Conceptual Frameworks and Ontological Priority An Analytic Approach

Conceptual Frameworks and Ontological Priority: An Analytic Approach to Transcendental Metaphysics Kraków, 2 Dec 2010 Winfried Löffler Department of Christian Philosophy University of Innsbruck / Austria Winfried. Loeffler@uibk. ac. at 1. Strawson on “descriptive” and “revisionary metaphysics” 2. Some closer characteristics of DM 3. Some minor points in need of clarification 4. Thesis I: Strawson regards DM as a sort of “transcendental metaphysics” 5. Thesis II: DM is indeed indispensable 6. On what there is: A proposal for “ontological priority” 1 7. An outlook at the philosophy of religion

1. Strawson on “descriptive” and “revisionary metaphysics” Peter F. Strawson, 1919 -2006 Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959) (Indywidua. Próba metafizyki opisowej (1980)) Starting-point of modern analytic metaphysics A possible connection to Kant & Aquinas: The Bounds of Sense „Aristotelian“ tendency 2

Result of Individuals (roughly): – Distinction between “DM” and “RM” – DM: the categorial framework that factually guides our thinking about the world – RM: a “better” framework [better in respect to what? ] – “Aristotelian” ontology; persons as primitive category – Objects of DM are “ontologically prior” – Ambiguous: “only descriptive” “transcendental” 3

2. Some closer characteristics of DM (i): l Forms of RM might be useful, but are indebted to DM l DM is only indebted to research/investigation in general l Can be found in “depth grammar” l More general than mere “conceptual analysis” l DM is mostly trans-historical and trans-cultural l l Concepts of DM are not sophisticated, but commonplaces behind any form of thinking, more or less elaborate DM provides reasons for what we believe instinctively % 4

2. Some closer characteristics of DM (ii): l l Criterion for ontological priority: A’s are prior to B’s iff A’s are identifiable without reference to B’s, but not conversely “Aristotelian”, i. e. mid-size objects of Lebenswelt are prior Special importance of persons in their double aspect: physical & mental predicates Only persons admit of referring to and acting within our spatio-temporal world 5

3. Some minor points in need of clarification l l Is DM an empirical or non-empirical discipline? (Dilemma: If empirical, it would be as inconsistent as “folk ontology”; if non-empirical, is it still “descriptive”? ) Relatively to “folk-ontology”, any DM has revisionary aspects: e. g. “colour-predicates are dispositional predicates” Do the natural, social etc. sciences influence DM? (Körner 1984) In relation to what is RM better than DM? What is the difference between a mere model and a RM? (Löffler 2007) 6

4. Thesis I: Strawson regards DM as a sort of „transcendental metaphysics“ – Usual reading: DM is “descriptive” / just our factual conceptual framework But: – Strawson’s wordings like “indispensable core…” – Individuals contains at least 4 transcendental arguments (retorsive type: doubting p presupposes the truth of p) % 7

Four transcendental arguments in Individuals: – The argument for diachronic identity of individuals (Summary: formulating doubts about the identity of x presupposes the identity of the objects other than x) – The argument against “no-ownership” doctrine of mental states (Summary: “my mental states have non owner, they are just causally dependent from a body” – but in order to single out a bundle of mental states as mine, one must presuppose an owner) – The argument for the adequacy of the attribution criteria for mental predicates (Summary: you couldn’t understand yourself as a case of mental life if you couldn’t successfully attribute mental predicates to others) – The argument for the indispensability of singular terms (Summary: anyone who wants to replace all singular terms (à la Russell/Quine) must have understood the applicability conditions for singular terms) 8

5. Thesis II: DM is indeed indispensable Result so far: Strawson – if he succeeds – shows that DM is factually indispensable. But what exactly is the function of DM? 9

5. Thesis II: DM is indeed indispensable A proposal of DM, somewhat richer: – Basic ontology of mid-size, “meso-scopic” objects: Persons, – – – animals, Tools, etc. bear monadic and relational properties of various kinds Human persons with double aspect (mental & physical) Basic principles (causality, identity [Leibniz’ law], …) Further objects (electrones, genes, magnetic fields, edges, gross national products, social groups, symphonies etc. ) make up other, “regional ontologies” Discourse about such objects is stable, provided discourse about DM-objects is stable 10

5. Thesis II: DM is indeed indispensable The function of DM: – Recall ch. 2: “DM provides reasons for what we believe instinctively” (i. e. what we presuppose in our acting etc. ) – Proposals: l l “what we believe instinctively” “Weltanschauung”/ Światopogląd ( Muck!) Weltanschauung has integration function (see next slide) DM then explicates general structures behind Weltanschauung that fulfils its integrative task, or: Any Weltanschauung that fulfils its integrative task has Aristotelian-Strawsonian DM as its core 11

5. Thesis II: DM is indeed indispensable – – – – “What we believe instinctively”: The contents of Weltanschauung / Światopogląd Theories of more/less generality, all-day and scientific Valuations and preferences, local and “ultimate” Beliefs about various fields of inquiry & practice (Rudimentary) beliefs about how those fields relate Beliefs which domains of objects are presupposed in those fields Beliefs about which theory-approach fits to what problem etc. … and the operative structure behind such Weltanschauung is a Strawsonian / Aristotelian DM 12

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority Further question: Does the traditional idea of “ontological priority” make sense? Recall Strawson’s criterion for ontological priority: A’s are prior to B’s iff A’s are (re-)identifiable without reference to B’s, but not conversely Strategy: Elaboration of this idea 13

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority Strawson’s criterion for ontological priority: A’s are prior to B’s iff A’s are identifiable without reference to B’s, but not conversely Can be read (i) as a broader methodological priority of DM: – Dependent objects within DM (accidents, events, processes …) cannot – – be identified without reference to DM-objects Objects in revisionary metaphysics (boundaries, fields, “tropes”, …) cannot be identified without reference to DM-objects Even the vocabularies of such metaphysics could not be introduced without reference to DM-objects The same holds for theoretical objects within scientific disciplines (potentials, inflation rates, …) Judgements on reasonable application-cases of scientific theories and the success/failure of applications are being made on DM level 14

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority Three examples: 1. Usual introductory examples in “trope theory” (tropes = nonunversal, individual property): “the brown of my table”, “the temperature of this wire”, … 2. The way we handle disturbance cases in scientific practice, e. g. singling out a broken-down thermometer: activities of comparing, standardizing etc. at the level of meso-scopic, Lebenswelt objects (not by reference to natural laws: they explain the behaviour of the broken-down thermometer just as well!) 3. The description of a medical syndrome: bundling reported headache, blood-pressure, paleness, temperature, … as properties of one DM-object; - similarly: judgements about success/failure of therapy (ultimately) on DM level 15

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority Strawson’s criterion can be read/extended (ii) as ontological priority of DM: Objects of category A are ontologically prior iff (i) The (re-)identification of objects of all other categories B, C, D, … is dependent on objects of category A (ii) The linguistic handling of the objects of category A is the basis for the introduction of concepts for the objects of categories B, C, D, … (abstractors in various directions) … & plausible that DM objects are indeed ontologically prior. 16

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority Is this explication of ontological priority preferable? At least 2 reasons: (i) What else could be the criterion? What stronger requirement could be demanded? (Simple “appeal to reality”, “appeal to evidence” etc. relies on obscure phenomenology!) 17

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority Is this explication of ontological priority preferable? (ii) Avoids some common mistakes: – – Taking abstractions as ontologically prior (i. e. in naturalist, materialist ontologies, trope theories etc. ) Fruitless attempts to reconstruct the initial phenomenon from such abstractions (e. g. naturalist accounts of the mind, trope theories) “Fallacy of reciprocal constitution of concepts”; “broken symmetry” between initial phenomenon and abstraction (indication: e. g. appeal to “structure tropes”!) Throwing objects of different into one ontological pot: e. g. treating atoms and tables as “material objects” Misunderstanding metaphysics as “the great collection of all things”, by summing up all regional ontologies 18

6. On what there is: A proposal for ontological priority What about the inhabitants of other ontological regions? Do tropes / universals / boundaries / electrons / points / lines / edges / tunes / masses / weights / groups / … “really” exist? – – – Yes, as long as a stable discourse on such objects is possible. But not in the same way as DM-objects exist. Traditionally: “entia rationis cum fundamento in re” 19

7. An outlook at the philosophy of religion So far: DM is “transcendental”; in the sense of indispensable No reference to a special notion of “being” No reference to God But: Re-established rationality of “Weltanschauung” and its explication in DM; Concepts of traditional metaphysics are not an extravagant addendum, but explicate the core of our access to reality. (“Reveiling apriori, not conceiling apriori”); Plausible arguments for God’s existence, if any, are formulated in terms of DM, not in some RM. Under some plausible evaluation criteria (consistency, coherence, completeness etc. ), DM-plus-theism scores better than a naturalist world-view which usually rests on RM. (Löffler 2006, ch. 5) 20