# Ys strategy Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1

• Slides: 14

Y’s strategy Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 a, a b, c Strategy 2 c, b d, d X’s strategy Figure 10. 1 Two player binary choice games.

Y’s strategy X’s strategy Pollute Abate Pollute 0, 0 5, -2 Abate -2, 5 3, 3 Figure 10. 2 A two-player pollution abatement game.

Y’s strategy X’s strategy Defect (Pollute) Cooperate (Abate) Defect (Pollute) 2, 2 4, 1 Cooperate (Abate) 1, 4 3, 3 Figure 10. 3 The two-player pollution abatement Prisoners’ Dilemma game: ordinal form.

Y’s strategy Pollute Abate Pollute -4, -4 5, -2 Abate -2, 5 3, 3 X’s strategy Figure 10. 4 A two-player Chicken game.

Figure 10. 5 Extensive form of Chicken game. Y’s choice Pollute (-4, -4) Abate (5, -2) X’s choice Abate Pollute Abate (-2, 5) (3, 3)

B’s Do not Contribute Do not contribute 0, 0 0, -8 Contribute -8, 0 4, 4 strategy A’s strategy Figure 10. 6 A two-player Assurance game.

Figure 10. 7 The payoffs to one country from abating and from not abating as the number of other countries abating varies.

Figure 10. 8 The payoffs to one country from abating and from not abating as the number of other countries abating varies: alternative set of parameter values.

Figure 10. 9 The payoffs to one country from abating and from not abating as the number of other countries abating varies: third set of parameter values (a = 0, b =5, c = 3 and d = 3).

Figure 10. 10 A comparison of the non-cooperative and full cooperative solutions to an environmental public good problem. MB MCi MBi ZN ZC Z

Figure 10. 11 A one shot Prisoners’ Dilemma game. B’s Defect Cooperate Defect P, P T, S Cooperate S, T R, R strategy A’s strategy

Figure 10. 12 The two-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma game. B’s Defect Cooperate Defect 2 P, 2 P T+P, S+P Cooperate S+P, T+P R+P, R+P strategy A’s strategy

Figure 10. 13 (the old Figure 13. 1) Incremental SO 2 concentrations from an oil combined cycle power station located in Lauffen, Germany. Source: Extern. E (1995), page 61. Fig. 10. 14 (old Figure 13. 8) United Kingdom year 2000 total abatement cost curve. Source: Halkos and Hutton, 1993, page 5 Figure 10. 15 (old Figure 13. 9) Cooperative and non-cooperative pollution outcomes in the presence of international pollution spillovers. Figure 10. 16. Qualitative directions of SRES scenarios for different indicators. (Source: IPCC(3), Figure TS. 1, page 24) Figure 10. 17. IPCC: Comparison of reference and stabilisation scenarios. (Source: IPCC(3), Figure TS. 2, page 25) Figure 10. 18 (the old Figure 13. 2 with one correction) Trade and the environment.