Struggles over scale cumulative impact assessment and Liquefied

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Struggles over scale: cumulative impact assessment and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects Derrick Hindery,

Struggles over scale: cumulative impact assessment and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects Derrick Hindery, Ph. D. Assistant Professor Departments of International Studies and Geography University of Oregon dhindery@uoregon. edu Research funding: Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, University of Oregon Office of Research and Faculty Development, Departments of Geography and International Studies

Introduction • Early 2000 s: industry push for LNG “import” projects (backed by FERC,

Introduction • Early 2000 s: industry push for LNG “import” projects (backed by FERC, DOE) • Mobilization, challenges brought by environmental / human rights orgs. : “RACE” Coalition - Several cancelled not b/c of upstream cumulative impacts (Russia, Peru etc. ) but b/c of domestic safety, security, environment concerns • 2007: fracking boom “flip” from import to export increased mobilization around upstream impacts of fracking in US, Canada

LNG increasingly prominent with US gas boom

LNG increasingly prominent with US gas boom

Struggles over cumulative impact assessment • Groups critical of LNG pressing for comprehensive regional

Struggles over cumulative impact assessment • Groups critical of LNG pressing for comprehensive regional and national-scale assessment of LNG’s cumulative impacts (including fracking) • Significant political, legal resistance by industry developers, backed by FERC, DOE • Paper examines struggle over assessment across various scales, looking at rise of LNG as global commodity that “provides an opportunity to witness in real time the ‘historic’ processes through which the multi-scalar geographies of a ‘global’ commodity are produced. ” (Bridge, 2004: 395)

Emerging scholarship to fill gap in research on resource geographies related to gas •

Emerging scholarship to fill gap in research on resource geographies related to gas • Much work to date focused on single case studies • exceptions involving comparative research (e. g. Bebbington and Bury, In Press; Perreault and Valdivia, 2010; Sawyer and Gomez 2012) • Little on impacts or mobilization across the supplychain

Forthcoming (In press) Synergistic impacts of gas and mining development in Bolivia’s Chiquitanía: the

Forthcoming (In press) Synergistic impacts of gas and mining development in Bolivia’s Chiquitanía: the significance of analytical scale. In Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America, Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury (eds. ) Austin: University of Texas Press. (Expected publication Summer/early Fall 2013)

Construction of Enron (Ashmore) and Shell’s Cuiabá Pipeline through the Chiquitano Forest (626 kms.

Construction of Enron (Ashmore) and Shell’s Cuiabá Pipeline through the Chiquitano Forest (626 kms. Long) Photo by Derrick Hindery, November 1999

Don Mario gold mine controversy, involving Enron (now Ashmore), Shell, the World Bank (IFC)

Don Mario gold mine controversy, involving Enron (now Ashmore), Shell, the World Bank (IFC) and ousted President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006

Excavation of trench for 4 km “feeder” pipeline to tap Cuiabá pipeline (to fuel

Excavation of trench for 4 km “feeder” pipeline to tap Cuiabá pipeline (to fuel Don Mario gold mine) Photo by Bolivian organization CEADES, September, 2002

4 km “feeder” pipeline from Cuiabá pipeline to mine

4 km “feeder” pipeline from Cuiabá pipeline to mine

Photo by Bolivian organization CEADES, September 2002

Photo by Bolivian organization CEADES, September 2002

Pipes delivering gas at Don Mario gold mine Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2008

Pipes delivering gas at Don Mario gold mine Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2008

Pipeline veers toward mine (map by Danny Redo)

Pipeline veers toward mine (map by Danny Redo)

Synergistic impacts of Cuiabá pipeline & Don Mario gold mine

Synergistic impacts of Cuiabá pipeline & Don Mario gold mine

Logging mill along road to Don Mario mine Photo by Derrick Hindery,

Logging mill along road to Don Mario mine Photo by Derrick Hindery,

“We are observing unauthorized loggers, wood thieves and narcotraffickers using the mine’s road and

“We are observing unauthorized loggers, wood thieves and narcotraffickers using the mine’s road and [the logging company’s] road, which are in very good conditions. . . And this was one of the reasons we established a guard post, to be able to control outsiders passing through the area. But this didn’t work out as the post was destroyed. The company didn’t say anything further about the subject. ” - Chiquitano community member

Other synergies: Ipias power plant, IDB highway, Mutun, IIRSA

Other synergies: Ipias power plant, IDB highway, Mutun, IIRSA

Cumulative assessment for hydrocarbons projects commonly poor • Often absent (e. g. on Russia’s

Cumulative assessment for hydrocarbons projects commonly poor • Often absent (e. g. on Russia’s Sakhalin II Gas and Oil Pipeline see Norlen, 2005 and Johnston and Kozloff, 2005) • Or inadequate (e. g. on Ecuador’s Heavy Crude Pipeline (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP) see Soltani and Koenig, 2005; on Peru’s Camisea gas project see Bebbington and Bury, In Press; Goldzimer, 2005; Griffiths, 2007; Hearn 2007; Johnston and Kozloff, 2005; Pratt 2007; Pratt, In Press)X

Cumulative impacts are significant and multiplicative • environmental, social and economic impacts of singular

Cumulative impacts are significant and multiplicative • environmental, social and economic impacts of singular projects combine generate synergies that are not always predictable and may be multiplicative and as serious or more serious than in isolation (Dourojeanni, Barandiarán Gómez and Dourojeanni, 2009)

Shifting geographies of mobilization around LNG: distancing and the rising significance of cumulative impacts

Shifting geographies of mobilization around LNG: distancing and the rising significance of cumulative impacts • With fracking boom increasing criticism that FERC, industry not adequately assessing cumulative impacts (regional, national, global) • Critics confronting industry to show LNG terminals linked to fracking, as are cumulative impacts (e. g. fracking impacts, climate change, increased energy costs)

Jordan Cove LNG Terminal (Coos Bay, Oregon) and Pacific Connector Pipeline

Jordan Cove LNG Terminal (Coos Bay, Oregon) and Pacific Connector Pipeline

Increased attention on cumulative assessment as “distance” from impacts decreases • More “distant” upstream

Increased attention on cumulative assessment as “distance” from impacts decreases • More “distant” upstream or downstream impacts not prioritized by Sierra Club etc. • Increased attention to upstream impacts once “fracking” close to home emerged and was linked to LNG export terminals

Battling over geographic uncertainty and linking LNG terminals to fracking • FERC resisting cumulative

Battling over geographic uncertainty and linking LNG terminals to fracking • FERC resisting cumulative fracking assessment b/c “does not regulate production or drilling or gathering of natural gas” • Env. Orgs, State of Oregon, EPA disagree b/c fracking a significant effect, causally connected to LNG export terminals

FERC’s argument: can’t do meaningful analysis b/c it can’t foresee the location, scope and

FERC’s argument: can’t do meaningful analysis b/c it can’t foresee the location, scope and timing of wells and associated infrastructure (e. g. well pads, pipelines and roads) that might be developed to supply LNG export terminals -not possible to tie LNG exports to any particular shale formation -could come from shale or conventional gas fields -Fulbright and Jaworski, leading industry law firm: “Developers would be well advised to avoid filing materials with agencies that link their projects to specific natural gas resources absent offsetting benefits for such claims” (2012)

Environmental groups and some state agencies counter: -LNG projects trigger upstream gas production, “reasonably

Environmental groups and some state agencies counter: -LNG projects trigger upstream gas production, “reasonably foreseeable, ” supported by existing cases -DOE’s own energy models make such predictions -LNG industry literature acknowledges this

Conclusion • With flip from import to export, distant upstream impacts abroad superseded by

Conclusion • With flip from import to export, distant upstream impacts abroad superseded by upstream impacts, especially fracking, that have immediate impact on local livelihoods • groups critical of LNG have prioritized cumulative assessment more as “distance” from impacts decreases, and as they perceive local livelihoods to be threatened • scalar struggle over whether to evaluate impacts of local LNG terminals vs regional, national and global effects of all connected projects evident in a legal battle over geographic certainty, and whether extraction can be linked to terminals

Additional slides

Additional slides

NEPA’s definition of a cumulative impact: “the impact on the environment which results from

NEPA’s definition of a cumulative impact: “the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action [i. e. project] when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time. ” (40 C. F. R. § 1508. 7). Cumulative impacts include indirect effects that “are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance [than direct effects], but are still reasonably foreseeable. ” (40 C. F. R. § 1508. 8(a))

Cuiabá Pipeline Impacts • Failure on the part of multinational oil corporations and international

Cuiabá Pipeline Impacts • Failure on the part of multinational oil corporations and international financial institutions to comply with agreements to title lands of affected indigenous communities • Failure to provide long-term compensation as established in International Labor Organization Convention 169 • Failure to include indigenous representatives on the board of conservation programs (e. g. the Chiquitano Forest Conservation Program, governed by Enron, Shell, and four NGOs) • Secondary impacts along pipeline routes (e. g. hunting, colonization, illegal logging, biopiracy and mining, due to lack of reforestation) • Direct social and environmental impacts (e. g. soil erosion, degradation of wetlands, increased prostitution in local towns and increased alcoholism)

Indigenous mobilization • sent letter to WB/IFC (was 11% shareholder in the mine) $620,

Indigenous mobilization • sent letter to WB/IFC (was 11% shareholder in the mine) $620, 000 Indigenous Development Program • indigenous mobilization (letters, press, negotiations) included: 1) Pressuring mine to recognize 5 communities as “indigenous” (identity politics) 2) Denouncing mine for offering diesel and employment to leaders 3) Pressuring for more compensation (asked for 3. 6 mn initially) “For me what the mine is providing is very little because the mine earns enough in one day, yet just gives us crumbs. ” Chiquitano community member

Tailings pond, Don Mario gold mine – drains to Pantanal Wetlands Photo by Derrick

Tailings pond, Don Mario gold mine – drains to Pantanal Wetlands Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006

Tailings dam, Don Mario gold mine Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006

Tailings dam, Don Mario gold mine Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006

“Nobody tells us the truth. They themselves [the mine personnel] don’t want to notify

“Nobody tells us the truth. They themselves [the mine personnel] don’t want to notify us. They say it was something else and that it wasn’t the tailing pond that overflowed, but rather the fresh water reservoir, but I don’t think this is true because the fresh water reservoir is located higher and the tailing pond is lower. I don’t think the overflow would have gone another way. So I think it would really be worth it to assemble a more serious commission, go to the site and take samples for analysis, including soil samples a meter deep, perhaps deeper or shallower, as well as plant and water samples, and possibly hunt a nearby animal to analyze its tissue for contamination from the chemicals used to extract and clean the minerals. ” - Chiquitano community member

Toxic Facilities and Poverty Levels in Long Beach, California Proposed LNG Terminal Source: EPA

Toxic Facilities and Poverty Levels in Long Beach, California Proposed LNG Terminal Source: EPA Enviromapper, April 2004

Toxic Facilities and Ethnicity in Long Beach, California Proposed LNG Terminal Source: EPA Enviromapper,

Toxic Facilities and Ethnicity in Long Beach, California Proposed LNG Terminal Source: EPA Enviromapper, April 2004

Proposed LNG Terminal, Long Beach, and Nearby Sources of Toxic Emissions (Oil & Gas

Proposed LNG Terminal, Long Beach, and Nearby Sources of Toxic Emissions (Oil & Gas Wells, Toxic Release Inventory Sites, AB 2588 Sites 1, National Priority List Sites, and Leaking Underground Fuel Tanks) Proposed LNG Terminal N 1 Senate Bill AB 2588 requires facilities to report air toxics emissions, ascertain health risks, to notify nearby residents of significant risks, and to reduce risk where significant 1 Mile Map Produced by Derrick Hindery

Neoliberal Policies & the Entrance of Multinational Oil Corporations in Bolivia • 1996: administration

Neoliberal Policies & the Entrance of Multinational Oil Corporations in Bolivia • 1996: administration of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada implemented "Energy Triangle" to attract foreign investment in hydrocarbons: 1) a new Hydrocarbons Law: • Lowered taxes • allowed foreign oil corps. to engage in distribution, transportation, industrialization, and refining 2) Capitalization of the state oil company, YPFB • Bolivian govt. sold 50 percent of the equity in the state oil company, YPFB to various multinational oil corporations, including those analyzed in this case (Enron (now Ashmore), Shell) 3) Construction of Bolivia-Brazil pipeline • primary shareholders: Enron, Shell, Petrobras

“Post” neoliberalism – business as usual … with some reforms - governments from across

“Post” neoliberalism – business as usual … with some reforms - governments from across the political spectrum continuing to pursue extractive models of development throughout Latin America - Little substantive change, but some improvements related to indigenous rights and environmental protection - e. g. ’s: - Ecuador: 2008 Constitution grants rights to Nature as a social actor (Hazlewood, 2010; Gudynas 2009) - Bolivia: 2009 Constitution grants indigenous peoples and campesinos right to environmental & social oversight and monitoring of mining and hydrocarbons activities (Art. 304)

Logging trucks use pipeline access roads (San Jose de Chiquitos, Bolivia) Photo by Derrick

Logging trucks use pipeline access roads (San Jose de Chiquitos, Bolivia) Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2007