Moscow State Institute of International Relations MGIMOUniversity School

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) School of Government and International Affairs & Alexander Shishkin Department of Philosophy The Basics of Philosophy Part II Cosmocentric Philosophy Lecture 4 Plato Substantiation of Idealism

Plato Substantiation of Idealism q The Sensual World of Corporeal Things and the Intelligible World of Ideas (Forms) q Psychological Preconditions of Idealism q The Triune Concept of Eidos (Idea, Form) and the Triple Substantiation of Idealism The Triune Concept of Eidos • • The Triple Substantiation of Idealism Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal • Eidos as an Intelligible Entity • § Criticism of Sensualism § Knowledge as Recollection § The Eternity (Immortality) of Soul • Eidos as a Perfect Prototype (Pattern) of Sensual Things The Ontological Argumentation The Epistemological Argumentation • The Axiological Argumentation

Plato Substantiation of Idealism Abdera Elea Croton Athens Ephesus Samos Miletus

Plato Substantiation of Idealism Principal Writings • • The Apology Meno Phaedo The Symposium The Republic Theaetetus Parmenides Timaeus Plato (428/427 – 348/347 B. C. )

The Sensual World of Corporeal Things and the Intelligible World of Ideas • • • How did it happen that Atomism, for all its merits and advantages, particularly evident in retrospect, was eventually marginalised and had to cede the status of the paradigmatic philosophical doctrine to a rival theory? This was due to the fact that the Atomists, though they developed an original and promising ontological hypothesis that showed the way out of the Eleatic dead-end, failed to provide a convincing account, least so feasible conceptualisation, of the general and the mental. In the meanwhile, it were precisely those two problems, viz. of the general and of the mental, that proved of critical importance to account for the new cultural phenomenon and that challenge to philosophy that was Greek science.

The Sensual World of Corporeal Things and the Intelligible World of Ideas • • Knowledge reached the level of theory and became scientific thanks to dexterous use of universals, i. e. general concepts produced by abstract thinking. As a cognitive procedure, abstraction was aimed at mentally eliminating whatever was peculiar to the objects of study and concentrating on what was common to (general about) them, thus providing a basis for logical reasoning as inferences from generals to particulars. To Plato, general and mental are virtually identical; this dual (or, rather, triune since also perfect) entity is named eidos; it also proves to be eternal. To construct this concept, Plato counterpoises (1) general and particular, (2) mental and sensual, (3) perfect and deficient, clustering the firsts of the three opposites together and thus positing and sharply distinguishing between two kinds of reality or, to put it otherwise, two worlds: one, eternal; the other, transient.

The Sensual World of Corporeal Things and the Intelligible World of Ideas Plato’s World of Things Plato’s World of Ideas resembles closely Heracleitean World of Eternal Flux resembles somewhat Parmenidean World of Eternal Changeless Reality

Psychological Preconditions of Idealism Our idea of a thing being relatively independent of the thing, thus allowing us to imagine thing and to think of it in its absence, as well as to play with the idea and transform it in our mind as we find fit, gives us good reason to consider thoughts of our mind as entities related to, but essentially different from their objects.

The Triune Concept of Eidos and the Triple Substantiation of Idealism Things Ideas Sensual Deficient Eternal Transient Single Arguments Universal Ontological Intelligible Epistemological Perfect Axiological

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Universal Hypostatisation (Lat. universalis, general) is a general concept or term or something in reality to which it corresponds. (Gr. υπόστασις, substance) is attribution of real identity (self-sufficient existence) to an abstract concept. Snow is white Day is warm Whiteness Swan is white Water is warm Room is warm Warmth Cloud is white

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism The idea of cat The idea of dog This is a cat a dog a cat a dog This is a dog

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Whiteness is always white Warmth is always warm Snow is sometimes white Day is sometimes warm Swan is sometimes white Water is sometimes warm Cloud is sometimes white Room is sometimes warm

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Whiteness is necessarily white Warmth is necessarily warm Snow can be white Day can be warm Swan can be white Water can be warm Cloud can be white Room can be warm

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Whiteness is in itself white Warmth is in itself warm Snow shares in whiteness Day shares in warmth Swan shares in whiteness Water shares in warmth Cloud shares in whiteness Room shares in warmth

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Things Ideas Arguments Complex, hence divisible Simple, hence indivisible Changeable, hence transient Changeless, hence eternal Single, but multiple Universal, therefore unique Ideas are indivisible, hence eternal; eternal, hence prior to things both in time Ontological and ontologically. Have their qualities Are identical with their qualities Accidentals Substances Ideas are substances, hence self-sufficient (independent) and necessary.

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Things Ideas Arguments Complex, hence divisible Simple, hence indivisible Changeable, hence transient Changeless, hence eternal Single, but multiple Universal, therefore unique Ideas are indivisible, hence eternal; Since universals eternal, hence are prior things to individual to things and are, bothother in time on the hand, and ontologically. ideal, whereas Have their qualities Are identical with their qualities Accidentals Substances individual things Ideas are material, substances, hence ideas are prior self-sufficient to matter. (independent) and necessary.

Eidos as an Hypostatised Universal The Ontological Substantiation of Idealism Materialism is a philosophical theory that mind is prior to matter. is a philosophical theory that matter is prior to mind. The exact meaning of the term depends, of course, on the definition of mind, which is identified either (1) with transcendent reason (hence the belief that ultimate reality lies in a realm transcending phenomena, i. e. objective idealism), or (2) with human consciousness (hence the belief that all reality is essentially mental, i. e. subjective idealism). The exact meaning of the term depends, of course, on the definition of matter, which is either (1) identified with physical matter (which is consequentially seen as the only or fundamental reality), or (2) refers to objective reality (with emphasis on latter’s objectivity rather than its specific features and qualities, this being a response to subjective idealism).

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism We can see that snow is white and feel that water is warm, but whiteness as such and warmth as such cannot be sensed, they can only be thought. But whence thoughts?

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity Criticism of Sensualism One might think that thoughts are based on sense perceptions, but Plato denies this categorically. Sensual things are in perpetual flux, hence their perceptions are as fleeting as things themselves. True knowledge cannot be based on transient perceptions; these yield but dubious opinions. Plato refuses to view opinions, even right opinions, as a kind of knowledge.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity Criticism of Sensualism Genuine, i. e. certain, absolute and, therefore, eternal, knowledge is that of universals; of transient individual things one can have but opinions. However, general knowledge cannot be obtained from individual facts, even from firmly established facts, for no finite number of particular instances can justify universal generalisations: one may not affirm of all what is only known of some. Since what we sense are but individual things, genuine knowledge cannot be based on sense perception.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism Triangle The sum of the angles 179052'16" 180009'45" 179059'57" Mathematical knowledge, like any general knowledge, can neither be deduced from nor substantiated with knowledge of individual instances. 180000'34" 178049'51"

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism This is due to the fact that the true objects of this knowledge are not sensual things, but intelligible entities.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism Length 1 ft Height Triangle 1, 5 ft 2 ft

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism Triangle Right isosceles Right scalene Obtuse scalene

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity Knowledge as Recollection Since intelligible entities (ideas) can neither be perceived, nor deduced from opinions, based on perception, their knowledge is not dependent on perception, has existed before all perception, i. e. before birth.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Eternity (Immortality) of Soul In this case the bearer of this knowledge, i. e. the soul, must have existed before the birth or, more precisely, before the birth of the body and, consequently, will, as an unborn entity, continue to exist after its death. If some ideas seem unfamiliar, this is because they have been forgotten. From this standpoint, all knowledge is but recollection.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Eternity (Immortality) of Soul The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say “learning”, out of a single recollection, all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. Plato. Meno.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism Things Ideas Complex Simple Transient (changeable) Eternal (changeless) Single (multiple) Universal (unique) Have their qualities Are identical with their qualities Accidentals Substances Arguments Simple and changeless logically precedes complex and changeable. Eternal and universal cannot be perceived, Epistemological only thought. Substantial is prior to accidental both logically and ontologically.

Eidos as an Intelligible Entity The Epistemological Substantiation of Idealism Things Ideas Complex Simple Transient (changeable) Eternal (changeless) Single (multiple) Universal (unique) Have their qualities Are identical with their qualities Accidentals Substances Arguments Simple and Sincelogically changeless knowledge of precedes complex general ideas and changing. precedes knowledge of individual things Eternal and universal (not vice versa), cannot be perceived, objects of this only thought. knowledge, i. e. eternal ideas, Substantial is prior must precede objects of sensual to accidental perception, i. e. both logically transient things. and ontologically.

Eidos as a Perfect Prototype of Things The Axiological Substantiation of Idealism Things are but transient and imperfect instantiations of ideal paradigms.

Eidos as a Perfect Prototype of Things The Axiological Substantiation of Idealism Things Ideas Transient (changeable) Eternal (changeless) Single (multiple) Universal (unique) Accidentals Substances Deficient (imperfect) Perfect Based on prototypes Prototypes Arguments The eternal, changeless, unique, universal, self-sufficient, perfect, paradigmatic is of greater value Axiological than the transient, changeable, particular, just one of the many, dependent, imperfect, imitative.

Things Ideas The Triune Concept of Eidos and the Triple Substantiation of Idealism Ontological argumentation Epistemological argumentation Axiological argumentation The simple, eternal, unitary, self-sufficient, necessary is ontologically prior. The simple, timeless, universal, changeless, substantial is logically (and ontologically) prior. The eternal, self-sufficient, perfect, paradigmatic is axiologically (as well as logically and ontologically) prior. The complex, transient, multiple, dependent, accidental is ontologically secondary. The complex, temporary, partial, changeable, accidental is logically (and ontologically) secondary. The transient, dependent, deficient, imitative is axiologically (as well as logically and ontologically) secondary.

The Triune Concept of Eidos (Gr. είδος, Lat. forma) is an Ancient Greek philosophical term that initially (in its pre-philosophical use) indicated “shape” or “image”; in Platonic philosophy is synonymous to “Idea” (Gr. ιδέα) and indicates (1) a transcendent intelligible entity, the only object of definite and trustworthy (scientific) knowledge , (2) an hypostatised universal that exists independently of individual things and serves as (3) their ideal prototype (pattern).

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