Risk assessment of seadumped conventional munitions yvind Voie

Risk assessment of seadumped conventional munitions Øyvind Voie Espen Mariussen Aktuell nr 40, 1962

A reproducible sampling strategy for decision making • How to sample munition constituents when you want to make a judgement on whether this is a problem for the environment or not in a specific area

Content of paper • Review of fate and transport of dumped munitions constituents in marine systems • Uptake and accumulation in organisms • Toxicity and sediment quality benchmarks • Sampling strategies for risk assessment http: //timesofindiatimes. com/india (accessed 2016) http: //www. xray-mag. com/ (accessed 2016)

The issue of representativity Three Common Sources of Measurement Error: Activity Error (% of True Value) Sampling 1000% Sample preparation 100 – 300 % Analytical measurement 2 – 20 % Rasemann, 2000 • Where does sampling error come from? There are two primary sources: – The heterogeneity of the composition of the contaminated particle; and – The uneven or heterogeneous distribution of the contaminant over a given area.

Multi-increment sampling http: //post. queensu. ca/ http: //www. antarctica. gov. au/

What’s your «Decision Unit» (DU)? • • The physical boundaries of the locations within the project area of interest that will need to be sampled. A DU will be used to make a decision that will drive an administrative action to be taken in relation to the project goals for that unit.

Sediment quality benchmarks for munitions constituents G. A. Pascoe et al. / Chemosphere 81 (2010) 807– 816

Monitoring by passive samplers

WP 3. 2 Case studies on wrecks filled with chemical munitions John Tørnes Berit Gilljam

Status • A planning meeting in Sopot and a visit to R/V IMOR was conducted 8 -9 June 2016. Discussions were carried out on: – Methods for sediment sampling – Methods for biological sampling • Proposed time for cruise in Skagerrak is about 2 weeks (transit from Poland included) in May-July 2017 • Maritime Institute in Gdańsk (MIG) will be responsible for the safety onboard R/V IMOR, including safety against chemical warfare agents • A questionnaire has been sent out to all DAIMON partners

Prioritised wrecks • 1 st priority – Wreck no 13 at 580 m depth – – – • Length > 115 m and broken into several parts. Aerial bombs observed in the hold and around the wreck. Was investigated in 1989 and 2002. Water and sediment samples were collected analysed. CW and decomposition products were identified in many samples. 2 nd priority – Wreck no 5 at 655 m depth – Length 75 -34 m with remnants spread around the wreck – Not investigated before • 3 rd priority – Wreck no 12 at 550 m depth – Length 110 m and somewhat broken – Not investigated before 1 st pri: Wreck no 13 2 nd pri: Wreck no 5 3 rd pri: Wreck no 12