Youth Conflict and Terrorism Zachary Rothschild Eurasian Regional

Youth, Conflict, and Terrorism Zachary Rothschild Eurasian Regional Affairs Officer Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism U. S. Department of State rothschildzr@state. gov 202 -647 -2169

OVERVIEW u Definitions u Relationship between Youth and Conflict u Lessons learned and programmatic approaches

Definitions… • “Terrorists care about how many people are watching, not how many are dead. ” • Insurgents: an armed group seeking to wrest political power from a government.

…and a relationship… • In 2006, al-Qaida and other terrorists (sought to) exploit insurgency and communal conflict as radicalization and recruitment tools, especially using the Internet to convey their message. ” - U. S. Department of State

Are youth a cause of war and terrorism? • No statistical correlation between youth ‘bulge’ and civil conflict, except where other factors present: – High unemployment – States in transition – Politics is organized around violent factions. • Most recruits into violent groups are alienated youth…

How Conflict Emerges • USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework: – Incentives for Violence (Greed and Grievance – personal and group) – Resources (Weapons, Training, Recruits) – Weak State & Social Capacity to Respond

Not just self-interest… • Profile of Shehzad Tanweer, 21, one of the British Tube Bombers, July 2005 – – Accomplished athlete studying sports science at Leeds Metropolitan U. Born and raised in U. K, of Pakistani origin Loving, supportive, and financially successful parents A friend described him as “not interested in politics, ” and “as sound as a pound. ” • Sageman’s study of Al-Qaeda Biographies – 2/3 were middle or upper class – 60% had gone to college

…. It’s also who you know… • Sageman: 88% of Al-Qaeda members studied (n=400) had family/friends in the ‘Jihad’ • Peer pressure: No suicide bomber has ever acted alone.

…and what you accept as right (legitimizing ideology)… “He is an enemy of ours whether he fights us directly or merely pays his taxes. ” - Osama bin Laden

Doing something about it: Principles and Programs • Peer networks and peer pressure drive radicalization and recruitment… but can also support youth engagement and development. • Programs: – Networking in and out-of-school youth, – Service learning

A Mathematical Interlude • 4 th grade math puzzle in Afghanistan: – ‘The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead? ’

Doing something about it: Principles and Programs • Lesson: What youth know can shape what they believe to be right. • Programs: – Maradi Youth Development (Niger) – Madrasa Street Law Program (Kyrgyzstan)

Doing something about it: Rural Dynamics • “Traditional authority figures often wield enough power to single- handedly drive an insurgency. This is especially true in rural areas. ” – U. S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual • Pacifying the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: The Datu and his bananas • Lesson: Engage youth with traditional leadership, not apart from youth in isolation – and create opportunity. • Programs: – Intergenerational Dialogue Workshops (Burundi) – Create economic opportunity to reinforce hope and dignity.

Doing something about it: Rural Dynamics • Safehavens key to terrorist access to resources; often found in (rural) border areas. • Less state control, less state services = More opportunities for insurgents. • Examples: Hamas & Hizballah • Lesson: Engage youth in service-delivery to reduce likelihood safehavens emerging. • Programs: – Youth Service Corps to improve service delivery

Closing Note – Trusted Networks