Key terms recap Cognitivism Ethical statements are meaningful

Key terms recap • Cognitivism Ethical statements are meaningful– either true or false – and can be known. Ethical statements are FACTS There are two kinds of moral cognitivism: • Naturalism: ‘moral goodness’ is a natural property that can be discovered through experience. • Non-naturalism: ‘moral goodness’ is not a natural property. • Non-cognitivism Ethical sentences are not truth-apt, and are instead meaningless when taken as assertions of fact. So ethical sentences express something other than facts: • Emotion (Ayer’s Emotivism). • Prescriptions (Hare’s Prescriptivism).

1 B. Meta-ethical approaches: Intuitionism Candidates should be able to explain with clarity what Intuitionism is (see Moral Philosophy: A Guide to Ethical Theory by G. , Hayward, J. and Cardinal, D. (Hodder Murray)); they must have a good understanding of Pritchard’s view on Intuitionism. Candidates need to study the listed criticisms of Intuitionism and have a clear knowledge of each criticism and why it is specifically damaging to the meta-ethical theory of Naturalism. All of the criticisms should be exemplified, in order to demonstrate understanding.

Ethical Thought 1 e Intuitionism Meta-ethical approaches - Intuitionism: • Objective moral laws exist independently of human beings; • moral truths can be discovered by using our minds in an intuitive way; • intuitive ability is innate and the same for all moral agents; • intuition needs a mature mind so not infallible; • allows for objective moral values. • H. A. Prichard, ‘ought to do’ has no definition; • recognise what we ‘ought to do’ by intuition; • two ways of thinking (general and moral). Challenges: no proof of moral intuition exists; intuitive ‘truths’ can differ widely; no obvious way to resolve conflicting intuitions.

What is an intuition? An intuition is a form of perception in reaction to an a posteriori observation, something I either know innately or because of moral training about the things that I observe – that some of those things are ‘good’ and some ‘bad’. Moral properties are, as Descartes observed, ‘clearly and distinctly true’. To know what is right/wrong humans need either: • Innate moral feelings or • A type of perception of events that can pick out exactly what properties make them wrong

According to an Intuitionalist, what do I mean by. . . ‘Stealing is wrong’ ‘Lying is wrong I have moral intuition that stealing is wrong I have a. .

Introduction to intuitionism In 1903, G. E. Moore (1873 -1958) published Principia Ethica. Moore believed that moral judgements could never be proved empirically, as opposed to Ethical Naturalism For Moore, philosophers who attempt to define intrinsic “goodness” commit the naturalistic fallacy, the fallacy of defining the term "goodness" in terms of some natural property, such as pleasure. You cannot get an “ought” from an “is”. The naturalistic fallacy is to define an ethical judgement as factual. 1. What did G. E. Moore believe about moral judgements ? 2. Moore believed that those who attempt to define terms like “goodness” commit the naturalistic fallacy. What did he mean by this ?

G. E. Moore – a non-naturalist – we can’t establish what is good by observation of facts He argued that goodness could not be defined, because it was unlike any other quality. In other words, if you try to say `Something is good if. . . ' you will never find a definition that does not reduce and limit the idea of goodness, and thus make it inapplicable to other things. In his book, Moore argued that the things that are intrinsically good can't be defined or analysed: "If I am asked "What is good? " my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked "How is good to be defined? " my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. " GE Moore, Principia Ethica)

What is ‘Yellow’?

Yellow Moore argues that "goodness" is a foundational and unanalyzable property, similar to the foundational notion of "yellowness, “and is not capable of being explained in terms of anything more basic. You cannot define a colour or simply point to it and say `That is what I mean by yellow. ' Try defining yellow for the benefit of someone who has never seen that colour - it cannot be done! We intuitively recognize goodness when we see it, as we similarly recognize yellowness when we see it. But the notion of "goodness" itself cannot be defined. 3. Why did Moore believe “goodness” was undefinable ? 4. What other example did he give of an undefinable term?

We know that something is ‘good’ by intuition - it is self-evident. We can define an action as being ‘right’ if it leads to a ‘good’ result. We can argue rationally about many moral problems deciding which of various options will lead to the ‘good’ - but we cannot define that basic idea in itself. We recognise good things intuitively when we see them, and in this sense Moore is an intuitionist - but not an ordinary intuitionist. In fact he says in “Principia Ethica” “I am not an “intuitionist” in the ordinary sense of the term”. He believed that moral judgments were incapable of being proved, not that the origin of moral judgments lay in moral intuitions. 5. Moore can be regarded as a teleological intuitionist. Why ?

Moore defends his contention with what has been called the open question argument. For any property we attempt to identify with "goodness, " we can ask, "Is that property itself good? " For example, if I claim that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good, the question can be asked, "But, is pleasure itself good? " The fact that this question makes sense shows that "pleasure" and "goodness" are not identical. Moore believes that no proposed natural property can pass the test of the open question argument. This implies that all moral theories fail that are based on anything other than immediate moral intuition. It is only of secondary importance whether an action produces pleasure, is in accord with the will of God, or is conducive to reason. What truly matters is whether we can simply recognize the goodness of a particular action based upon the consequences it produces. For example we say that “Mother Teresa was good“, this statement is not verifiable by observation and experience, but we say the statement is true and correctly say it is true. We can immediately see that a property of moral goodness does belong to this woman. 5. He used the “open question” argument to defend his views. Explain this with an example of your own.

Intuitionism: G. E. Moore ‘Principia Ethica’ A summary. . . Ethics come from intuition. • “We know what good is, but we cannot actually define it. ” • Goodness is indefinable Like yellow. We know what is yellow and can recognise it but we cannot actually define it or describe particular qualities of it. • Did not believe human intuition was infallible (perfect). • Statements can be true/false (cognitive) • Cannot use senses to tell whether something is good but moral intuition.

H. A. Prichard (1871 -1947): built on Moore’s work

Pritchard argued that to justify moral obligation by reducing it to an interest or something else was a mistake. Moral obligation is known to our intuition ‘this apprehension is immediate, in precisely the same sense in which mathematical apprehension is immediate…’

Prichard thought there were two types of thinking: a. General - Reason – looks at the facts of a situation b. Moral - Intuition – decides what to do. In any situation, intuition shows what particular action is right and what our moral obligations are. For example Abortion – in deciding whether to have an abortion, reason collects all the data on the nature of abortion – and then intuition determines what we should do. We would need to weigh up the obligation to the unborn human with that owed to the mother – Pritchard claimed intuition would tell us which obligation is greater

Euthanasia example: Work it out yourself. . . In deciding whether or not to carry out euthanasia: a. reason collects all the data on the nature of euthanasia – the people concerned, and the various possible outcomes, and then b. intuition determines what we should do. Ethical dilemmas are about making a choice between different actions where there are conflicting moral obligations.

• Prichard recognised the problem that people’s morals are different. • This is because some people’s moral thinking has developed further than others. • He does not explain why this is, nor does he list any fundamental obligations or moral virtues.

• What happens if there is a conflict in obligations? • Prichard just says that we must look at the situation and decide which obligation is greater. • But if your moral thinking is not developed, how can you do this?

Summary. . . Intuitionism teaches three main things: • There are real objective moral truths that are independent of human beings. • These are fundamental truths that can't be broken down into parts or defined by reference to anything except other moral truths. • Human beings can discover these truths by using their minds in a particular, intuitive way.

Re-Cap – including key terms 1. 2. 3. What is meta-ethics What does cognitive mean? What does objective mean? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Which scholar is associated with ethical naturalism? What did Hume say about the ‘is-ought’ gap? Explain the naturalistic fallacy in a couple of sentences Why did Moore believe that good can’t be defined? What else did Moore claim couldn’t be defined? What two types of thinking does Pritchard identify? How does Pritchard explain people having different morals?

Can you think of any challenges to Intuitionalism? http: //www. newworldencyclopedia. org/entry/Ethical_intuitionism Moore does not explain nor prove how we know good through intuition alone and not through senses. How can we be sure our intuitions are correct? Since we cannot use sense experience how do we decide between intuitions? What happens if these intuitions conflict? Moral intuitions seem to come from social conditioning and differ between cultures – hard to see how these can be a reliable guide to objective ethical truths. J. L Mackie - He argues that morality is not just about what a person believes is intuitively right, but it is about doing something about it.

Challenge 1 There is no proof that moral intuition exists From BBC ethics • The idea that human beings have something called moral intuition is superficially attractive, but doesn't easily stand up to inspection. • Is it another sense like sight or hearing? Probably not, since the moral truths that moral intuition should detect don't seem to be out in the physical world. • Nor is it a process of reasoning, because intuitionists usually rule that out, too. • Perhaps it shows itself in moral emotions, like feelings of guilt? But although human beings certainly have such feelings, the feelings could be the result of breaking internal mental rules of conduct or breaching cultural rules, rather than of breaking objective moral rules.

Challenge 2 Intuitive ‘truths’ can differ widely From BBC ethics Moore was a university professor, and his idea of what things were good, such as friendship and the appreciation of beauty, was limited by his quiet and academic life. His writings didn't demonstrate that his theory was likely to help deal with serious ethical dilemmas. From Jeff Mc. Mahon The vast majority of whites in the antebellum South thought it obvious that the enslavement of blacks was morally justified. They reinforced their intuitive idea by participating in the practice of slavery and raising their children to accept it as a natural part of their lives. Many others saw slavery as inherently wrong – based on the intuitive ideas about equality and the rights of freedom.

Challenge 3 No obvious way to resolve conflicting intuitions From BBC ethics • If there are real objective moral truths, then they are presumably the same for everyone. Yet different people come to different conclusions faced with the same ethical problems – they have conflicting intuition • Some people say that these moral truths are 'self-evident', but this just leaves the problem of different things being self-evident to different selves!

Strengths of Intuitionism • Intuitionism allows for objective moral values to be identified and therefore proposes a form of moral realism. • Intuitionism does not propose a subjective or emotive approach to ethics but it does avoid the problems of identifying ethics with a natural property. • Whilst we may recognise the wrongness of some actions, it is difficult to specify exactly why they are wrong. Rather we interpret it through a moral sense, not a list of moral definitions or rules • We can identify a moral sense in the same way as we might identify an aesthetic sense in art or literature. • Intuitionism allows for moral duties and obligations, and so satisfies a moral absolutist. • The intuitionist points to the existence of a considerable common consensus/ agreement on moral issues, such as the value of human life, as evidence of a common intuition of morality. • Intuition may be associated with the idea of conscience as a moral guide – so could be compatible with some Christian ideas

Issue 1: Whether moral terms are intuitive AO 2 Lines of argument Many people would say that they experience things as intuitively ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ – in other words as ‘objective features of the world’ or ‘facts’. Intuitionism supports this common experience of morality – even for those who do not believe in God. • Many religions and philosophers and societies support the idea that the world is an ‘ordered’ place. This order is shown in the laws of nature, the laws of mathematics, the laws of ethics and the fact that there is a common sense of morality in many cultures. Intuitionism supports this view of the world by presenting moral terms as intuitive (underived and true apart from analysis). • Approaching moral terms as intuitive avoids the naturalistic fallacy – definitions reduce or limit the ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (reference Moore here). • If moral terms were intuitive, then we would expect morality to be uniform the world over – at least we would expect there to uniformity (a common intuition) between those who consider and reflect seriously on morality. Anthropology can give examples where this is not the case! Psychologists and sociologists can demonstrate that what appears to be intuitive approaches to morality are really the result of conditioning from family, tribe and/or culture. • Within just our own culture there are widely different views on specific ethical issues amongst those who have reflected deeply – are we to consider that these people are not listening to their intuition? • There is no way to verify Intuitionism! There is no empirical evidence for it and there is no agreement on the origin of Intuitionism (God? Gut feelings? Genetics? ). Even the Intuitionists disagree amongst themselves on what morality consists of!

Key questions that may arise could be: 1. Is our intuition really a trustworthy guide to ultimate truth? What about my intuition that there is a ghost in my closet? 2. Is there really one true order to the universe, or is that viewpoint merely an interpretation of reality? 3. Is there really no uniformity amongst the various moralities the world over? 4. Do people in our own culture really disagree on the most important aspects of morality? 5. Do you need to have empirical evidence to know if an action should be judged as moral or immoral? Possible conclusions to some arguments put forward could be: 1. Moral terms are intuitive. 2. Moral terms come from testing our views over and over again in different situations. 3. Moral terms are both given by our intuition and develop in response to real life situations.

AO 2‘Moral terms are intuitive’ Evaluate this view Yes, they are intuitive Ethical statements are intuitive – there is considerable agreement on moral issues e. g. value of human life We can discover objective moral laws using our minds in an intuitive way – not through reason or the senses Intuitive ability is universal and innate – so must mean that moral terms are intuitive Moore – moral judgements are based on intuitive knowledge of good things – not on duty, pleasure etc. Moral terms such as good can’t be defined as that would reduce or limit them – so is intuitive – simple like yellow not horse Pritchard – we know moral obligation through our intuition Whilst we may recognise the wrongness of some actions, it is difficult to specify exactly why they are wrong. Rather we interpret it through a moral sense, not a list of moral definitions – so moral terms are known through our intuition No, they are not intuitive – challenges • Moore did not prove his own case – can’t test for intuition, there is no proof moral intuition exists, not like sight • Moral terms are not intuitive they can be defined naturally e. g. Ethical Naturalism – goodness can be expressed in terms of pleasure or duty or God’s commands • Bradley – moral terms are not intuitive – they are the same as scientific and mathematical statements cognitive, objective and remain the same, intuition can change from person to person • Ethical statements are not intuitive they are emotive – moral terms express personal emotional attitudes and not propositions that can be verified or falsified – what we think is intuition is guilt