Vehicle to Vehicle Authentication Shlomi Dolev 1 2

Vehicle to Vehicle Authentication Shlomi Dolev 1 2 1 Łukasz Krzywiecki Nisha Panwar Michael Segal 1 1 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, 2 Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland. 1/30/2022 1

Contents • Basic scheme: no hardware. • Certificating vehicle public key with vehicle attributes. • Intermediate scheme: simple LASER. • Dynamic attribute based vehicle authentication. • Sophisticated scheme: Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) device. • PUF based vehicle authentication. 1/30/2022 2

Man-in-the-Middle Attack SENDER RECEIVER 1. Cert. S 2. Cert. A 5. Cert. R||(keyr) Keyr 3. Cert. R||(keyr) keyr 4. Extracts keyr ADVERSARY 1/30/2022 3

Basic Scheme • Certificate Authority (CA). • Certificate pre-processing. • Monolithically certified attributes together with public key. • Out-of-band channel of communication. • Vehicle authentication with verifiable attributes. • Certified coupled public key and attributes. 1/30/2022 4

Basic Scheme 1 b. Verify (Signature. CA, Attributes. S) 1 a. Cert. S RECEIVER SENDER 2 b. Verify (Signature. CA, Attributes. R) 2 a. Cert. R|| (Session key+Sequence. S) 5. Esession_key {message} 1/30/2022 5

Authentication with only “Static Attributes” • Static attribute based authentication seems ‘imperfect’ for the multiple identical vehicle scenario i. e. — Multiple vehicles with exactly same attributes. • It stipulates the need of Dynamic Attributes coupled with the public key and static attributes. • A Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER) beam with modulation capabilities is suggested as a means of out-of-band verification channel. 1/30/2022 6

Attack Scenario-”mimicking” (Laser is not sufficient) (V 5, L 2) May be every identical vehicle I can see multiple mimics V 2 identical vehicles ? (V 3, L 3) (V 6, L 2) Request V 2 for visual or acoustic signal i. e. LED blink or press siren (V 2, L 2) (V 4, L 2) 1/30/2022 (V 7, L 2) (V 1, L 1) V 4 mimics the visual effects of V 2 7

Intermediate Scheme (Integration with Dynamic Attributes) 1 b. Verify (Signature. CA, Attributes. S) 1 a. Cert. S||m 1 Laser bits RECEIVER SENDER Compute session key (m 1 m 2) 2 b. Verify (Signature. CA, Attributes. R) 2 a. Cert. R||m 2 Compute session key (m 1 m 2) 3. Esession_key {message} 1/30/2022 8

Sophisticated Scheme (Coalition Attack Scenario) m 1 SENDER m 1 AR AS RECEIVER Adversary coalition m 1 SENDER m 2 m 1 AR AS m 2 RECEIVER Optical channel Separate cannel 1/30/2022 9

Sophisticated Scheme SENDER (PUFA pk. A) Beam modulation mi at PUFB -Decode numeric Receive speckle si, B and decode response ri w(si, B) -Switch radio: receive Cert(ri, B PKB) and verify with ri w(si, B) 1/30/2022 RECEIVER (PUFB pk. B) -PUFB(mi) generate si, B -Switch radio: send Cert(ri, B PKB) 10

Applications • Byzantine tolerant virtual traffic light • Replicated state machine • Synchronized state transition • Adaptive agreement before movement • Secure digital periphery for static vehicles • Knowledge based initial pairing • Commitment based authentication • Personified localization 11

Future directions • How to secure internal flexray network communication ? • How to utilize reactive data dissemination via probe vehicles? • How to ensure privacy in Internet of Things? • How to provide a secure vehicle-to-telecom integration via 5 G infrastructure? 12