ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION Managerial Economics Jack Wu NTUC INCOME
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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION Managerial Economics Jack Wu
NTUC INCOME: PREMIUMS FOR $200, 000 LIFE INSURANCE female civil servant group policy • maximum coverage limit • no medical exam $240 individual policy • no maximum coverage • medical exam required $991 $1849
IMPERFECT/ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION imperfect information – absence of certain knowledge (uncertainty) asymmetric information -- one party has better information than the other party with worse information also suffers from imperfect information
RISK uncertainty about benefit or cost arises from imperfect information risk-averse person prefers certain payment to uncertain payments with same expected value risk-averse person will buy insurance
WINE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, I Price (Hundred $ per case) 8 supply of good vintage 7 combined supply of good and bad vintage 5 actual demand (marginal benefit) for good vintage 3 2 0 1 2 3 Quantity (Thousand cases a month) 8
WINE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, II actual demand = combined supply of good and bad at equilibrium price actual marginal benefit (adjusted for prob of getting bad vintage) = price actual marginal cost (of good vintage) = price
ADVERSE SELECTION economic inefficiency possible market failure
MARKET FAILURE, I Price (Hundred $ per case) 8 combined supply of good and bad vintages actual demand (marginal benefit) 2 0 demand (marginal benefit) for good vintage c d F Quantity (Thousand cases a month) 8
MARKET FAILURE, II conventional market: when supply exceeds demand, lower price restores equilibrium wine market with adverse selection: lower price drives out better vintages, leaving even worse adverse selection
LIFE INSURANCE, I Coverage = $200, 000 for 43 year-old male NTUC Income Singapore Pacific Century Hong Kong Group policy $240 $212 Individual (nonsmoker) $1849 $466 Individual (smoker) $1849 $1120
LIFE INSURANCE, II group policy avoids adverse selection individual policy attracts adverse selection no maximum policy coverage medical examination required
APPRAISAL characteristic is objectively verifiable potential gain covers appraisal cost
SCREENING • less informed party indirectly elicits other party’s characteristic through structured choice • better informed party must be differentially sensitive to the choice
WHO’S THE REAL MOTHER? Solomon: “Divide the living child into two, and give half to the one, and half to the other. ” Woman whose son was alive: “give her the living child, and by no means slay it. ” Other woman: “It shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it. ”
INDIRECT SEGMENT DISCRIMINATION restricted vis-a-vis unrestricted air fares separate cable channels vis-à-vis bundle cents-off coupons
MULTIPLE ASYMMETRIES screening mechanisms may conflict example -- auto insurance policy: higher deductible screens out bad drivers screens out more risk-averse
AUCTION auctions to sell: seller doesn’t know buyers’ valuations auctions to buy: buyer doesn’t know sellers’ costs use competitive pressure to force bidders to reveal their information
AUCTION METHODS open/sealed bidding discriminatory/non-discriminatory pricing reserve price
WINNER’S CURSE In auction to buy: winning bidder over-estimates the true value In auction to sell: winning bidder under-estimates the true cost More severe where more bidders true value/cost more uncertain sealed-bid auction
SIGNALING • better informed party communicates characteristic through signal • cost of signal differs according to characteristic self-selection signal is credible
SIGNALING: EXAMPLES auto manufacturers – extended warranty Intuit – money-back guarantee on Quicken U. S. publicly-listed companies -- dividends
ADVERTISING AS A SIGNAL advertising expenditure must be sunk buyers must be able to detect poor quality information about poor quality must quickly spread and cut into seller’s future business
CONTINGENT CONTRACT Payment is contingent on realized characteristic: international trade -- buyback (supplier of technology must buy future product) mergers and acquisitions – payment in shares
CONTINGENT FEE Lawyer has better information about likelihood of success at trial contingent fee time-based fee
DISCUSSION This question applies the technique for deriving a market equilibrium with adverse selection presented in the math supplement. Suppose that the demand for genuine antiques is D = 4 - p, and the supply is S = p - 2, where D and S are in thousands of units a month, and p represents price in hundreds of dollars. In addition, some sellers produce 500 fakes at zero marginal cost. In a market of purely genuine antiques, what will be (i) the buyers' marginal benefit from a quantity Q, (ii) the sellers' marginal cost of providing a quantity Q, (iii) the market equilibrium price and quantity. In a market including both genuine antiques and fakes, what will be (i) the buyers' marginal benefit from a quantity Q, (ii) the sellers' marginal cost of providing a quantity Q, (iii) the market equilibrium price and quantity.
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