Moscow State Institute of International Relations MGIMOUniversity School

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) School of Government and International Affairs & Alexander Shishkin Department of Philosophy The Basics of Philosophy Part V Epistemocentric Philosophy Lecture 12 René Descartes and Benedict Spinoza Substantiation of Rationalism

René Descartes Dualistic Rationalism q Descartes’ Epistemology • • • Methodic Doubt “I Think, Therefore I Am” (“Cogito Ergo Sum”) The Idea of God The Natural Light of Reason Rules for the Direction of the Mind q Descartes’ Ontology • The Mind-Matter Dualism § Substances and Their Attributes § Empty Space and Animal Mind • The Problem of Substances’ Interaction § The Natural Light of Reason (“Innate Knowledge”) § “The Pineal Gland” § Cartesian Occasionalism

René Descartes (1596 – 1650) • • • Born on March 31, 1596 in La Haye (now Descartes) Student at the Jesuit college at La Flèche (1606 – 1615) Years of travels (1618 – 1625) § The so called “Ulm Revelation” (November 10, 1619) • • Life in Paris (1625 – 1628) Life in the Netherlands (1628 – 1649) § Trips to Paris (1644, 1647, 1648) • • Trip to Sweden (1649) Died on February 11, 1650 in Stockholm Leiden Paris La Flèche La Haye Neuburg

René Descartes (1596 – 1650) Principal Writings • The World, or Treatise on the Light (1633) • Discourse on the Method (1637) • Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) • Principles of Philosophy (1644) René Descartes (a copy of the lost portrait by Frans Hals)

Descartes’ Epistemology Methodic Doubt Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed, and by how doubtful was the structure of beliefs that I had based on them. I realized that if I wanted to establish anything in the sciences that was stable and likely to last, I needed to demolish everything completely. I will suppose, then, that everything I see is fictitious. I will believe that my memory tells me nothing but lies. I have no senses. I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world. Don’t I exist either? No, for if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. 1 After thoroughly thinking the matter through I conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it.

Descartes’ Epistemology “I Think, Therefore I Am” I can doubt anything, except the fact that I doubt, for by doubting it I but confirm it. Doubt is a form of thought. I doubt, therefore I think. Descartes doubts everything not to demonstrate that certain and reliable knowledge cannot be obtained, but to identify truths capable of standing the harshest test of doubt, in order to build science on this firm foundation. But I cannot think, unless I exist. I think, therefore I am. My own existence is a truth beyond doubt. Therefore, truths beyond doubt exist and are attainable. 2 Cogito ergo sum Since my knowledge of my own existence is based on the fact that I think, I am, first and foremost, a thinking thing.

Descartes’ Epistemology The Idea of God Being a thinking thing, I find in myself countless ideas; some of them, confused; others, clear and distinct. One of the latter is the idea of God, i. e. of a substance that is infinite, eternal, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful. Though expressed in the causal language, Descartes’ proof of the existence of God is a version of St. Anselm’s ontological argument. My being a substance explains my having the idea of substance; but it does not explain my having the idea of an infinite substance: I am finite. On the other hand, the idea of God cannot be obtained from other ideas, since it has in it more representative reality than all other ideas. 3 The idea of God must be due to something that has no less reality than is contained in the idea, i. e. only due to God himself.

Descartes’ Epistemology The Natural Light of Reason Upon establishing that he is a thinking thing, Descartes faces the problem of reliability of As to other ideas, I cannot trust his thinking capacity, i. e. its ability to serve confused ideas to be true. as a criterion of truth and argues that one can trust one’s reason because reason is God’s gift to man Even clear and distinct ideas are not above suspicion, because they might which is sufficient guarantee that have been put into my mind by some the laws of reason (logic) are powerful and cunning deceiver. “correct” in the sense that Though I know from experience that they correspond to the laws of the Universe I have a faculty of judgement that created by God. allows me to distinguish between true and false, can I trust it? But it is impossible that God should ever want to deceive me, because that would be a sign of malice or weakness not to be found in God. 4 I may, therefore, trust this natural light of reason, provided, of course, that I use it correctly.

Descartes’ Epistemology The Natural Light of Reason Empiricism (Gr. , ἐμπειρία, experience) is an epistemological theory that all knowledge originates in experience which serves as the ultimate criterion of truth. Rationalism (Lat. , ratio, reason) is an epistemological theory that reason is in itself a source of knowledge superior to and independent of sense perceptions and is the ultimate criterion of truth. Adapted from The Merriam-Webster's Dictionary.

Descartes’ Epistemology Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes’ method – his four rules for the direction of the mind – are to help man use this gift of God, this natural light of reason, to the best of its capacity. (1) Never to accept anything as true Instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, suffice it to have the four following ones, provided I do not violate them. unless it presented itself so clearly and distinctly to my mind that there was no occasion to doubt it. (2) To divide each of the difficulties which I encounter into as many parts as possible, and as might be required for an easier solution. (3) To think in an orderly fashion, beginning with the things easiest to understand, and gradually reaching toward more complex knowledge. 5 (4) Always to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I would be certain that nothing was omitted.

Descartes’ Epistemology Rules for the Direction of the Mind 3 2 7 х 4 1 7 = 1 3 6 3 5 9 7 х 7 = 4 9 To accept as true only what appears clear and distinct to the mind To divide the problem into parts easy to solve To think orderly: from the simplest to the more complex To make reviews to ensure that nothing was omitted 7 х 1 = 7 3 2 7 The 1 st rule The 2 nd rule 4 1 7 2 2 8 9 The 3 rd rule 3 2 7 1 3 0 8 1 3 6 3 5 9 The 4 th rule

Descartes’ Ontology The Mind-Matter Dualism All that exists Thinking things Extended things (res cogitans) (res extensa) … to give up, as totally useless, the attempt that physicists make to understand the world in terms of what things are for, that is, in terms of God’s purposes. Only a very rash man would think he could discover what God’s impenetrable purposes are.

The Mind-Matter Dualism Substances and Their Attributes Mind Matter Intelligence Extension Substance Attribute (Lat. substantia, from sub- + stare, to stand under) is a philosophical term that indicates something characterised by independent existence, the permanent and persisting reality underlying all transient manifestations and change. (Lat. attributum, from ad- + tribuere, to bestow) is a philosophical term that indicates an inherent (intrinsic) characteristic (quality, property) of a substance necessary for its existence and sufficient for its identification.

The Mind-Matter Dualism Empty Space and Animal Mind Defining matter as extension results in denial of empty space (space separate from body). Defining soul as intelligence results in denial of animal soul (capacity to think and feel). Matter that fills the entire space moves in whirls. Animals, like all other bodies, are but machines.

The Mind-Matter Dualism The Problem of Substances’ Interaction Mind Matter thinks does not think unextended indivisible If mind and matter have nothing in common, how can they interact? How can a mind know anything about material bodies? How can it have even an idea of a material body?

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction “Innate Knowledge” 1 y = x 2 Human mind has an innate idea of material substance and innate knowledge of the laws it is subject to as a part of the God-given natural light of reason.

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction “The Pineal Gland” 2 The mind interacts with the body in the pineal gland that transforms physical (bodily) movements (impacts) into mental movements (thoughts) and these latter into physical (bodily) movements (actions).

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction “The Pineal Gland” I must A lion! run! 2 The mind interacts with the body in the pineal gland that transforms physical (bodily) movements (impacts) into mental movements (thoughts) and these latter into physical (bodily) movements (actions).

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction Cartesian Occasionalism Mental and material process are coordinated, just like two clocks show the same time (even though they do not interact) thanks to the Wise Watchmaker. The two-clocks argument 3 Arnold Geulincx (1624 – 1669)

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction Cartesian Occasionalism Vision in God 3 Nicolas Malebranche (1638 – 1715)

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction Cartesian Occasionalism The moving force of bodies is not then in themselves, this force being nothing but the Will of God: bodies then have no proper action, and when a moving ball meets with another, and moves it, the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter, as not having in itself the impression it communicates, though the former be the natural cause of the latter's motion; and therefore a natural cause is not a true and real cause, but only an occasional, which in such or such a case determines the Author of Nature to act in such or such a manner. Nicolas Malebranche. Search After Truth.

The Problem of Substances’ Interaction Cartesian Occasionalism (Lat. occasio) is a version of Cartesian metaphysics that denies the possibility of direct interaction of an unextended mind an extended body and asserts that all such interaction is mediated by God, the appearance of direct interaction being due to God moving the body on the occasion of the mind's willing and putting ideas in the mind on the occasion of the body's encountering other material objects; there are, thus, no such things as a material cause of a thought (or an act of will) or a mental cause (an idea or a wish) of a physical movement (action), all these being but occasions on which God, the only true cause of everything, acts.

Benedict Spinoza Monistic Rationalism q Spinoza’s Ontology • Criticism of Dualism • Pantheism • Determinism q Spinoza’s Epistemology • Transition to Epistemology: Logical and Physical Necessity • “The Geometric Order” • Three Kinds of Knowledge q Spinoza’s Ethics • Freedom as the Mastery of Affects

Benedict Spinoza (1632 – 1677) • • • Born on November 24, 1632 in Amsterdam Excommunication (1656) Died on February 21, 1677 in The Hague Amsterdam The Hague

Benedict Spinoza (1632 – 1677) Principal Writings • René Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order (1663) • A Theologico-Political Treatise (1670) • Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order (1663 – 1675) Benedict Spinoza

Spinoza’s Ontology Criticism of Dualism By “substance” I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself. Ethics, Part I Definition 3 By “attribute” I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. Ethics, Part I Definition 4 There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. Ethics, Part I Proposition 11 1 Ethics, Part I Proposition 5 God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes … necessarily exists. Ethics, Part I Proposition 14 Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Spinoza’s Ontology Criticism of Dualism Clearly, therefore: (1) God is one, that is only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite. It follows: (2) that extension and thought are either attributes of God or accidents of the attributes of God. Ethics, Part I Corollaries 1 & 2 to Proposition 14

Spinoza’s Ontology Pantheism Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived. Ethics, Part I Proposition 15 From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways. Ethics, Part I Proposition 16 God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect. Ethics, Part I Proposition 17 2 Ethics, Part I Corollary 1 to Proposition 16 God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Ethics, Part I Proposition 18 God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Spinoza’s Ontology Pantheism Ethics, Part I Note to Proposition 29 By nature viewed as active (naturans) we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. By nature viewed as passive (naturata) I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

Spinoza’s Ontology Pantheism (Gr. παν, all, Gr. θεός, God) is the doctrine that the universe conceived of as a whole is God and, conversely, that there is no God but the combined substance, forces, and laws that are manifested in the existing universe or, to put it otherwise, that the Universe and God are one: “God in everything” and/or “Everything is divine”.

Spinoza’s Ontology Determinism A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God and cannot condition itself to act. Ethics, Part I Proposition 26 A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned. Ethics, Part I Proposition 27 Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature. Ethics, Part I Proposition 33 3 Ethics, Part I Proposition 29 Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained. Ethics, Part I Proposition 35 Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.

Spinoza’s Ontology Determinism That thing is called “free, ” which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action. Ethics, Part I Definition 7

Spinoza’s Ontology Determinism The difference between freedom and non-freedom is not in determination or the absence thereof (for nothing in the Universe is indeterminate), but in the character of determination, viz. intrinsic or external.

Spinoza’s Epistemology Logical and Physical Necessity Thought is an attribute of God; that is, God is a thinking thing. Ethics, Part II Proposition 1 Extension is an attribute of God; that is, God is an extended thing. Ethics, Part II Proposition 2 Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. Ethics, Part II Corollary to Proposition 7 4 Ethics, Part II Note to Proposition 7 Whatsoever follows from the nature of God in the world of extension, follows in the same order from the idea of God in the world of thought. Ethics, Part II Proposition 7 The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Spinoza’s Epistemology Logical and Physical Necessity Ethics, Part II Note to Proposition 7 A circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes – that is, the same things following in either case.

Spinoza’s Epistemology “The Geometric Order” Definitions Axioms Postulates Propositions (theorems) Lemmas Corollaries Notes (scholia)

Spinoza’s Epistemology Three Kinds of Knowledge Opinion or imagination From particular things through our senses From symbols Reason Intuition From notions and adequate ideas From attributes of God to the essence of things

Spinoza’s Epistemology Three Kinds of Knowledge of the first kind [“opinion, ” or “imagination”] is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second [“reason”] and third kinds [“intuition”] is necessarily true. Ethics, Part II Definition 41

Spinoza’s Ethics Freedom as the Mastery of Affects In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined, and so on. Ethics, Part II Proposition 48 An affect can’t be restrained or removed except by another affect that is opposite to it and stronger than it. Ethics, Part IV Proposition 7 By the guidance of reason we follow the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils. Ethics, Part V Proof of Proposition 20 5 Ethics, Part IV Proposition 65 This [intellectual] love toward God [the third kind of knowledge] is the highest good we can want according to the dictate of reason. Ethics, Part V Note to Proposition 20 If clear and distinct knowledge doesn’t absolutely remove passive affects, at least it makes them the smallest part of the mind.

Questions?