Comparative political economics Lecture 4 Paolo Graziano ExecutiveLegislative

Comparative political economics Lecture 4 Paolo Graziano

Executive-Legislative Relations • • where is power? different types of government… but also different types of power relations. ‘democratic’ need for a balance of power presidential system parliamentary system semipresidential system prime ministership

Presidential system • head of government is elected for a predefined period and usually cannot be forced to resign by a vote of no confidence • presidents are directly elected • one-person, noncollegial executives • ex: US, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela

Parliamentary system • head of government is responsible to the legislature (i. e. dependent on the legislature’s confidence and can be dismissed by a legislative vote of no confidence or censure) • prime ministers are selected by legislatures • collective or collegial executives • ex: United Kingdom, Germany

Semipresidential system • mix of both presidential and parliamentary features • president directly elected… • … but with power to be shared with the prime minister… • … appointed by the president by responsible to the legislature • possible ‘cohabitation’ • ex: France, Ireland, Finland, Austria, Iceland, Portugal

Prime ministership • prime minister is responsible to the legislature but. . . • directly elected and not selected by the legislature (possible ‘mutual dismissal’) • formally collegial executives, but often non collegial executive (prime minister predominance) • ex: Israel (1996 -2001)

Executive dominance I • what is the indicator of executive dominance? • cabinet durability: a long-lasting cabinet is likely to be dominant… • … and able to make sound decisions, but… • … policy adoption differs from policy implementation. • relevance of top bureaucrats with respect to the overall performance of democracies.

Executive dominance II • how can we measure executive dominance? • average cabinet I: cabinet ends with new elections, new prime minister, new party composition • average cabinet II: party composition • index of executive dominance: mean of measures I and II • United States vs United Kingdom

Electoral systems • electoral formula: plurality/majority vs. proportional system • district magnitude: single-member vs. plurality districts • electoral threshold • total membership of elected body • presidential/legislative elections • malapportionment: unequal voting population • interparty electoral links: vote combination

Disproportionality • aggregate vote-seat share deviations • does proportionality mean ‘more’ democratic? • links between electoral and party systems: – all electoral systems tend to yield disproportional results – all electoral systems reduce electoral parties – all electoral systems can create a parliamentary majority for parties non supported by a majority of votes

Interest groups • pluralism vs. corporatism • meanings of corporatism: – groups are organized into national, specialized, hierarchical, and monopolistic peak organizations – incorporation of interest groups into the policy formation

Key elements of corporatism • it assures concertation – i. e regular consultation by the leaders of peak organizations with each other and with the government – that arrives at comprehensive binding agreements (tripartite pacts) • IG are – large in size and small in number – coordinated into national peak organizations

Patterns of democracy: a critique • challenging in its research design and useful as a overall introduction to key political concepts but: – very (too? ) ambitious, but not always very accurate (ex: Eu compared to other countries) – conceptual ambiguities (ex: plural vs. non plural societies…) – inadequacy of analytical criteria (es: independence Central Bank in the Federal-Unitary dimension)