Eliminative materialism Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co uk Elimination

Eliminative materialism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk

Elimination v reduction • Eliminative materialism: the way we commonly think and talk about the mind is so mistaken that we should abandon our mental concepts, and talk about brain processes instead. • Reductionism says that there are mental properties, but they are physical properties • Eliminativism says that there are no mental properties

Folk psychology • Churchland: we understand explain each other’s behaviour by referring to beliefs, desires, etc. • Explanations require laws: we use a network of commonsense laws – E. g. if someone is thirsty, they will look for something to drink • This knowledge is ‘folk psychology’ • These laws form an empirical theory about human behaviour

Empirical theories • If empirical theories turn out not to be accurate, then they should be abandoned – If folk psychology is not good at explaining behaviour, we should reject it • Theories hypothesize that certain things exist in order to explain what we observe – E. g. atoms, germs, phlogiston, vital force – If theory is unsuccessful, we shouldn’t think that the hypothesized thing exists • If folk psychology is unsuccessful, we shouldn’t believe that beliefs, desires etc. exist

Reduction or elimination? • Science shows that there is a strong connection between the mind and brain states and processes – Therefore, folk psychology must fit onto neuroscience • Reduction: folk psychology reduces to neuroscience • Elimination: folk psychology will be replaced by neuroscience

Is folk psychology false? • Folk psychology cannot explain much about the mind, e. g. mental illness, intelligence, sleep, perception, learning • Folk psychology has not progressed in 2, 500 years • Folk psychology cannot be made coherent with neuroscience

Intentionality • Mental states are ‘about’, or ‘directed onto’, something, e. g. belief about Paris, desire for chocolate. • Intentionality has nothing to do with intentions. • An Intentional mental state has Intentional content. – ‘What are you thinking? ’

Irreducibility • How could anything physical have intentionality? – Physical states are never ‘about’ anything • So folk psychology can’t be reduced to neuroscience

The intuitive certainty of mental states • Obj: Nothing could be more certain to me than the fact that I have mental states • Reply: but what seems obvious can be false – Does the Sun move around the Earth? – Am I a thinking thing? • Churchland does not deny the existence of psychological phenomena – he denies that folk psychology is the right account of these phenomena – Can we be certain of a theory?

Folk psychology is not false • Folk psychology is meant to explain human action – It is no objection that folk psychology does not explain mental illness etc. • It explains and predicts action very well – Much better than neuroscience! • Folk psychology is the basis of developments in scientific psychology • Reply: all this is superficial, and folk psychological explanations are very weak compared to other areas of science

Self-refuting? • Eliminativism tries to change our beliefs by presenting arguments – Arguments are expressions of beliefs and rely on the meaning of words • Yet it claims there are no beliefs and no meanings! – Any argument for eliminativism refutes itself – its conclusion contradicts its own assumptions

Reply • The objection begs the question – It assumes that folk psychology is the correct account of meaning – Cp: ‘there is no vital force; life is chemistry’ ‘If there is no vital force, you would be dead! The fact that you speak refutes you. ’

Objection • It is a conceptual truth that claims and arguments are ‘about’ something – Eliminativism denies that anything is ‘about’ anything • It is inconceivable that folk psychology is false, since the very idea of ‘being false’ depends on folk psychology being true • Folk psychology is not an empirical theory, but a condition of intelligibility – Therefore, it cannot be eliminated

Implication • If Churchland is right that folk psychology doesn’t reduce to neuroscience, then it is irreducible, not eliminable