Changing Certain and Uncertain Attitudes The Opposite Effects

Changing Certain and Uncertain Attitudes: The Opposite Effects of General Action and Inaction Goals 1, 2 Owenby 1 Handley Capt. Shaun R. & Dr. Ian M. 1 2* Montana State University , United States Air Force Introduction Method Results Goals typically define specific desired end-states to achieve (e. g. , lose weight, increase work productivity) and drive our (in)actions (Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010). But goals can define less specific end-states. Of current focus, individuals can hold general goals for action or inaction, and these goals impact information processing (Albarracín et al. , 2008; Albarracín & Handley, 2011). Participants. Two hundred forty-four introductory psychology students at Montana State University participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (attitude certainty: uncertainty salient vs. control) x 3 (goal prime: action vs. inaction vs. control) between-participants design. Manipulation Check. Participants in the control condition (M = 4. 14, SD = 1. 80) reported marginally greater initial attitude certainty toward Miniac than participants in the uncertainty salient condition (M = 3. 87, SD = 2. 00), t (242) = 1. 075, p =. 142 (one-tailed). Generally, action (relative to inaction) goals increase information processing (e. g. , integration and recall of written information; Albarracín et al. , 2008). However, in persuasion contexts, action (relative to inaction) goals increase the activation of relevant attitudes, thus decreasing the processing of counter -attitudinal information and attitude change (Albarracín & Handley, 2011). Procedure. v Participants completed the experiment via computer running Media. Lab. v First, participants reported their initial attitudes about “Miniac, ” a new (actually fictitious) food they may have seen on the market. v Next, participants were randomly assigned to either complete thought listing questions about Miniac in order to highlight attitude uncertainty, or complete a filler (control) task. v Then, participants were asked to rate their attitude certainty about Miniac. v Next, participants were randomly assigned to complete word fragments to prime ACTION, INACTION, or NO (control) GOAL. v Following the priming task, participants read a persuasive argument about Miniac before reporting their attitudes toward Miniac again. v Finally, participants were probed for suspicion regarding the true goal of the experiment before being debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. To investigate this idea, we created situations in which individuals’ default tendency was to process persuasive information carefully (i. e. , they have an uncertain attitude) or not (i. e. , they have a clear pre-existing attitude). v Action goal have a certain (i. e. , clear) attitude use it and do not change it (facilitating action) v Action goal uncertain (i. e. shaky) attitude seek information to alter/form attitude and decrease uncertainty (facilitating action) Thus, the present experiment sought to extend existing research by determining whether action and inaction goal primes elicit opposite effects on attitude change (information processing) when individuals’ pre-existing attitudes are certain versus uncertain. v Hypothesis 1: Inaction (vs. action) goal primes will elicit greater attitude change when initial attitudes are certain (replicating previous research). v Hypothesis 2: Action (vs. inaction) goal primes will elicit greater attitude change when initial attitudes are uncertain. v Hypothesis 3: Attitude change will be comparable across certainty conditions within the Control (no goal) prime conditions. Dependent Measures. Attitude Certainty. Participants responded to the following two attitude certainty items using a 9 -point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree): “I am certain my current attitude toward Miniac is the best one to hold. ” and “I would use my current attitude about Miniac with great confidence. ” Responses were averaged to create and attitude-certainty score. 2 Mean Attitude Change These opposing effects for action goals may suggest they depend on the default tendency of a situation. When processing information is typical, action goals increase this tendency; however, when scant information processing is typical (e. g. , when one already has an attitude), action goals may enhance this tendency. Attitude Change. A between-participants factorial ANOVA yielded only the predicted significant interaction, F(2, 238) = 3. 42, p =. 034, (all other Fs <1). • Most important, a planned contrast testing the predicted crossover interaction between the action and inaction conditions was significant, t(238) = 2. 55, p =. 0057. • Further, contrasts revealed a significant difference of attitude uncertainty among the action-goal, t(238) = 1. 664, p =. 049, and inaction-goal conditions, t(238) = 1. 947, p =. 027, but no difference within the controlgoal conditions, t(238) =. 844, p =. 400. Control Uncertainty Salient 1, 6 1, 2 0, 8 0, 4 0 Action Error Bars: +/- 1 SE Control Inaction Goal Prime Discussion Attitude Change. Participants responded to five attitude measurement items about Miniac at the beginning and end of the experiment by completing the following statement: “Miniac is: ” (1=harmful, bad, foolish, unfavorable, negative to 9 = beneficial, good, wise, favorable, positive). Participants’ responses were averaged at each time point, from which we created an attitudechange measure by subtracting post-message attitudes from the pre-message attitudes. When the uncertainty of participants’ initial relevant attitudes was not salient, our results replicate prior findings: action (inaction) goals resulted in less (more) attitude change following a persuasive message. But, extending this research in a novel way, this pattern was significantly reversed when initial attitude uncertainty was made salient. Attitude Change Means, Standard Deviations, & Sample Size by Condition These results suggest action and inaction goals can influence the extent people think about information, but this influence may depend on additional factors —in this case, perceived certainty about the topic. Future research will seek to replicate and extend these novel findings and the possibility of a default tendency explanation of the impact of action and inaction goals. Goal Prime Attitude Certainty Action Control Inaction Uncertainty Salient 1. 43 (1. 75) n = 42 1. 12 (1. 57) n = 42 0. 95 (1. 95) n = 42 Control 0. 830 (1. 47) n = 40 1. 43 (1. 40) n = 40 1. 66 (1. 63) n = 38 Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. References Albarracín, D. , Handley, I. M. , Noguchi, K. , Mc. Culloch, K. C. , Li, H. , Leeper, J. , Brown, R. D. , Earl, A. , & Hart, W. P. (2008). Increasing and decreasing motor and cognitive output: A model of general action and inaction goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 510– 523. Albarracín, D. , & Handley, I. M. (2011). The time for doing is not the time for change: Effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude accessibility and attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 983– 998. Bargh, J. A. , Gollwitzer, P. M. , & Oettingen, G. (2010). Motivation. In S. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzay (Eds. ), Handbook of social psychology (5 th ed. , pp. 268 -316). New York: Wiley. *Disclaimer Clause: The views expressed in this poster are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Government. Approved for public release.