Regulatory oversight of HOF at Hungarian Nuclear Facilities

Regulatory oversight of HOF at Hungarian Nuclear Facilities Dr. Eszter Rétfalvi Nuclear Safety Inspector Hungarian Atomic Energy Authotity 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 1

• • • Nuclear facilities Legal system and Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority Inspection Assessment HOF events 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 2

Nuclear facilities in Hungary

Paks Nuclear Power Plant 4 x WWER – 440 / 213 Electrical power: 4 x 500 MW; enrichment of the fuel: 4. 2%; coolant and moderator: light water; twin-unit with 2 cooling circuit in common building; • primary circuit: 6 cooling loops. • •

Training Reactor of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics Main technical data of the reactor: • From 1971 • pool-type reactor; • coolant and moderator: light water; • fuel: 24 EK-10 assemblies, 10% enrichment; • first criticality 1971 (10 k. W) • upgrading 1980 (100 k. W)

Budapest Research Reactor Main technical data of the reactor: • From 1959 • tank-type reactor; • coolant and moderator: light water; • fuel: VVR-SM and VVR-M 2, 36% enrichment is being changed for 20%; • nominal thermal power: 2 MW (1959), 5 MW (1967), 10 MW (1993 after reconstruction).

Interim Spent Fuel Store Properties: • modular vault dry storage; • for a fifty-year period; • capable of storing 450 fuel assemblies in one vault; • 33 vaults are to be constructed (to date 20 vaults were built). Stored SF assemblies: • 6067 by 2009; • 6547 by 2010; • 7027 by 2011 (288 of 450 in vault 16); • (Acceptance is limited to 500/year).

Paks II Nuclear Power Plant 2 x WWER – 1200 / AES-2006 V 49 III+ generation • • 2020. 09. 25. Electrical power: 2 x 1200 MW; enrichment of the fuel: 4. 2%; coolant and moderator: light water; primary circuit: 4 cooling loops. HAEA – Presentation 8

Radiactive waste storage facilities in Hungary

The Hungarian Regulatory body Parliament Government Ministry of National Development Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority -Nuclear activity and Radioactive waste disposal - Ministry of Human Resources National Public Health and Medical Officer Service Office of the Chief Medical Officer National Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene - Radiation dangerous - Ministry of Public Administration and Justice County/capital Government Offices Public Administration Bodies Responsible for Health Radiation Health Centres

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 11

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) According to the Act on Atomic Energy • the relevant authority regarding nuclear facilities (safety and security) • HAEA is authorized to determine as a nuclear safety authority in a resolution made for nuclear safety of a nuclear facility • • the relevant authority regarding radioactive waste disposal from 1 st of July 2014 Radiation protection 1. January 2016 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 12

Regulatory independence, financing, staffing • HAEA is indpendent, task, budget • New tasks, (new NPP, rad. prot, waste disposal) • Staffing of HAEA – Project law (2015 january): – Solve the problem of competitiveness (bound to public administration rules) – New staff member (80) – Problem of availability (only young engineers) – The research reactors specialized employees are not separated in a single organizational unit. The further training system of the HAEA includes several modules for increasing the knowledge regarding research reactors. 13

IAEA rewiew • 2013. IPPAS Mission for security • 2015. May IRRS Mission March 24, 2014 Presentation of Hungary at the 6 th Review Meeting of the CNS 14

IAEA rewiew • 2015. May IRRS Mission ‒ GP: safety indicator system for RR ‒ R: inspection planning process ‒ S: inspection with coauthorities ‒ S: safety analysis requirements for small facilities (grading approach) 15

Hierarchy of Hungarian Regulations and Guidance of Nuclear Safety "In the use of nuclear energy, safety has priority over all other aspects". „prime responsibility for safety shall entirely rest with that person or organization, who or which is the licensee of the facility „ „taking into account operating experience and new knowledge of safety-related - duty continuous activities to improve safety. ” 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 16

HOF in legal Atomic Act 4§ (5) „For safety, human performance capabilities and limitations must be considered over the lifetime of nuclear installations. ” 10§ scope of licensee: taking into account operating experience and new knowledge of safety-related - duty continuous activities to improve safety. ” 17§ (6. ) scope of authority : „licensing and inspection of nuclear facilities and radioactive waste storage systems, system components, the licensee's organizational structure, management system, converting regulatory documents”; 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 17

Nuclear Safety Code 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 18

Safety Guidelines for HOF Effective 1. 1. Site licensing of nuclear facilities 1. 11. Licensing documentation of building (demolition) of nuclear facilities 1. 24. Regular reports of research reactors, 1. 25 Event reports of research reactors 1. 49 Regular reports of research reactors, 1. 50 Event reports of research reactors 1. 43. Authority inspection of nuclear facilities 1. 71 The modification of the organization and the management system in nuclear power plant 2. Safety culture inspection and developing at nuclear facilities 4. 21. Nuclear power plant maintenance, inspection and surveillance program 9. 2. New design of the nuclear power plant's quality management system 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 19

Inspection NBI -- ME-3 -1 -6 Inspection of nuclear power plant NBI -- ME-3 -0 -12 Comprehensive inspections NBI—ME-3 -24 Inspection of official licensing exams NBI -- ME-3 -0 -25 Inspection of contractors of nuclear power plant • NBI -- ME-3 -2 -7 Inspection of training reactor • NBI -- ME-3 -2 -8 Inspection of research reactor • NBI -- ME-3 -0 -26 Planning the inspection plan • • 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 20

Inspection 1. One form from the annual planning to assessment 2. Approval chain (in all stage) 3. Systematic planning view points : facilities, system, priority, area 4. IT database (question list, focus points) 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 21

HOF • HOF 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 22

• announced and unannounced inspections • Ad-hoc • Indicator program for effectivness 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 23

Comprehensive inspection • The results of the comprehensive safety inspections rear of the NBI perspective appreciates the leadership of the nuclear facility (Level A), operating folyamatok- (level B), and various functional units and proper functioning of disciplines. • • • A 1 Security Management A 11 organizational and administrative factors A 12 Procedures A 2 Qualityof regulation A 22 Documentation Management 2020. 09. 25. B 1 technical condition of the facility B 11 Rating B 12 Aging B 13 Maintenance B 2 Operation B 21 features for safe operation and utilization of their operating experience • B 22 Human Factors • B 23 Fire protection • B 24 Radiation protection • B 25 Managing Radioactive Waste • Treatment of B 26 nuclear emergency • Utilization of operating experience and R & D results from other establishments B 27 • B 3 Safety analyzes HAEA – Presentation 24 • • •

Comprehensive inspection of onsite supervision of suppliers • • The licensee can contract suppliers in activities related nuclear safety in accordance with Govt. Decree 118/2011 (VII. 11. ) and its Annexes 2 -9. Even in this case, the licensee is responsible for nuclear safety. Within the scope of a regulatory inspection, the HAEA examined how the supervision of suppliers involved in activities related to nuclear safety takes place and how the licensee’s responsibility occurs in that processes. The HAEA stated the Paks NPP implemented the most important elements for supervision of suppliers’ activity and they are in use. The tasks and responsibilities are mostly defined, but there are many fields to improve. Significant problems: ‒ priority of safety ‒ the oversight activity of Paks NPP does not cover the inspection of subcontractors of contractors ‒ and there are deficiencies in assurance of working abilities (competence/qualification) of suppliers’ employees. 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 25

Comprehensive inspection of management • • • Within the main process branch of safety management, the management of nuclear facility is one of the most important elements from point of view of nuclear safety. overview the management of deficiencies discovered during previous inspections, the self-assessment and management review processes, improvement of management culture and quality assurance. As a special viewpoint the HAEA took into consideration during the inspection the past management of changes, modifications of the controlling agreement, management of service life extension of the units, impact of new unit construction in the neighbouring site and degradation of some safety performance indicators affecting management processes. 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 26

Internal regulation of HAEA for inspection 7. 3. 3 walks During the visits to the repairs must be kept in the organization of maintenance, compliance with nuclear safety standards and to monitor the overall level of safety culture without prior consultation with the licensee. During such visits should be the focus of the following areas: • Provision of housekeeping, cleanliness, foreign body exemption criteria focus on the main open -water circuit installations, • Check insulation and coating condition after shutdown and start pre-condition to thermal bridges, hot spots, high temperature coatings fixing the damage, • floors, pipes, slabs control after a stop dripping and leaking water, separate boric acid solutions including exploration, • actuators, rotary machines, electric motors control leakage of lubricating and cooling detect, • verify the properation and maintenance of installation systems (ventilation, lighting, etc) • current maintenance requirements (technologies, maintenance instructions, etc) checking the existence and awareness, • Monitoring of striking faults and deterioration (corrosion, damage, rupture of small diameter trampling, etc) • The MUT-cause marketing and management control -subcontracting activities too. " 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 27

2015: HOF specific inspections • • Managerial briefing before work Near Miss and low importance event investigation Measures to increase the safety culture Organizational structure transformation in the IT security field 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 28

Review and assessment Cooperation: Developing a NEW Safety and Security Performance indicator System (Deadline: December 2016) Existing Safety Indicator System • HAEA has established a set of performance indicators to aid in the performance assessment of research reactors . The indicators are used to initiate regulatory actions when action thresholds are exceeded. (2005) • The indicators track a wide variety of inputs important to safe facility operation. • The performance indicators are independent of the indicators in use by licensees. • Expert judgement from a review of past performance was used to initially establish performance thresholds. The thresholds are periodically assessed to ensure regulatory actions can be implemented before performance concerns become significant. • Three levels of performance are determined: acceptable (Green), warning (Yellow), and regulatory action required (Red) 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 29

Review and assessment Cooperation: Developing a NEW Safety and Security Performance indicator System (Deadline: December 2015) Existing Safety Indicator System • HAEA has established a set of performance indicators to aid in the performance assessment of research reactors . The indicators are used to initiate regulatory actions when action thresholds are exceeded. (2005) • The indicators track a wide variety of inputs important to safe facility operation. • The performance indicators are independent of the indicators in use by licensees. • Expert judgement from a review of past performance was used to initially establish performance thresholds. The thresholds are periodically assessed to ensure regulatory actions can be implemented before performance concerns become significant. • Three levels of performance are determined: acceptable (Green), warning (Yellow), and regulatory action required (Red) 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 30

BME NTI OR • egyenletes üzemvitel, • kis kockázat melletti üzemelés, biztonságtudatos üzemeltetés 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 31

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The concept of new system: User level : first for the authority and licensees second for public (limited set) Performance level: ”red” enforcement required, out from authority limits „orange” preventing action required „yelow” warning „green” acceptable, good „white” no data Different philosophy: based on the defense in depth and engineering barriers (restructuring of indicators, new indicators), involving security 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 33

Event assesment 2014 • The HAEA implemented an auxiliary method for the safety assessment of events: The assessment method categorizes the events on base of their safety effect in a way, when the numeric values are given to each deficiency according to its safety significance. • The assessment system gives special attention to the events showing different variants of human failure. In 2014 there were 18 reportable events according to Regulatory Guide 1. 25. Only one event was among these immediately reportable according to Nuclear Safety Code. The number of both event types decreased in comparison with the last year value. Among the events, the violation of Technical Specifications (Tech. Spec) occurred once. There was no reactor trip. Human failures were identified by investigation in 14 events, which can refer to problems in written procedures or in safety culture. Having been increasing for years, the regulation violations show that the safety culture improvement measures were not effective enough. The regulatory oversight focuses on the degrading or unacceptable fields. • • • 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 34

1791 • Falure of reactor hall bridge crane passenger basket • The three workers own efforts could not climb to the relaxing pool level • the NPP-help fire departments get asked. for the rescue rubber boots aluminum ladder. Enviromental factor, skills, working conditiona planning, procedure, 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 35

1810. • • PVC test the safety and relief valves based on the testing manual. During the trial the administration of YP 21 signal due to the lack of a baseline statement of the ECCS system Safety signal has occurred. Due to the signal TLIP started, consumers worked fine. pump fed into the reactor. • The baseline assertion failure was caused by a test driver on duty was not adequately block out the basic instructions for the test signal and failed to produce the required parameter control. The test program conducted under the leadership of educational activities, which have impeded that the focus needed attention to the implementation of the program. The event is the development of testing also contributed to the current design. Requirements for parameter settings are not drafted in the form of instructions or commands to run test cases and test parameter settings for implementing it are made in a separate step, which enabled the development of the event. • • • Communication Problems: Fault prevention tools not use Procedure not detailed enough Confusion with namea distraction: Ergonomics is not fault-tolerant system 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 36

1839 1. Confusion Details ignore. 2. The classification differences. - Ergonomics 3. Documentation problem 4. Not apply error preventive techniques. 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation The worker did not pay enough attention to the work area during the approach to the selection of cabinets, have not exercised self-monitoring technique, the other member of the pair - who had not been included in completely entrusted correctness of routine activities carried out in the manner of his colleagues. In addition to the working of an event not to attend properly to the sections is not sufficient coherence between the marking system and the documentation led. 37

Overexposure of two workers (9, 3 m. Sv, 1. 5 m. Sv) Ir-192 radiographic. They are trying to control the radiation source from the holder to carry out the new tests, which failed. It concluded that the radiation source during the film exchange process has been outside the penalty box holder. The problem is, in order to identify the one employee corrugated pipe connected to the holder and he has raised manually so that the source slipped to the shielding. 1. Wrong maintenance 2. Failure the procedure following 3. Lack of oversight 2020. 09. 25. Switch off! HAEA – Presentation 38

Thank you for your attention! 2020. 09. 25. HAEA – Presentation 39