Anonymity in MANETs Threats and Mitigations Roy Friedman

Anonymity in MANETs Threats and Mitigations Roy Friedman, Neer Roggel Technion, Israel Institute of Technology Computer Science Department {roy, nroggel}@cs. technion. ac. il 1

Outline • • • What are MANETs? Anonymity scenarios Attackers and threats Our approach: IP hopping Limitations and future work Open discussion 2

What is a MANET? 3

4

5

What are MANETs? 6

What are MANETs? 7

Anonymity Scenarios • Battlefield – Units in motion – Sensor network • Content sharing – Oppressive regime – Rights protected content 8

Attacker Capabilities • • Eavesdropping Geolocating a node Device fingerprinting Generating traffic Man in the middle Node compromise Worm holes 9

Threats to Anonymity • • • Irrefutably implicating a node Distorting route construction “Chattering laptops” Attacks on timing Traffic analysis 10

Traffic Analysis 11

Traffic Analysis Example K IP 8 P A IP 1 B IP 2 L IP 7 O A B M D E IP 6 L O IP 3 D E IP 4 IP 5 K P 12

Our Approach 13

Simple Example IP 8 A L M B P O IP 1 IP 2 K IP 7 IP 3 D E IP 6 IP 4 IP 5 14

IP Hopping • Step 1: agree on shared information A B M D E E D M B A 15

IP Hopping • Step 2: derive temporary addresses 16

IP Hopping • Step 3: use temporary addresses [Ai, B, M, D, Ei] A [Ai, B, M, D, Ei] B [Ai, B, M, D, Ei] M D E 17

Traffic Analysis Revisited K IP 8 IP 1 IP 2 L IP 7 A B M D E IP 6 O IP 3 IP 4 IP 5 P 18

Limitations • Routing efficiency – Discovery, maintenance • In-band agreement • Network services – Authentication, service discovery, address binding, address assignment 19

Future Research Directions • More IP information leaks • Better routing mechanisms • TCP stream information leaks 20

Discussion • How can we tell the network to help us find someone we are looking for without telling the network who it is we are looking for? • Once the route is known, how do we ensure that all nodes along the way are capable of receiving the packet and forwarding it? 21