this hostile environment? 范錚強

Myths of Information Security Protection against hackers Protection against virus Segregation of external threats

Myths of Information Security Protection against hackers Protection against virus Segregation of external threats … 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack Story The Problem Spitfire Novelties usually generates between 5

Brute Force Credit Card Attack Story The Problem Spitfire Novelties usually generates between 5 and 30 transactions per day On September 12, 2002 in a “brute force” credit card attack, Spitfire’s credit card transaction processor processed 140, 000 fake credit card charges worth $5. 07 each (62, 000 were approved) 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) The total value of the approved charges

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) The total value of the approved charges was around $300, 000 Spitfire found out about the transactions only when they were called by one of the credit card owners who had been checking his statement online and had noticed the $5. 07 charge 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) Brute force credit card attacks require minimal

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) Brute force credit card attacks require minimal skill Hackers run thousands of small charges through merchant accounts, picking numbers at random When the perpetrator finds a valid credit card number it can then be sold on the black market Some modern-day black markets are actually member-only Web sites like carderplanet. com, shadowcrew. com, and counterfeitlibrary. com 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) Relies on a perpetrator’s ability to pose

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) Relies on a perpetrator’s ability to pose as a merchant requesting authorization for a credit card purchase requiring A merchant ID A password Both 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) Online Data’s credit card processing services, all

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) Online Data’s credit card processing services, all a perpetrator needed was a merchant’s password in order to request authorization Online Data is a reseller of Veri. Sign Inc. credit card gateway services Veri. Sign blamed Online Data for the incident Online Data blamed Spitfire for not changing their initial starter password 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack Story (cont. ) In April 2002 hackers got into

Brute Force Credit Card Attack Story (cont. ) In April 2002 hackers got into the Authorize. Net card processing system (largest gateway payment system on the Internet) Executed 13, 000 credit card transactions, of which 7, 000 succeeded Entry into the Authorize. Net system required only a log-on name, not a password 范錚強

Brute Force Solution Online Data should assign strong passwords at the start Customers should

Brute Force Solution Online Data should assign strong passwords at the start Customers should modify those passwords frequently Authorization services such as Veri. Sign and Authorize. Net should have built-in safeguards that recognize brute force attacks 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Solution (cont. ) Signals that something is amiss: A merchant

Brute Force Credit Card Solution (cont. ) Signals that something is amiss: A merchant issues an extraordinary number of requests Repeated requests for small amounts emanating from the same merchants 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) The Results Veri. Sign halted the transactions

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) The Results Veri. Sign halted the transactions before they were settled, saving Spitfire $316, 000 in charges Authorize. Net merchants were charged $0. 35 for each transaction The criminals acquired thousands of valid credit card numbers to sell on the black market 范錚強

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) What we can learn… Any type of

Brute Force Credit Card Attack (cont. ) What we can learn… Any type of EC involves a number of players who use a variety of network and application services that provide access to a variety of data sources A perpetrator needs only a single weakness in order to attack a system 范錚強

Brute Force What We Can Learn Some attacks require sophisticated techniques and technologies Most

Brute Force What We Can Learn Some attacks require sophisticated techniques and technologies Most attacks are not sophisticated; standard security risk management procedures can be used to minimize their probability and impact 范錚強

Accelerating Need for E-Commerce Security Annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute and

Accelerating Need for E-Commerce Security Annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute and the FBI Organizations continue to experience cyber attacks from inside and outside of the organization 范錚強

Accelerating Need for E-Commerce Security (cont. ) The types of cyber attacks that organizations

Accelerating Need for E-Commerce Security (cont. ) The types of cyber attacks that organizations experience were varied The financial losses from a cyber attack can be substantial It takes more than one type of technology to defend against cyber attacks 范錚強

Accelerating Need for E-Commerce Security (cont. ) According to the statistics reported to CERT/CC

Accelerating Need for E-Commerce Security (cont. ) According to the statistics reported to CERT/CC over the past year (CERT/CC 2002) The number of cyber attacks skyrocketed from approximately 22, 000 in 2000 to over 82, 000 in 2002 First quarter of 2003 the number was already over 43, 000 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT): Group of three teams at Carnegie Mellon University that monitors incidence of cyber attacks, analyze vulnerabilities, and provide guidance on protecting against attacks 范錚強

Security Is Everyone’s Business Security practices of organizations of various sizes Small organizations (10

Security Is Everyone’s Business Security practices of organizations of various sizes Small organizations (10 to 100 computers) The “haves” are centrally organized, devote a sizeable percentage of their IT budgets to security The “have-nots” are basically clueless when it comes to IT security 范錚強

Security Is Everyone’s Business (cont. ) Medium organizations (100 to 1, 000 computers) Rarely

Security Is Everyone’s Business (cont. ) Medium organizations (100 to 1, 000 computers) Rarely on managerial policies in making security decisions, and they have little managerial support for their IT policies The staff they do have is poorly educated and poorly trained—overall exposure to cyber attacks and intrusion is substantially greater than in smaller organizations 范錚強

Security Is Everyone’s Business (cont. ) Large organizations (1, 000 to 10, 000 computers)

Security Is Everyone’s Business (cont. ) Large organizations (1, 000 to 10, 000 computers) Complex infrastructures and substantial exposure on the Internet While aggregate IT security expenditures are fairly large, their security expenditures per employee are low IT security is part-time and undertrained—sizeable percentage of the large organizations suffer loss or damage due to incidents Base their security decisions on organizational policies 范錚強

Security Is Everyone’s Business (cont. ) Very large organizations (more than 10, 000 computers)

Security Is Everyone’s Business (cont. ) Very large organizations (more than 10, 000 computers) extremely complex environments that are difficult to manage even with a larger staff rely on managerial policies in making IT security decisions only a small percentage have a wellcoordinated incident response plan 范錚強

Security Issues From the user’s perspective: Is the Web server owned and operated by

Security Issues From the user’s perspective: Is the Web server owned and operated by a legitimate company? Does the Web page and form contain some malicious or dangerous code or content? Will the Web server distribute unauthorized information the user provides to some other party? 范錚強

Security Issues (cont. ) From the company’s perspective: Will the user not attempt to

Security Issues (cont. ) From the company’s perspective: Will the user not attempt to break into the Web server or alter the pages and content at the site? Will the user will try to disrupt the server so that it isn’t available to others? 范錚強

Security Issues (cont. ) From both parties’ perspectives: Is the network connection free from

Security Issues (cont. ) From both parties’ perspectives: Is the network connection free from eavesdropping by a third party “listening” on the line? Has the information sent back and forth between the server and the user’s browser been altered? 范錚強

Security Requirements Authentication The process by which one entity verifies that another entity is

Security Requirements Authentication The process by which one entity verifies that another entity is who they claim to be Authorization The process that ensures that a person has the right to access certain resources Auditing The process of collecting information about attempts to access particular resources, use particular privileges, or perform other security actions 范錚強

Security Requirements (cont. ) Confidentiality Keeping private or sensitive information from being disclosed to

Security Requirements (cont. ) Confidentiality Keeping private or sensitive information from being disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes Integrity As applied to data, the ability to protect data from being altered or destroyed in an unauthorized or accidental manner 范錚強

Security Issues (cont. ) Non-repudiation The ability to limit parties from refuting that a

Security Issues (cont. ) Non-repudiation The ability to limit parties from refuting that a legitimate transaction took place, usually by means of a signature 范錚強

Information Security Vulnerabilities Intentional Unintentional or Natural Causes Hardware exposure Thefts, vandalism, criminal acts

Information Security Vulnerabilities Intentional Unintentional or Natural Causes Hardware exposure Thefts, vandalism, criminal acts Natural disasters, fire, floods, disk crash Information exposure Alteration of data, systematic updates Incompetence of programmers, missing Disclosure of information Unauthorized copy, network interception, fraud Careless Network intrusions Theft of information, alteration of data, use of computers as a crime tool ── 范錚強

Safeguarding information Assess exposure and risk Identification and protect any possible threats and vulnerabilities

Safeguarding information Assess exposure and risk Identification and protect any possible threats and vulnerabilities Technical and procedural preventions Understanding the characteristics of security technologies SOP: Standard Operations Procedure The strength of a chain is the strength of the weakest link 范錚強

Basic Security Concepts Security is never ABSOLUTE The balance between security and ease of

Basic Security Concepts Security is never ABSOLUTE The balance between security and ease of use Security is costly What is your exposure and potential loss? How much are you willing to pay? There are technical and social dimensions in security issues All perpetrators are human beings Mostly internal employees 范錚強

Security and Ease of Use What will you end up doing, if every time…

Security and Ease of Use What will you end up doing, if every time… You have to unlock 10 locks to get home You have to lock 10 door before you leave Risk and Security measures should be balanced 范錚強

A simple case When you take a vacation, you supervisor asks you to provide

A simple case When you take a vacation, you supervisor asks you to provide your password. . Should you comply? Can you refuse? On what basis? 范錚強

The Onion of Security Insurance Business Environment International Standards Personnel Control Security Policy Input

The Onion of Security Insurance Business Environment International Standards Personnel Control Security Policy Input and output controls Comms. Control Access Control Process Program Control 硬體 資料 Audit Physical Trail Segregation Document Control Operations Control Application Recovery Plan Legal Environment 范錚強 Company User Control Security Plan

Some Basic Security Measures Virus protection Encryption PKI/CA 范錚強

Some Basic Security Measures Virus protection Encryption PKI/CA 范錚強

Virus Protection Files Virus code Programs Anti-Virus S/W Analyze Program Look for virus Fix

Virus Protection Files Virus code Programs Anti-Virus S/W Analyze Program Look for virus Fix or Segregate 范錚強 Pass

Encryption – general concept Eg. My Phone number: 0916059841 Simple multiplication Multiply by 13—

Encryption – general concept Eg. My Phone number: 0916059841 Simple multiplication Multiply by 13— 011908777933 I send it to you and you devide by 13… A simpler scheme 9807797118664201455098988941411426975 Key: we have to protect the encryption rule ──Is there any secrete? 范錚強

Symmetry Key Encryption Encrypt S Encrypted Message Decrypt Encrypted Message 范錚強 R Message

Symmetry Key Encryption Encrypt S Encrypted Message Decrypt Encrypted Message 范錚強 R Message

The concept of two keys You open a SAFE in a bank Open Account

The concept of two keys You open a SAFE in a bank Open Account Verification of Identity Get a key – Private Key Use Verification of Identity, log Bank officer take a public key, together with your private key, open the safe Are you safe? Why? 范錚強

Asymmetric Key Encryption RSA scheme Invented by three mathematicians with last names starts with

Asymmetric Key Encryption RSA scheme Invented by three mathematicians with last names starts with R/S/A. Mathematically generate a pair of “keys”, KA and KB Generated simultaneously. KA and KB are independent, one cannot be derived from another. A file encrypted by key KA can only be decrypted by KB and not A, and vice versa KA is kept private, and KB is open publicly 范錚強

Asymmetric Key Encryption for Confidentiality Encrypt with Public Key S Encrypted Message Decrypt with

Asymmetric Key Encryption for Confidentiality Encrypt with Public Key S Encrypted Message Decrypt with Private Key Encrypted Message 范錚強 R Message

Asymmetric Key Encryption for Non-repudiation R Public Encrypt S Encrypted Message S Private Encrypt

Asymmetric Key Encryption for Non-repudiation R Public Encrypt S Encrypted Message S Private Encrypt R Public Decrypt Encrypted Message R Message S Private Decrypt 范錚強

PKI/CA PKI – Public Key Infrastructure Encryption scheme based on RSA encryption An infrastructure

PKI/CA PKI – Public Key Infrastructure Encryption scheme based on RSA encryption An infrastructure for effective operations CA – Certificate Authority Issuance of Keys Trusted third party Hierarchical structure of reference 范錚強

Issuance of Certificate by CA CA Certificate Elec. Document XXXX Contract Digital Signature Issuer

Issuance of Certificate by CA CA Certificate Elec. Document XXXX Contract Digital Signature Issuer Issue Date Holder Public Keu Issuance of Certificate by CA X 509 110111001 John Open for Public Identification Private Key 范錚強 Public Key 43