What do we mean by mind Michael Lacewing

What do we mean by ‘mind’? Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk © Michael Lacewing

Two features of mind • To have a mind is to have a ‘point of view’ or ‘perspective’ on the world – To experience the world – To exist as a subject • Many philosophers think mind has the two features of ‘thought’ and ‘consciousness’ • Mental properties: mental states (e. g. beliefs) and mental events (e. g. thinking a thought, feeling a pain) © Michael Lacewing

Intentionality • Mental states are ‘about’, or ‘directed onto’, something, e. g. belief about Paris, desire for chocolate, anger at the government – (Intentionality has nothing to do with intentions. ) • In Intentional mental states, we conceive of something in a certain way – E. g. Oedipus and Laius: Oedipus was angry at ‘the old man’; was he angry at ‘his father’? – Intentional states represent the world in particular and partial ways © Michael Lacewing

Intentionality • Intentional object: what an Intentional state represents • ‘Aspectual shape’: the way the object is represented • Intentional content: Intentional object + shape – The answer to the question ‘What are you thinking? ’ • We can take different ‘attitudes’ toward the same content – E. g. I can believe I’m arriving late, I can want to be arriving late, I can fear I’m arriving late, etc. © Michael Lacewing

Intentionality • An Intentional mental state is a particular type of ‘attitude’ (or ‘mode’) towards a particular Intentional content – Aka ‘propositional attitudes’, since Intentional content is often described by a proposition • Are all mental states Intentional mental states? – The answer depends in part on how we understand consciousness © Michael Lacewing

Phenomenal properties • Phenomenal consciousness – The type of consciousness involved in perception, sensation, emotion • ‘What it is like’ – E. g. to see a ripe tomato, to smell coffee, to feel sad – Not comparative – Subjective qualities of experience • Almost everyone agrees there are phenomenal properties – But they disagree on what they are © Michael Lacewing

Qualia • Qualia are intrinsic, non-Intentional properties of experience – Intrinsic: not relational • Would the smell of coffee be the same smell if it wasn’t caused by coffee? – Intentional properties: what makes the mental state ‘about’ its object • Relational, not intrinsic – (Introspectively accessible) • Is this theory of phenomenal properties correct? Do qualia exist? © Michael Lacewing

The debate • Is the smell of coffee ‘about’ coffee? Is it merely caused by coffee or does it also represent coffee? – If it does represent coffee, is this all there is to the smell of coffee? • Could conscious experiences have both Intentional and non-Intentional, intrinsic properties? © Michael Lacewing