Ethical naturalism Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co uk Cognitivism

Ethical naturalism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk

Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism • What are we doing when we make moral judgments? • Cognitivism: moral judgments, e. g. ‘Murder is wrong’ – Aim to describe how the world is – Can be true or false – Express beliefs that the claim is true • Non-cognitivism: moral judgments – Do not aim to describe the world – Cannot be true or false – Express attitudes towards the world

Three quick arguments • If there were no facts about moral right and wrong, it wouldn’t be possible to make mistakes. • Morality feels like a demand from ‘outside’ us, independent of what we want or feel. • How is moral progress possible, unless some views about morality are better than others?

Types of realism • Moral realism: good and bad are properties of situations and people, right and wrong are properties of actions • Moral judgements are true or false depending on whether they ascribe the moral properties something actually has • What is the nature of these properties?

Ethical naturalism • Naturalism: moral properties are actually natural (psychological) properties – Reductionism: things in one domain are identical with things in another • Utilitarianism as naturalism – Goodness is happiness – Rightness is maximizing happiness – Cf. non-reductive reading: maximizing happiness and rightness are correlated

Objection • How can we prove the identity claim? – Which natural property, if any, is identical with goodness isn’t obvious • We can’t use empirical reasoning – Science can show whether, e. g. someone is happy, but can’t show whether this is good • We can’t deduce it: conceptual analysis of ‘happiness’ doesn’t establish that it is good • Philosophical argument will be necessary

Was Mill a naturalist? • Moore argues that Mill defines good as ‘desired’ – Mill argues that happiness is desired, and then infers that happiness is good – But this only works if what is desired is good – Likewise, Mill says that to think of something as desirable (good) and as pleasant is the same thing – so pleasant, desired, good are all the same

Was Mill a naturalist? • But Mill could be taking what is desired as evidence as what is good – Not the same property, but evidence that a different property is possessed

Was Aristotle a naturalist? • Aristotle argues that eudaimonia – the good for people – what we achieve if we perform our ‘function’ well – There are psychological facts about what traits enable us to do this • Reply: but what eudaimonia is can’t be identified with any set of natural facts – The person with practical wisdom understands the reasons for feeling and acting a certain way – Whether something is a reason isn’t a natural fact