The Limits of Institutional Design Francis Fukuyama Johns

  • Slides: 8
Download presentation
The Limits of Institutional Design Francis Fukuyama Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

The Limits of Institutional Design Francis Fukuyama Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Presidential/PM v. Electoral Systems Plurality Presidential Parliamentary US, Philippines Westminster PR Latin America Continental

Presidential/PM v. Electoral Systems Plurality Presidential Parliamentary US, Philippines Westminster PR Latin America Continental Europe

Expected Decision Costs Participation v. speed of decision-making (Buchanan and Tullock) Percentage of population

Expected Decision Costs Participation v. speed of decision-making (Buchanan and Tullock) Percentage of population required to make decision

Types of veto gates • Electoral system – PR/plurality, district size, thresholds, timing •

Types of veto gates • Electoral system – PR/plurality, district size, thresholds, timing • Party discipline – Open v. closed list PR, campaign finance • Bicameralism • Federalism and decentralization • Independent Judiciaries

System Rankings • • • Classic Westminster Parliamentary/PR with strong parties Premier-presidential Presidential with

System Rankings • • • Classic Westminster Parliamentary/PR with strong parties Premier-presidential Presidential with plurality voting Parliamentary with fragmented parties Presidential with fragmented parties

British Election Results, 2001

British Election Results, 2001

Successful Institutional Reform • Electoral systems – Chile 1988, Japan 1994, Italy 1994, New

Successful Institutional Reform • Electoral systems – Chile 1988, Japan 1994, Italy 1994, New Zealand 1996, Thailand 1997 • Federalism – Brazil, Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000)

Conclusions • No such thing as an optimal political system • Institutions come in

Conclusions • No such thing as an optimal political system • Institutions come in complex, interdependent packages • Good institutions heavily dependent on local context and traditions • Need to invest in local knowledge of institutions • Leadership matters • Formal institutions matter less than many think

LIMITS LIMITS STANDARD LIMITS LIMITS STANDARD LIMITS LIMITSLIMITS LIMITS STANDARD LIMITS LIMITS STANDARD LIMITS LIMITS
Trust Prosperity Government Francis Fukuyama Freeman Spogli InstituteTrust Prosperity Government Francis Fukuyama Freeman Spogli Institute
StateBuilding The Missing Dimensions of Stateness Francis FukuyamaStateBuilding The Missing Dimensions of Stateness Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama The End of History The NationalFrancis Fukuyama The End of History The National
Limits I Why limits II What are limitsLimits I Why limits II What are limits
LIMITS Why limits Methods for upper limits DesirableLIMITS Why limits Methods for upper limits Desirable
Understanding Limits Limits Limits are the foundation ofUnderstanding Limits Limits Limits are the foundation of