Science and Security ORPA Gunta Liders Associate VP

Science and Security ORPA Gunta Liders Associate VP for Research Administration Josef Mejido, M. S. , J. D. Export Control Officer October 2019

Outline § Background § Recommendations § Information from U. S. Government and media § Enforcement cases § How universities are responding § How the University of Rochester is responding § Summary

Background In the last two years, the federal government has increased attention and activity on concerns about national security threats involving foreign influence on teaching, academic freedom, federallysponsored research, and students/scholars, and the infiltration of U. S. institutions for purposes of espionage and technology acquisition/IP diversion: • Congressional hearings, testimony, letters, investigations, reports, amendments, and legislation • Federal research agencies (NIH, NSF, Do. D, DOE, Dept. of Ed) creating policies and conducting investigations • Additional scrutiny/awareness from intelligence community (i. e. , FBI, DOJ “China Initiative” to combat economic espionage)

Recommendations § Disclose international collaborations to ORPA and relevant funding sources § Disclose potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment to Dean’s office and relevant funding sources § Report gifts to Advancement for proper handling § Register faculty / staff travel through Global Engagement’s travel registry § Any activities involving Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Crimea region of Ukraine should be discussed with ORPA / Global Engagement beforehand § Disclose potential University inventions to UR Ventures early as possible

Recommendations (cont. ) § Ensure that no University material, data or equipment is removed from campus without appropriate prior review by University administration (e. g. MTA or DUA through ORPA) § Be cognizant of visitors to campus – be aware of unusual behavior § Reach out to Office of Counsel if contacted by the FBI § Ask Josef any export compliance questions

Houston Chronicle The Verge inewsource

New York Times, July 25, 2018 New York Times, Aug. 30, 2019 Science 12 Jul 2019: Mary Sue Coleman, President, Association of American Universities Vol. 365, Issue 6449, pp. 101 Office of the Director, NIH New York Times, April 4, 2019

NIH Dr. Collins letter • • “NIH is aware that some foreign entities have mounted systematic programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers and to take advantage of the long tradition of trust, fairness, and excellence of NIH-supported research activities. This kind of inappropriate influence is not limited to biomedical research; it has been a significant issue for defense and energy research for some time. Three areas of concern have emerged: ” Diversion of intellectual property o in grant applications or o produced by NIH -supported biomedical research to other entities, including other countries; • Sharing confidential information o on grant applications by NIH peer reviewers with others, including foreign entities, or o otherwise attempting to influence funding decisions • Failure to disclose o substantial resources from other organizations, including foreign governments Ø which threatens to distort decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds. https: //www. sciencemag. org/sites/default/files/NIH%20 Foreign%20 Influence%20 Letter%20 to%20 Grantees%2008 -20 -18. pdf

NIH clarifications… § Other support - includes all resources made available to a researcher in support of and/or related to all of their research endeavors § Foreign Components - existence of any “significant scientific element or segment of a project” outside of the United States § Financial Conflict of Interest - includes financial interests received from a foreign entity NIH: FAQs - Other Support and Foreign Components ORPA: Identifying all Sources of Support in Proposals for External Funding https: //grants. nih. gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-19 -114. html

NSF “…the National Science Foundation (NSF) is dedicated to maintaining a vibrant and diverse research community that thrives on the values of openness, transparency, and merit-based competition. . A great strength of the U. S. research and engineering enterprise is the diversity of talent—both domestic and international—and that is a strength we are committed to maintaining. International collaboration is essential to pursuing the frontiers of science…” Ø A renewed effort is now underway to ensure that existing requirements to disclose current and pending support information are known, understood, and followed https: //www. nsf. gov/pubs/2019/nsf 19200/research_protection. jsp

Department of Energy DOE Order 486. 1 § prohibits DOE employees and DOE contractor employees, while employed by DOE or performing work under a contract, from the unauthorized transfer of scientific and technical information to foreign government entities through their participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs of countries designated by DOE as a foreign country of risk. Ø What’s on the horizon for DOE grant sponsored research at universities ?

Department of Defense Proposers shall submit the below information for all key personnel, whether or not the individuals' efforts under the project are to be funded by the Do. D: § A list of all current projects the individual is working on, in addition to any future support the individual has applied to receive, regardless of the source § Title and objectives of the other research projects § The percentage per year to be devoted to the other projects § The total amount of support the individual is receiving in connection to each of the other research projects or will receive if other proposals are awarded § Name and address of the agencies and/or other parties supporting the other research projects § Period of performance for the other research projects

Department of Education announced this summer that it was investigating whether Georgetown, Texas A&M, and others were fully complying with a federal law that requires colleges to report all gifts and contracts from foreign sources that exceed $250, 000. Ø report all gifts to Advancement Ø all sponsored projects must go through ORPA https: //www. govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2019 -06 -28/pdf/2019 -13904. pdf

University of Kansas Researcher Indicted for Fraud for Failing to Disclose Conflict of Interest with Chinese University § Associate Professor at University of Kansas (KU) was indicted on federal charges of hiding the fact he was working full time for a Chinese university while doing research at KU funded by the U. S. government o Charged with one count of wire fraud and three counts of program fraud § Alleged to have defrauded the U. S. government by unlawfully receiving federal grant money at the same time that he was employed and paid by a Chinese research university § The indictment alleges that he signed a five-year contract with Fuzhou University, requiring him to be a full time employee of the university § While he was under contract with Fuzhou University, he was conducting research at KU that was funded through two U. S. Department of Energy contracts and four National Science Foundation contracts § In his required annual conflicts of interest report to KU, he falsely claimed to have no conflicts of interest. The indictment alleges that he fraudulently received more than $37, 000 in salary paid for by the Department of Energy and the National Science Foundation Ø “Any potential conflicts of commitment by a researcher must be disclosed as required by law and university policies. The Department will continue to pursue any unlawful failure to do so. ” - Assistant Attorney General Demers for National Security. https: //www. justice. gov/opa/pr/university-kansas-researcher-indicted-fraud-failing-disclose-conflict-interest-chinese

Former Virginia Tech Professor Sentenced for Grant Fraud, False Statements, Obstruction § biological systems engineering professor at Virginia Tech founded Cell-Free Bioinnovations, Inc (CFB) § CFB relied exclusively on federal grants for funding its research activities § Professor began working for the Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biotechnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences § Professor caused fraudulent grant proposals to be submitted to the NSF under the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) § Evidence presented at trial indicated grant funds obtained would be used for research he knew had already been done in China § Professor intended to use the grant funds for other CFB projects rather than for the projects for which the funds were requested. To obstruct the investigation, he submitted falsified timesheets to government investigators https: //www. justice. gov/usao-wdva/pr/former-virginia-tech-professor-sentenced-grant-fraud-false-statements-obstruction

• University stem cell researcher in Iran and 2 former students facing trial in U. S. federal court for attempting to transport growth factors to Iran from the U. S. without permission from the U. S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign assets Control (OFAC) • Former student 1 purchased the proteins in part because they are cheaper and more readily available in the United States than in Iran • Former student 2 said that she had agreed to transport the growth factors as a favor, without knowing that this was prohibited. Ø to be used for “medical purposes such as stem cell research, cancer research, and transplantation” Growth factors U. S. boarder agents 2 former students Stem cell researcher https: //www. nature. com/articles/d 41586 -01901 -4

AAU / AAMC recommendations “Responding to Undue Foreign Influence and Security Concerns on Campus • Awareness building and communication • Coordination/formation of cross-campus working groups • Training faculty and students • Review foreign gifts, grants, contracts and collaborations • Review of faculty foreign financial interests and affiliations • Protection of data and cybersecurity • Protection of intellectual property and use of technology control plans • Regular interactions with federal security and intelligence agencies • Foreign travel safeguards and protections • International visitors to campus • Export control compliance https: //www. aau. edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/AAU-APLU-Effective-Practices-Memo. pdf

University of Rochester Committee on Science and Security § § § Vice Provost for Research Vice Provost for Global Engagement Associate Vice President for Research and Project Administration Associate Vice President of Government and Community Relations Chair, Research Policy Committee of the Faculty Senate Dean of the Hajim School of Engineering and Applied Sciences Vice Dean for Research, SMD Dean for Research, AS&E Export Control Officer Associate Vice President for Program Development, LLE Office of Counsel Director of Government and Research Alliances

Meliora. Ever better. § Vast majority of individuals collaborating with and studying at the University are acting in good faith…advancing the arts, sciences, medicine, etc.

Vision and Values of the University of Rochester “We are a community in which all who work, teach, create, and provide care welcome and respected, and where all can pursue and achieve their highest objectives for themselves, their community, and the world. ” https: //www. rochester. edu/aboutus/values/

University’s commitment to openness in research OPEN RESEARCH AND FREE DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION § The University is committed to maintaining a teaching and research environment that fosters open research and exchange of ideas, encourages the creation and dissemination of new knowledge and promotes academic freedom. It is the policy of the University that it cannot accept extramural research support that would impose a fundamental limitation on the freedom to publish or otherwise limit, restrict or censor the dissemination of research results. A fundamental limitation is defined as any publication restriction other than a temporary restriction only to ensure that there is no inadvertent disclosure of proprietary information and/or to ensure that any patent rights are protected. § While funding sponsors may limit their financial support to particular groups (such as U. S. citizens), they may not prohibit the participation of others in University research or education. It is the policy of the University that it will not undertake research that would prohibit students, scholars, staff and faculty, whether US or foreign citizens, from participating in intellectually significant portions of educational and research activities at the University. § Exceptions to this policy may be made only in the rare instances where the area of work is extremely important to the University’s educational or research mission or necessary to serve the best interests of society, and these considerations outweigh the principles of the University set forth in its policies expressed above. Such an exception must be approved by the President. If an exception to this policy is approved, the President will decide whether it is appropriate to communicate the exception and the reasons therefore to the Faculty Senate and/or the Board of Trustees. https: //www. rochester. edu/ORPA/_assets/pdf/policy_Openness. Research. pdf

University’s commitment to openness in research OPEN RESEARCH AND FREE DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION § The University is committed to maintaining a teaching and research environment that fosters open research and exchange of ideas, encourages the creation and dissemination of new knowledge and promotes academic freedom. It is the policy of the University that it cannot accept extramural research support that would impose a fundamental limitation on the freedom to publish or otherwise limit, restrict or censor the dissemination of research results. A fundamental limitation is defined as any publication restriction other than a temporary restriction only to ensure that there is no inadvertent disclosure of proprietary information and/or to ensure that any patent rights are protected. § While funding sponsors may limit their financial support to particular groups (such as U. S. citizens), they may not prohibit the participation of others in University research or education. It is the policy of the University that it will not undertake research that would prohibit students, scholars, staff and faculty, whether US or foreign citizens, from participating in intellectually significant portions of educational and research activities at the University. § Exceptions to this policy may be made only in the rare instances where the area of work is extremely important to the University’s educational or research mission or necessary to serve the best interests of society, and these considerations outweigh the principles of the University set forth in its policies expressed above. Such an exception must be approved by the President. If an exception to this policy is approved, the President will decide whether it is appropriate to communicate the exception and the reasons therefore to the Faculty Senate and/or the Board of Trustees. https: //www. rochester. edu/ORPA/_assets/pdf/policy_Openness. Research. pdf

Ø will be available online…. soon

Visitors to the University The University fully supports the hosting of foreign visitors § Visiting faculty and researchers undertaking significant research or teaching activities at the University should have a formal appointment at the University Ø sign a Visiting Scientist Agreement § Short term visitors: o ensure no confidential information is visible or discussed at the time of the visit o escort visitors throughout lab and facility tours o ensure that no University material or equipment is removed from campus without appropriate prior review and approval by University administration (e. g. MTA, DUA) o if you have any questions whether a visitor appears on any U. S. government restricted party list that would impact the University’s ability to host the visitor or collaborate with their home institution, contact ORPA or the Office for Global Engagement to perform restricted party screening prior to the visitor’s arrival on campus v All U. S. immigration procedures (e. g. visa sponsorship) should be coordinated through the International Services Office (ISO) v University committee currently reviewing visiting faculty appointments, short term visitors

Ø no single office, department, lab or person that can handle these challenges alone Ø need collaboration and communication across campus Infectious Disease Dean’s Office ORPA Global UR Ventures Engagement River Campus Collaboration LLE Med center Advancement International Services Office of Counsel

Reach out to… § ORPA – sponsored projects; material/data transfers; export compliance; OFAC sanctions § Global Engagement – international projects, visitors, etc. that do not go through ORPA; travel registry § UR Ventures – University developed intellectual property § Advancement – gifts § Dean’s office – conflicts of interest / commitment § Office of Counsel – consulting arrangements; if contacted by FBI

Recommendations § Disclose international collaborations to ORPA and relevant funding sources § Disclose potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment to Dean’s office and relevant funding sources § Report gifts to Advancement for proper handling § Register faculty / staff travel through Global Engagement’s travel registry § Any activities involving Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Crimea region of Ukraine should be discussed with ORPA / Global Engagement beforehand § Disclose potential University inventions to UR Ventures early as possible

Recommendations (cont. ) § Ensure that no University material, data or equipment is removed from campus without appropriate prior review by University administration (e. g. MTA or DUA through ORPA) § Be cognizant of visitors to campus – be aware of unusual behavior § Reach out to Office of Counsel if contacted by the FBI § Ask Josef any export compliance questions

Questions?