Chapter 7 The rules governing judicial review have

Chapter 7 "The rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape. "

Judicial Review This is a very unsettling chapter if you are looking for a bright-line test for standards for judicial review. I have heard very respected federal appeals court judges say in public lectures that they have no idea where these tests begin and end. 2

Key Questions n n Is it a facial challenge to a statute or a regulation, like Abbott? Is it an “as applied” challenge, where there is more than one reasonable interpretation? n Is picking the controlling/best interpretation a policy choice or a legal choice? Is the court reviewing a factual determination by the agency? Is the court reviewing the application of 3

The Pre-APA Cases From the first, there has been a way to argue in the alternative in every case, and this has continued to the present.

Deference - NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U. S. 111 (1944) (Newsboys) n Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited. . [T]he Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be 5 accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a

Persuasion - Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944) n We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 6 factors which give it power to persuade, if

Skidmore and Hearst are still good law and are used by the courts when it is convenient.

APA § 706. Scope of review n To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall n (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and n (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be – n (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; n (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; n (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; n (D) without observance of procedure required by law; n (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or n (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial 8 de novo by the reviewing court.

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U. S. 837 (1984) n The regulation - 40 CFR 51. 18(j)(1)(i) and (ii) (1983): n "(i) 'Stationary source' means any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act. n "(ii) 'Building, structure, facility, or installation' means all of the pollutant-emitting activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control 9 of the same person (or persons under

Review the Bubble on the Board

The Chevron Test [18] 11

Step One n “When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 12

Applying Chevron Step One n n n The statute: n "The plan provisions required by subsection (a) shall --. . . "(6) require permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources in accordance with section 173 (relating to permit requirements). ” Does this define a stationary source as to resolve the bubble question? Would it allow the bubble definition of 13

Step Two n “If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based 14 on a permissible construction of the

Applying Chevron Step Two n n n If the statute is silent or ambiguous n This is frequently the case on controversial issues If the agency’s interpretation is just one of many allowable interpretations, what should the court do? n Decide which is the best interpretation? Defer to the agency – if so, why? n Why is deference to the agency the key to 15

What does it Mean to Be Silent or Ambiguous? n n Do you just look at the statute itself? n Scalia (and his followers), usually. Do you include legislative intent? n Breyer, usually. 16

Political Control of Agencies n n n How does Chevron deference fit with the political control of agencies? Is this a liberal/conservative view? While Gorsuch was appointed because he claims to hate Chevron, Chevron is critical to the Trump administration’s efforts to roll back regulations. n You only hate Chevron when you are 17 out of power.

Miller v. AT&T Corp. , 250 F. 3 d 820 (4 th Cir. 2001) n n n The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles an eligible employee to as many as 12 weeks of unpaid leave per year for ''a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee. '' The Act defines ''serious health condition'' as an ''illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider. '' FMLA does not define medical treatment 18

What does Medical Treatment Mean? n n What if the doctors say you are not sick or that your condition is untreatable? n Are you covered by the act? The agency makes a rule that finds that visits to the doctor that do not require specific treatment are covered by the act Did the court accept the agency interpretation? n What did the dissent want? Why does this decision make practical sense? 19

Opinions in Litigation n Chevron was a rulemaking, with all the attendant process and review What if the agency takes a position for the first time during litigation? n Why might the court not trust it? Why might an amicus brief in a case where the agency has no interest get more deference? n Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997) (We will see Auer again. ) 20

What Agency do you Defer to? n n n Courts will only defer to the agency with the primary responsibility for administering the law. n Why not defer to more than one agency? What does administering mean? n EPA sets the standards for Superfund cleanups. n It gets deference for these standards. There is a statutory mechanism for determining Superfund liability, which is overseen by the courts n EPA only enforces the liability once it is 21

Chevron and its Variations (looking ahead) n n The statutory language is broad or ambiguous and the agency must fill in the details. n Chevron The statutory language is clear, but the result is contrary to other laws and practice. n FDA versus Brown and Williamson (tobacco) The statutory language is broad or ambiguous, but the result was not anticipated when the act was passed. n Mass. v. EPA The statutory language is broad or ambiguous, but the result is so sweeping that Congress could not have meant it. (Elephants in mouse holes) n King v. Burwell 22

Brown v. Williamson