RSA Secur ID Authentication Ellen Stuart CS 265

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RSA Secur. ID® Authentication Ellen Stuart CS 265 Cryptography and Computer Security Fall 2004

RSA Secur. ID® Authentication Ellen Stuart CS 265 Cryptography and Computer Security Fall 2004 11/24/2004 E. Stuart

Agenda n n Introduction Components ¨ Tokens ¨ Server ¨ Algorithm n n n

Agenda n n Introduction Components ¨ Tokens ¨ Server ¨ Algorithm n n n Weaknesses Comparison Conclusion 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 2

Introduction n RSA Secur. ID® Authentication ¨ History of the RSA and Secur. ID®

Introduction n RSA Secur. ID® Authentication ¨ History of the RSA and Secur. ID® ¨ Two Factor Authentication ¨ Customer List NSA n CIA n White House n 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 3

Components of the Secur. ID® System Tokens n Authentication Server n Algorithm n 11/24/2004

Components of the Secur. ID® System Tokens n Authentication Server n Algorithm n 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 4

Components of the Secur. ID® System n Tokens Issued to users ¨ Each token

Components of the Secur. ID® System n Tokens Issued to users ¨ Each token had a unique 64 bit seed value ¨ “Something the user has” ¨ Software Hardware PINPAD Token Key Fob Token • User Doesrequired not require use separate PIN to to login in with Device PIN andpass access displayed code pass code • User required to use PIN to access pass code 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 5

Components of the Secur. ID® System n Authentication Server ¨ Maintains database of user

Components of the Secur. ID® System n Authentication Server ¨ Maintains database of user assigned tokens ¨ Generates pass code following the same algorithm as the token ¨ Seed – similar to symmetric key 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 6

Secur. ID Login Users issued tokens Internet 11/24/2004 E. Stuart RSA Authentication Server 7

Secur. ID Login Users issued tokens Internet 11/24/2004 E. Stuart RSA Authentication Server 7

Components of the Secur. ID® System n Algorithm ¨ Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm ¨ AES

Components of the Secur. ID® System n Algorithm ¨ Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm ¨ AES Hashing Algorithm 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 8

Components of the Secur. ID® System ¨ Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm n n 11/24/2004 Secret

Components of the Secur. ID® System ¨ Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm n n 11/24/2004 Secret key : = unique seed value Time : = 32 bit count of minutes since January 1, 1986 E. Stuart 9

Components of the Secur. ID® ¨ ASHF description of Brainard’s Hashing System Algorithm Each

Components of the Secur. ID® ¨ ASHF description of Brainard’s Hashing System Algorithm Each round -> 64 sub-rounds 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 10

Weaknesses of the Secur. ID® System ¨ Violation of Kerckhoff’s Principle ¨ Publication of

Weaknesses of the Secur. ID® System ¨ Violation of Kerckhoff’s Principle ¨ Publication of the alleged hash algorithm ¨ Key Recovery Attack (Biryukov, 2003; Contini, 2003) ¨ AES Implementation ¨ Human Factors 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 11

Comparison to Password Systems n Password systems are built-in, no additional implementation cost? ¨

Comparison to Password Systems n Password systems are built-in, no additional implementation cost? ¨ Administration ¨ Security n Costs Secur. ID ¨ No need to regularly change passwords ¨ No changes as long as tokens uncompromised (and hash function) 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 12

Conclusion Former implementation of Secur. ID supports Kerckhoff’s principle n RSA phasing out versions

Conclusion Former implementation of Secur. ID supports Kerckhoff’s principle n RSA phasing out versions with Brainard’s Hash Function n 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 13

References n n n n Mudge, Kingpin, Initial Cryptanalysis of the RSA Secur. ID

References n n n n Mudge, Kingpin, Initial Cryptanalysis of the RSA Secur. ID Algorithm, January 2001 www. atstake. com/research/reports/acrobat/initialsecuridanalysis. pdf V. Mc. Lellan; Firewall Wizards: RE: securid AES tokens, http: //www. insecure. org, Apr 26 2004, retrieved November 2004 F. Muhtar, Safer means to use passwords, Computimes, NSTP, Feb 13 th 2003, retrieved November 2004 from http: //www. transniaga. com/Default. htm S. Contini, Y. L. Yin, Improved Cryptanalysis of Secur. ID, Cryptology e. Print. Archive, Report 2003/205, http: //eprint. iacr. org/2003/205, October 21, 2003. V. Mc. Lellan, Re: Secur. ID Token Emulator, post to Bug. Traq, http: //cert. unistuttgart. de/archive/bugtraq/2001/01/msg 00090. html I. C. Wiener, Sample Secur. ID Token Emulator with Token Secret Import, post to Bug. Traq, http: //www. securityfocus. com/archive/1/152525 The Authentication Scorecard, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, http: //www. rsasecurity. com, retrieved November 2004. Protecting Against Phishing by Implementing Strong Two-Factor Authentication, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, http: //www. rsasecurity. com, retrieved November 2004. Are passwords Really Free? A closer look at the hidden costs of password security, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, http: //www. rsasecurity. com, retrieved November 2004. RSA Laboritories, FAQ Version 4. 1, May 2000 RSA Security, Inc, http: //www. rsasecurity. com. G. Welsh; Breaking the Code, Macquarie University News Feature, March 2004. Retrieved November 2004, from http: //www. pr. mq. edu. au/macnews. Biryukov, J. Lano, and B. Preneel; Cryptanalysis of the Alleged Secur. ID Hash Function (extended version), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 2003. RSA security website, http: //www. rsasecurity. com/company 11/24/2004 E. Stuart 14