What is consciousness What should we ask about

What is consciousness? What should we ask about its relation to selfconsciousness? Charles Siewert Rice University

What do we want a philosophical theory of consciousness to tell us?

What I would like it to tell us • A satisfactory preliminary account of what consciousness is. I. e. , identify the proper topic of theories that propose to explain it—so we can better evaluate them. • What its relation to mind is—both generally (does it make the difference between the minded and the mindless? ) and with regards to specific aspects (e. g. , perception and recognition of objects, conceptual thought, linguistic understanding, desire, self-awareness (or self-consciousness). • What is its role is in our knowledge (of our surroundings, of our own minds) • What its proper place is in our values, concerns.

Identify the topic: consciousness • But is this really a problem? • Isn’t it initially sufficiently obvious what consciousness is for us to evaluate theoretical claims and arguments about it? • I don’t think so.

Creature vs State Consciousness • Distinguish sense in which a person is conscious or unconscious, from sense in which a state of mind is conscious or unconscious. • What’s the relation? Too simple to say a person is conscious just when she’s in some conscious state of mind or other. Because saying a person is conscious seems to imply she’s awake. But a person can be unconscious (in the “not awake” sense) and still be in a “state of consciousness” (if dreaming counts). • Plausibly we should just say person is conscious (in the “awake” sense), only if she is in some non-dreaming state of consciousness. • Then to understand what it is for a person (or “creature”) to be conscious, we need to understand what it is for a state of a person to be conscious. And what is that?

Consider now Block’s 3 concepts of state consciousness • A state’s being “phenomenally” conscious = its being an experience, or experiential. What makes a state p-conscious: there is something ‘it is like’ to be in that state. (p. 206) • A state’s being “access conscious” = its having representational content “broadcast for free use in reasoning and direct ‘rational’ control of action (including reporting)” (p. 208) • Its being conscious in a “monitoring” sense (its being thought of by the person who is in that state, for example) (p. 214) Does this adequately clarify what it for a state to be conscious, so that we can go to work on evaluating theories? Let’s consider some of theoretical disputes.

Block’s 3 concepts: claims and controversies According to some (e. g. , Prinz, Tye) phenomenal consciousness just is a special kind of information accessibility. According to others (e. g. , David Rosenthal and Bill Lycan) phenomenal consciousness just is a special way the mind monitors itself (“higher order thought, ” “high order perception”). According to yet others (e. g. , Block) we neglect phenomenal consciousness in our theories by mistakenly identifying it with either of these. In Block’s view, “a great deal of confusion arises as a result of confusing P-consciousness with something else. ” (208) And whether a purely computational or a biological approach to explaining consciousness is better will depend on whether we identify or distinguish phenomenality from some form of access. (208 -9)

Block’s 3 concepts: claims and controversies We need to be clear enough on what we understand by ‘phenomenally conscious’ in order to… • Assess Prinz’s claims about phenomenality and accessibility and what empirical evidence shows • Decide whether Lycan and Rosenthal are right about consciousness and higher-order representation • Decide whether is Block is right about the dangers of conflation, and whether a theory of consciousness should be biologically focused. Do we have an adequate understanding of ‘consciousness’ to ground and guide our inquiry? Do Block and Prinz give us this?

Again, what does Block say “phenomenal consciousness” means? • A state is conscious just when: it’s an experience. • A state is conscious just when: there’s something it’s like to be in it.

Why Block’s explanation is insufficient First, “experience. ” We can rightly apply the term ‘experience’ in senses that don’t entitle us to infer what it applies to are conscious states. For example: “The flight from New York was quite an experience. ” “Scientists have shown that the sea slug can learn from experience” (by being electrically shocked). We aren’t justified in inferring from this: “That airplane flight was a conscious state” or “It has been shown that sea slugs have conscious states. ” Second, “something it’s like. ” We can rightly think there’s something it’s like to be in a certain state, where this doesn’t entitle us to infer it’s a conscious state. For example: What was it like to weigh 200 kilos? What was it like fall from 38, 000 meters? We can rightly think there was something it was like, in each of these cases, but we can’t rightly infer that weighing 200 kilos or falling from 38, 000 m are conscious states.

Consider now Prinz on what he means by “phenomenal c-ness” 1. states that “feel like” something 2. that have phenomenal qualities, qualitative character, or subjective properties. 3. Phenomenal consciousness = experience. 4. A state is conscious if its possessor can “know what it’s like” 5. What’s missing in cases of unseen video screen “flicker” and in cases of visual “masking”.

Why Prinz’s explanations are insufficient (1) doesn’t fit all cases even Prinz would want (we don’t speak of how its looking green to you feels). Provides a misleading general test of phenomenal consciousness. (1) “qualitative’ etc. just jargon that needs explanation. (3) and (4) have same problems as noted with Block. (5) One might think what’s missing in flicker is just that one doesn’t see the flicker. But don’t we want to focus more specifically on conscious, experiential seeing? How do we draw the contrast between conscious and unconscious vision? Masking example is better– but is it clear enough that what’s missing isn’t just memory, or (in interocular case) attention, rather than visual consciousness? Prinz ultimately maintains that consciousness just is (a sort of) attention. But we can’t take this for granted at the start. Also how should we conceptualize what’s missing in these cases? Just: consciousness of seeing? But then consciousness is “monitoring”?

What do we do then? • Some will be skeptical about using notions of experience or ‘what it’s like’ to identify the topic, consciousness. • Some will offer to explain these (or other) notions in ways that strongly favor or presuppose theories about what consciousness is, reasonably seen as controversial. • I want to avoid these reactions.

My Challenge Explain how to interpret ‘phenomenal consciousness’ in a way that: i. remedies the problems just described with Block’s and Prinz’s introductions, ii. Is suited to evaluating claims we find in Block, Prinz and Rosenthal, inter alia, and to addressing the philosophical issues earlier described that motivate me (identifying topic, placing consciousness in mind, knowledge, value), even while: iii. leaving open questions that should initially be left open.

Some disputed questions that should be left open when we identify our topic. a) Is consciousness something physical? Can it be “reduced” to brain activity? Functional role? b) Conceptual thought and understanding: “phenomenal” in the same sense as is sense experience? c) Does all consciousness essentially involve self-consciousness in some sense? For instance, is your every conscious state somehow represented in your own mind? d) Can phenomenal consciousness be explained in terms of a form of mental representation that doesn’t presuppose it? For example, as a kind of “access” to a subclass of such representations or their informational content?

My Threefold Conception of Consciousness I. Subjective Experience II. Subjective Contrast III. Subjective Knowledge (“what it’s like”)

I. Subjective Experience 1. 2. 3. 4. Hurricane Sandy was an experience. Getting food poisoning is an experience. Feeling anxiety is an experience. Feeling nauseated is an experience. Different senses of ‘experience’. Ask: (a) does the “experience” in question coincide with your experiencing it? (Is it suitable for an “internal accusative” formulation, using ‘experience’ as both verb and noun: like “dancing a dance, ” “singing a song”, “breathing (your last) breath”? ) (b) Do you experience the experience in question only in the sense in which it’s sufficient for you to experience something that it happen to you? If yes to (a) and no to (b), then this is where ‘experience’ (the noun) is synonymous with ‘phenomenally conscious state. ’

I. Subjective Experience • Phenomenally conscious states are subjective experiences. • Something is a subjective experience (it is subjectively experienced) if it is experienced by you, in a sense in which: – it is insufficient for this that it merely happened to you, and – it is necessary that it is experienced in such a way that it coincides with your experiencing it. (As a dance could be said to coincide with the dancer’s dancing it. ) • Subjective experiences differ with respect to how they are experienced by a subject, in this sense—they differ “subjectively”. E. g. , feelings differ with respect to how they feel to you. • Phenomenal character: experiences differ in phenomenal (subjective, experiential) character when they differ with respect to how they are experienced by a subject.

Subjective Experience Conception of Consciousness • Importantly, what this leaves open for examination. • We can understand what it means to say that an experience is subjectively experienced, without yet committing to the ideas: – that our own experiences are themselves targets of representation or intentionality (mental reference) – that they are objects of “inner experience” or “appearance” or “presentation” – that they figure in the conditions of correctness or accuracy of one’s own state of mind.

II. Subjective Contrast Making consciousness conspicuous by its absence: blindsight. Consider: a sense of ‘look’ in which nothing looks any way to you in a completely dark room, or to a completely blind person. Now consider this conception of blindsight: condition, due to cortical damage, in which the subject denies she sees a stimulus, even though she successfully discriminates the stimulus, because of its effect on her light sensitive organs. Her denial is correct, provided we interpret ‘see’ in such a way that, you see something, only if it looks somehow to you (in the sense just invoked). Consciousness: what’s present in vision, when you see something in the ‘looks’ sense sharpened by this conception of blindsight.

II. Subjective Contrast “Blindsighter”: in a sense she’s blind to the stimulus, she doesn’t see it—for it doesn’t look anyhow to her. But in another sense she does see it: the sort of discrimination of visual stimuli she retains could also be regarded as a kind of “seeing. ”

II. Subjective Contrast Necessarily, any instance of its looking somehow to you (sounding somehow, etc. ) in the sense made conspicuous in our imagined subjective contrast with blindsight is a phenomenally conscious state, and an instance of such a feature is a phenomenal feature. Differences in phenomenal character are differences such as may obtain only among phenomenally conscious states, and which are (ordinarily) subjectively discernible (discernible to first-person reflection).

Note: a particular interpretation of ‘blindsight’ • This is an importantly different interpretation of “blindsight” than one (frequently suggested) that holds only: Blindsight: condition in which the subject sees stimulus in the very same sense as she did before the damage, but now is just not aware of that fact that she sees it. • That interpretation typically biases one to “higher-order” or “self-representationalist” accounts. • This violates desideradum (c)—of leaving open whether conscious states are necessarily targets of (“inner”) representation in the mind to which they belong.

This proposed use of the “contrast” method avoids the problems of others, since it allows us: (i) to focus on missing visual consciousness specifically (not just missing vision) (ii) To avoid confusion with missing memory (iii) Leaves open whether what’s missing is attention (as “interocular masking” case does not as clearly do) (iv) allows us to leave suitably open the question of whether phenomenal consciousness includes (or just consists in) some form of higher-order representation.

III. Subjective Knowledge/”What it’s like” Conception What was it like for Felix to fall? – Mightn’t there have been nothing it was like for him? (He passed out, the moment he left the capsule. ) – Assuming there was something it was like for him to fall, wasn’t this entirely derived from what is was like for him to have other features—e. g. , for him to feel as he did? If so, the fact that one is in a state of falling does not itself make that state conscious—even if there is (at least sometimes) something it’s like for one to fall. Contrast this with: what was it like for Felix to feel as he did, when falling. What it was like for him to feel this way was not entirely derived from other features he had. That is to say: there was non-derivatively or fundamentally something it’s like for him to feel this way.

What is consciousness? It’s what there is fundamentally something it’s like for you to have Phenomenally conscious state: instance of a phenomenal feature, i. e. , a feature there is something it’s like for one to have—nonderivatively , or fundamentally. There is fundamentally something it’s like for one to have a feature F just when its having this status is not due entirely to the presence of other features there is something it’s like for one to have– other features that either (i) could occur without F, or (ii) could be had in the absence of F. We might say: in “derivative” cases, a feature F just “borrows” its “what it’s like” from some feature or features G. Case (i): if you kept F, while losing G, the “what it’s like” completely goes away. Then there is nothing “it’s like” to have F, in the relevant sense. What it’s like to fall from 38, 000 m; What it’s like for one to weigh over 200 k. Case (ii): you could lose F, and keep G, without changing “what it’s like. ” What it’s like to taste durian.

What does it mean to say: there’s “something it’s like for you” to have a feature? • There is something it’s like for one to have a feature just when: it is suited for someone to claim or desire a certain subjective knowledge of what feature it is. • For example: Durian’s tasting to you as it does is suitable for someone to claim or desire a kind of knowledge of what way of tasting that is, a kind: – one gets of some features by having them oneself (if one has any such knowledge) – Which type of knowledge may be reasonably sought of some features by trying to imagine having them oneself.

III. Subjective Knowledge/ ”What it’s like” Conception • A conscious state is an instance of a phenomenal feature, a feature there is fundamentally something it’s like for one to have. And that’s the case just when: • it is fundamentally suited for someone to claim or desire a certain subjective, knowledge of what feature it is. • The phenomenal character of a conscious state is what it is like for one to have the phenomenal feature of which it is an instance. • Two states differ in phenomenal character (they are instances of distinct phenomenal features) just when they differ with respect to what makes them fundamentally suited for subjective knowledge or curiosity.

My claims about this threefold preliminary account of consciousness • Three conceptions: I. subjective experience II. subjective contrast III. subjective knowledge (“what it’s like”) converge on the same feature: consciousness, phenomenality • Solve difficulties of interpretation such as those found in Block and Prinz • Leave open questions it’s desirable to leave open • Put us in a better position to answer those questions

Focus in future sessions • Questions about the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. • Some background reasons for interest: – tell us what consciousness is – how we know about it – how we are conscious of ourselves; what “the self” is.

Two senses of ‘self-consciousness’ • “Consciousness of one’s own consciousness. ” What I will call “state” self-consciousness (or state reflexivity) • “Consciousness of self. ” What I will call “subject” self-consciousness (or subject reflexivity)

“Consciousness of consciousness” A given conscious state is an instance of state self-consciousness just when: it is a state of being conscious of one’s own conscious state—where this is not simply to say it is “subjectively experienced” in the non-committal sense earlier explained. [“Non-egological” alternative: …just when it is a state of being conscious of a state that belongs to the same unity of consciousness…. ] – Here “being conscious of one’s own conscious state” includes, but is not presumed to be limited to, consciously thinking of one’s own experience. – It is left open what forms being conscious of one’s own conscious state might take. For example, is there an “inner sense” properly so called? Are conscious states somehow “self-representing”? Is one conscious of one’s own conscious state in some “non-objectifying” or “non-intentional” way that amounts to more than just being subjectively experienced?

“Consciousness of self” A given conscious state is an instance of subject self-consciousness just when : it is a state of being conscious of oneself. – This includes, but is not presumed to be limited to, consciously thinking thoughts expressible using the first-person pronoun (“I-thoughts”). – It is an open question in what sense, if any, such “first-person thoughts” are distinguished from other ways of thinking of one’s self. – It is also an open question in what sense, if any, being conscious of one’s self involves a special sort of consciousness of oneself “as subject, ” what this might consist in (is it “agentive”? -- for example), and whether that is to be found in ordinary non-reflective conscious states.

Two broad questions • How is a state’s being conscious related to state self-consciousness? (“consciousness of consciousness”) • How is a state’s being conscious related to subject self-consciousness? (“consciousness of self”) • In future sessions, I will take these in turn. Here’s preview

How is a state’s being conscious related to “state reflexive” self-consciousness? • This will be theme of sessions 2, 3 & 4. • I will explore various ways in which one might maintain that state self-consciousness is either essential to or constitutive of a state’s being conscious. • These are found in “higher-order thought, ” “inner sense (or higherorder perception)” and self-representational accounts of consciousness. • I will argue that these are mistaken. • But from this, a positive answer to the question also emerges.

How is a state’s being conscious related to “state reflexive” self-consciousness? There is a sort of “consciousness of consciousness” —a kind of reflective attention: – which is itself conscious thought – whose occurrence requires the occurrence of the conscious state it is a thought of, – a state whose status as conscious, in turn, requires that it be available for reflection of that very kind, in beings who are capable of it.

How is a state’s being conscious related to subject self-consciousness? • This will be theme of sessions 5, 6 & 7. • I will consider views, inspired significantly by Hume, according to which: – The consciousness one has of oneself in thinking “I-thoughts” (reflective or otherwise) is grounded in an a more basic state self-consciousness. (Howell’s view) – neither reflective nor non-reflective conscious states involve one’s being conscious of oneself (or experiencing oneself) in a distinctive “as subject” way. (Prinz’s view) • I will also consider views, inspired significantly by Kant, according to which: – One does have a special “as subject” (or at any rate, “agentive”) consciousness of oneself in virtue of exercising rationality—to that extent, the consciousness of a rational being essentially involves a subject self-consciousness. (Views in Korsgaard and O’Brien) – Such agent consciousness of self serves as a developmentally basic subject self-consciousness that enables one to acquire the sort of self-consciousness involved in mastery of the firstperson pronoun. (O’Brien) – Agent self-consciousness functions to constitute a self through time. (Korsgaard)

How is a state’s being conscious related to subject self-consciousness? I plan to argue (with varying degrees of tentativeness): – Hume’s phenomenology of self-consciousness is overrated and often underexamined; once this is seen, we can see that it won’t work to try to ground reflective consciousness of self in state self-consciousness. – The Kantians have a point against the Humeans—there are two plausible candidates for consciousness of self as subject that the latter underrate: the “non-attributive” consciousness one has of oneself in experiential ‘Ithoughts’; and agent consciousness. – However, there is a form of such self-consciousness some Kantians neglect: a consciousness of oneself as an active, embodied perceiver. – By recognizing this aspect of pre-reflective, subject self-consciousness as a part of ordinary experience, we are in a better position to account for how one acquires the ability to express “I-thoughts” in language, and how the self is “constituted” through self-consciousness.