Monitoring and Early Warning for Internet Worms Cliff

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Monitoring and Early Warning for Internet Worms Cliff C. Zou, Lixin Gao, Weibo Gong,

Monitoring and Early Warning for Internet Worms Cliff C. Zou, Lixin Gao, Weibo Gong, Don Towsley Univ. Massachusetts, Amherst 1

How to detect an unknown worm at its early stage? n Monitoring: u Monitor

How to detect an unknown worm at its early stage? n Monitoring: u Monitor worm scan traffic (non-legitimate traffic). Ø Ø u Observation data is very noisy Ø Ø n Connections to nonexistent IP addresses. Connections to unused ports. Old worms’ scans. Port scans by hacking toolkits. Detecting: u u Anomaly detection for unknown worms Traditional anomaly detection: threshold-based Ø Ø Check traffic burst (short-term or long-term). Difficulties: False alarms; threshold tuning. 2

“Trend Detection” Detect traffic trend, not burst Trend: worm exponential growth trend at the

“Trend Detection” Detect traffic trend, not burst Trend: worm exponential growth trend at the beginning Detection: the exponential rate should be a positive, constant value Monitored illegitimate traffic rate Exponential rate a on-line estimation Non-worm traffic burst Worm traffic 3

Why exponential growth at the beginning? n n The law of natural growth reproduction

Why exponential growth at the beginning? n n The law of natural growth reproduction Exponential growth — fastest growth pattern when: u u u n Negligible interference (beginning phase). All objects have similar reproductive capability. Large-scale system — law of large number. Fast worm has exponential growth pattern u u u Attacker’s incentive: infect as many as possible before counteractions. If not, a worm does not reach its spreading speed limit. Slow spreading worms can be detected by other ways. 4

Worm modeling — simple epidemic model : # of susceptible : # of infectious

Worm modeling — simple epidemic model : # of susceptible : # of infectious : Total # of hosts : Infectious ability # of contacts I S Simple epidemic model: It Discrete model: with exponential rate At very early stage: 5

Why use simple epidemic model? n n Can model most scan-based worms. We can

Why use simple epidemic model? n n Can model most scan-based worms. We can use other worm models as well with minor modifications (such as exponential model). Code Red SQL Slammer Figures from: D. Moore, V. Paxson, S. Savage, C. Shannon, S. Staniford, N. Weaver, “Inside the Slammer Worm”, IEEE Security & Privacy, July 2003. 6

Kalman Filter Estimation n Equivalent to Recursive Least Square Estimator: u u Give estimation

Kalman Filter Estimation n Equivalent to Recursive Least Square Estimator: u u Give estimation at each discrete time. Robust to noise. n System: Discrete-time simple epidemic model n System state: u u n Worm infection rate a. (a= b. N, exponential growth rate at beginning) Epidemic parameter b. (worm infectious ability) Measurement from monitors: u Ci : cumulative # of observed infected, Zi : # of scans at time i. 7

Kalman Filter Estimation System: where Kalman Filter for estimation of Xt : 8

Kalman Filter Estimation System: where Kalman Filter for estimation of Xt : 8

Code Red simulation experiments Population: N=360, 000, Scan rate h = N(358/min, 1002), Monitored

Code Red simulation experiments Population: N=360, 000, Scan rate h = N(358/min, 1002), Monitored IP space 220, Consider background noise Infection rate: a = 1. 8/hour, Initially infected: I 0=10 Monitoring interval: D = 1 minute Before 2% (223 min): estimate is already stabilized and oscillating a little around a positive constant value 9

SQL Slammer simulation experiments Population: N=100, 000, Monitored IP space 220, Scan rate h

SQL Slammer simulation experiments Population: N=100, 000, Monitored IP space 220, Scan rate h = N(4000/sec, 20002), Initially infected: I 0=10 Monitoring interval: D = 1 second, Consider background noise Before 1% (45 sec): estimate is already stabilized and oscillating around a positive constant value 10

Early detection of Blaster n Blaster: sequentially scans from a starting IP address: u

Early detection of Blaster n Blaster: sequentially scans from a starting IP address: u u n 40% from local Class C address. 60% from a random IP address. It follows simple epidemic model. After using low-pass filter 11

Bias correction for uniform-scan worms n Bernoulli trial for a worm to hit monitors

Bias correction for uniform-scan worms n Bernoulli trial for a worm to hit monitors (hitting prob. = p ). Bias correction: : Average scan rate Monitoring 217 IP space Monitoring 214 IP space Bias correction can provide unbiased estimate of It 12

Prediction of Vulnerable population size N Direct from Kalman filter: Alternative method: h :

Prediction of Vulnerable population size N Direct from Kalman filter: Alternative method: h : A worm sends out h scans per D time (derived from egress scan monitor) Estimation of population N 13

Use exponential growth model At the early stage: : observation data Model #2: Autoregressive

Use exponential growth model At the early stage: : observation data Model #2: Autoregressive (AR) model Early stage of worm propagation Model #3: Transformed linear model 14

Comparison between three estimation models Epidemic model n AR exponential model Transformed linear model

Comparison between three estimation models Epidemic model n AR exponential model Transformed linear model Observations u u u AR exponential model is smoother than epidemic model Transformed linear model gives best results Detect a worm when it infects about 0. 5% population 15

Simple analysis of three estimation models n Why AR exponential model is smoother than

Simple analysis of three estimation models n Why AR exponential model is smoother than epidemic model? u n Introduced errors from measurement data: Ø Epidemic model Ø AR exponential model Why transformed linear model is better than AR model? assume AR exponential model: Transformed linear model: where 16

Summary n Trend detection: non-threshold-based methodology u u u n Principle: detect traffic trend,

Summary n Trend detection: non-threshold-based methodology u u u n Principle: detect traffic trend, not burst Pros : Robust to background noise low false alarm rate Cons: Rely on worm model, representation of measurement data Epidemic model, exponential model Using low-pass filter on noisy observation data For uniform-scan worms u Bias correction: u Forecasting N: ( IPv 4 ) : scanning IP space : scan hitting prob. Routing worm : Average scan rate : Infection rate : cumulative # of observed infectious 17