Violence Threat Assessment and Management Schools Robert Kinscherff
Violence Threat Assessment and Management Schools Robert Kinscherff, Ph. D. , Esq. William James College Senior Fellow in Law and Applied Neuroscience Harvard Law School – Mass General Hospital National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice
Definition of Violence • For purposes of this discussion, “violence” is defined as threatened or actual behavior that could or does result in physical injury warranting medical attention/care, potentially significant physical and/or psychiatric disability of the victim, or death. 2
Orienting Perspectives • School Homicides Are Rare – Average 8. 5 annually – Average school will have one school homicide every 13, 870 years (Cornell, 2006) – 2. 6% of youth homicides occur at schools – But 486, 400 non-lethal attacks (2014, age 12 -18) – Mass homicides: 0. 8% schools, 47% at homes • Attackers Are Usually Students When They Occur – Often bullied, depressed angry, desperate – Almost all had signaled their intention to peers – Highly individual confluence of individual social, family and psychological factors make it impossible to construct a useful “profile” of a potentially homicidal student
Orienting Perspectives • Attacks Occurred in Context of Significant Social Isolation of Attacker or Escalating Conflict Between Groups of Youth • Most Risk to Youth is Outside of School • Juvenile Rates of Serious Crime Are Significantly Down • All Schools Deal With Bullies, Fights, Threats but Risks Higher Among Schools in Lowest 15% of Academic Achievement and/or Poor Student Engagement • Students With Significant Mental Health Issues As A Group More Likely to be Victims of Threats and Bullying Than to be Perpetrators
Orienting Perspectives • “Universal” strategies should be the foundation for school violence prevention – Academic support and achievement – Positive student engagement – Bullying prevention and intervention – Student conflict resolution procedures • Behavioral Threat Assessment: Strategies for identifying, assessment and managing threats when universal prevention strategies ineffective in individual situations
Orienting Perspectives Compared to adults, middle school through high school students: – – – More frequently make threats Threats on continuum: communication—instrumental More frequent engaged in firghts Have situationally-dependent over-reactions More vulnerable to “hot cognition” errors • Key: Distinguish making a threat v. posing a threat Schools have a duty to educate and provide a safe learning environment—but have to operate under privacy protections (but which have emergency provisions)
Orienting Perspectives The Virginia Model reflects key goals/principles: • Move away from punitive zero-tolerance • Address misbehavior but keep engaged in school • Threats: Indication that youth has a problem that he/she feels can’t otherwise resolve • Behavioral threat assessment to prevent violence, solve the problem, create teaching opportunity, calibrate disciplinary response, support school engagement
Secret Service Key Findings in School Shootings • Incidents of Targeted Violence At School Rarely Are Sudden, Impulsive Acts • Prior to Most Incidents, Other People Knew About the Attacker’s Idea And/Or Plan To Attack, But This Information Rarely Was Known By An Adult
Secret Service Key Findings in School Shootings • Most Attackers Did Not Threaten Their Targets Directly Prior To Advancing The Attack • There Is No Accurate Or Useful “Profile” Of Students Who Will Engage in Potentially Lethal Mass Attacks at School—Only Profiles With Very High False Positive Errors And No Known Data on False Negatives
Secret Service Key Findings in School Shootings • Most Attackers Engaged In Some Behavior, Prior To the Incident, That Caused Others Concern Or Indicated A Need For Help • Most Attackers Had Difficulty Coping With Significant Losses Or Personal Failures. Many Had Considered Or Attempted Suicide
Secret Service Key Findings in School Shootings • Most Attackers Felt Bullied, Persecuted Or Injured By Others Prior To The Attack • Most Attackers Had Access To And Had Used Weapons Prior To The Attack
Secret Service Key Findings in School Shootings • In Many Cases, Other Students Were Involved In The Attack In Some Capacity • Despite Prompt Law Enforcement Responses, Most Attacks Were Stopped By Means Other Than Law Enforcement Intervention And Most Attacks Were Brief In Duration
Risk Assessment and Management • Is the goal to predict or to manage risk? • Time frame available or anticipated? • Risk management with or without ambiguity about essential information regarding risk, protective and contextual factors? 13
Risk Assessment and Management • Risk management with or without options for adequate monitoring or containment? • Risk management with or without capacity for adequate ongoing communication? • Risk management with or without consensus on “risk tolerance” by key players?
BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENT Operational “real time” assessments Distinguishing “making a threat” v “posing a threat” Focuses primarily on concrete behaviors Info on psych characteristics can inform, rarely resolve
Examples of Targeted Violence • • • Stalking School Attacks Workplace Attacks Intimate Partner Violence Political Figure or Public Figure Attacks Other 16
Behavioral Threat Assessment • Current Intensity of the Motivation • Current Focus of the Intention • Current Operational Capacity (Ability) • Current Access to Intended Target (Ability) • Vulnerability of Intended Target (Ability) 17
Risk as on Dynamic Trajectory Contextual Dynamic Static 18
Trajectory Towards Violent Outcome Capability Intent Situational Precipitant Desperation and Tunnel Vision + Target Vulnerability
Pathway to Targeted Violence: Adapted with permission from F. S. Calhoun and S. W. Weston (2003). Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing and managing individuals of violent intent. © 2003 F. S. Calhoun and S. W. Weston. All rights reserved. (with thanks to Dr. Reid Meloy) Pre-attack Preparation on ci si de Violent Ideation Es al a fin Probing & Breaches Research & Planning the Attack ct s Attack n o i at l ca al c s n o i t a -E e D The “Grievance” 20
“Red Flags” (Beware False Positives) • Red Flags that can reflect potentially destabilizing distress: – Problems with peers and/or academic performance – Onset of heightened irritability, sadness, moodiness – Evidence of heightened substance abuse – Loss of key or supportive relationships – Sudden withdrawal, disinterest, sense of desperation – Acute or cumulative stressors 21
“Red Flags” (Beware False Positives) • Red Flags that may reflect heightened violence risk to others: – Preoccupation with violent thoughts, images, plans – Attitudes of entitlement and justifications of violence – Identification of person(s) “responsible” for problems – Information that has/could acquire a lethal weapon – Heightened conflict with adults or peers, or isolation – Implied or explicit threats, esp. if reflect planning
Framing Role of MHP • As participant in Behavioral Threat Assessment process—hopefully as part of an established team • Providing emergency evaluation • Providing specialized risk assessment evaluation that includes specialized tools and is richly informed by collateral data and behavioral details regarding trajectory of behaviors of concern in contexts incl peers, family, school— yield pragmatic risk management plan including interventions on R-N-R model
Operating Principles • Any threat/concern about violence is serious • Note: Role of desperation and tunnel vision • Note: “Hunters” versus “Howlers” • All threats/concerns promptly reported • Multidisciplinary threat assessment team • All info sources anonymous whenever possible consistent with safety considerations
Operating Principles • Screening may yield further assessment but both result in follow-up steps no matter what the outcome of threat determination • High coordination with school attorney, local law enforcement, mental health and other resources
FBI Typology of Threats • Direct Threats: Threaten a specific act towards specific target(s) in an explicit manner indicating that violence will occur • Indirect Threats: Vague, ambiguous threats which imply violence which could occur
FBI Typology of Threats • Veiled Threats: Strongly imply but do not explicitly threaten violence. • Conditional Threats: Warning violence will occur if certain conditions, demands or terms are not met.
FBI Levels of Risk • Low-level threats: Pose minimal risk to potential targets, threats are vague and indirect. Risk assessment information is inconsistent, implausible, and/or lacking either detail or realism
FBI Levels of Risk • Medium-level threats: Could be carried out although they may not seem realistic. More direct and concrete than low-level threats, reflect some degree of thought/planning about how violent act would occur. Include general indications of place/time but well short of a detailed plan and little indication of preparation or initial steps to carry out plan. Still, person signals intent (“I’m serious!”)
FBI Levels of Risk • High-level threats: Direct, specific and plausible threats that appear to pose imminent and serious danger to others, and suggest that concrete steps in preparation have already occurred (e. g. , acquiring weapon, stalking victim, figuring out school schedule/location). This level always requires law enforcement involvement.
Kids make threats when they can’t figure out how to resolve problems any other way. ” Dr. Dewey Cornell The Virginia Model for Student Threat Assessment
VA Model for Student Threat Assessment Threat Reported To Principal (1) Evaluate Threat Interview threatener, target, any witnesses Carefully document all information and statements obtained Consider circumstances of threat and the intent of the threat (2) Is threat clearly transient or substantive? Consider criteria for substantive and transient threats Consider student’s age, credibility, prior discipline history
VA Model for Student Threat Assessment Threat Clearly Transient (3) Respond to Transient Threat • Responses may include: – – – Reprimand Parent Notification Making Amends Mediation Counseling Threat Substantive or Meaning Not Clear (4) Decide if Serious or Very Serious Threat • Serious threat: – Threat to Assault, Strike – Threat to “Beat Up” • Very Serious include: – – Threat to Kill Threat to Rape Threat to Seriously Injure Threat to Use Weapon
VA Model for Student Threat Assessment Threat is Serious Threat is Very Serious (5) Respond to Serious Substantive Threat (6) Conduct Safety Evaluation • Immediate protective precautions including notification of parents of victim and victim • Notify parents of student • Consider law enforcement • Refer for counseling, dispute mediation, other • Discipline as warranted by severity and chronicity of behavior • Immediate protective precautions including notification of parents and victim notification • Notify law enforcement • Notify parents of student • Initiate mental health assessment of student • Discipline response as warranted
VA Model for Student Threat Assessment If Threat is Very Serious (7) Implement Safety Plan • Complete a written plan • Suspension pending finishing assessment that includes both mental health and law enforcement component • Maintain contact with student • Revise plan as needed
Implementation of VA Model (Nekvasil & Cornell, 2015) • Compared with other schools using other threat response and disciplinary approaches: – Lower short-term suspensions – Student perception fairer discipline – Lower levels of student aggressive behaviors – Teachers report feeling safer – Increasing ratings of (+) school engagement
Specialized Assessment • • • Not part of most standard mental health training Multiple sources of information essential Use of threat assessment model Organization of risk, protective, context factors Identification of likeliest “risk scenarios” 37
Specialized Assessment • “Testing” not dispositive but some tools help: – Firestone Assessment of Violent Thoughts. Adolescent (FAVT-A) – Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth – Psychopathy Checklist-Youth Version – Novaco Anger Scales • Always also screen and assess for suicide
Four Domains of Assessment (FBI) • Characteristics of the student – Behavioral Characteristics • Capacity to cope with stress, conflict, loss • How deals with anger, humiliation, sadness, disappointment • Resiliency to failure, criticism, other negative experiences • Responses to rules, authority • Need for control (and how asserts control over others) • Capacities for empathy and respect for others • Sense of self-importance compared to others
Four Domains of Assessment (FBI) • Characteristics of the student – Personality Traits • • Tolerance for frustration Coping skills (and willingness to use them in situation) Focus on perceived injustices by others Signs of depression or other mental illness Self-perceptions (narcissistic and/or insecure, devaluing) Need for attention Focus of blame/responsibility (internalized/externalized)
Four Domains of Assessment (FBI) • School Dynamics • • Individual and general student engagement to school General and selective tolerance for disrespect, misconduct Approach to discipline (equitable, arbitrary, selective) Flexibility and/or inclusiveness of school culture Pecking order among students Code of silence Supervision of computer access
Four Domains of Assessment (FBI) • Social Dynamics • • • Peer group relationships and culture Use of drugs/alcohol Media, entertainment, technology Level and focus of outside interests Potential copycat from past incidents
Four Domains of Assessment (FBI) • Family Dynamics • • Parent-child relationship Attitudes towards concerning behavior in past, currently Attitudes towards any signs of depression or other MI Access to weapons Sense of connection/intimacy among family members Attitude/enforcement towards parental authority Monitoring of TV, video, internet, social media, other
Specialized Assessment • Assessment may have to consider any qualifying disability and specifically address what, if any link, exists between a disability and a problematic behavior for “manifest determination” purposes. Evaluators must know SPED • Therapists for an individual are typically not adequate sources for reliable violence risk assessments or risk management opinions 44
Assessment Flow Chart (Harris, Rice & Quinsey, 1993) 45
Additional Tips • Consider whether the threat being assessed or managed: – Is an threat by an individual who is feeling desperate and focusing upon violence as a solution to a problem, but does not reflect broader threat – Reflects threat arising from toxic peer or other interactions where others may also make or pose threats in addition to the “person of interest” – Reflects threats arising from criminal activity inside the school and likely with activities outside the school
Additional Tips • Know the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) for your school and community: risk clusters • Key strategy: Active engagement with youth in the school to create relationships where youth will bring worries and information to adults— especially with youth who are of concern • Key strategy: Focus on youth in distress rather than trying to pick out a low-frequency outliers 47
Additional Tips • Document and pass along concerns—and take care especially to document specific statements and/or behaviors of concern • Be familiar with school policies and practices regarding sharing of information and exceptions to usual rules of confidentiality • Try to see the school peer environment as youth see it —including who may be protected when engaging in misconduct that is sanctioned if others do it—and the sense of safety in coming to and from school or school activities 48
Additional Tips • School policy and practices must be clear that licensed professionals (e. g. , nurses, school psychologists, social workers, others) are members of the school team with different roles than other community based health or mental health professionals. This should be part of informed consent discussions with parents/guardians and youth 49
Points to Consider • Increased law enforcement engagement by schools for responding to minor misconduct or offenses tends to increase arrests and especially youth of color, poor, urban, special education => So inadvertently fuels “school to prison pipeline” • Research mixed on SROs in schools—may depend on attitude, orientation, training of SROs and school response/disciplinary practices
Points to Consider • Focusing solely or primarily on mental health will be ineffective because it fails to address primary drivers of violence: – – – Attitudes, values beliefs that justify/maintain violence Substance abuse, esp. alcohol Lethal weapons access, esp. firearms Poverty, unemployment Family instability, dysfunction, violence Unnecessary entanglement in juvenile justice systems • While mental health issues may contribute to individual cases, an over-focus on mental health as a driver of violence reinforces stigma and may deter parents or youth from accessing clinical care
Points to Consider • Obstacles to accessing mental health assessment and screening for youth include: – Relatively sparse for child-trained clinicians – Even fewer trained in Operational Threat Assessment – Can be considerable delays to access care – Authorized care insufficient for acuity of needs • Is there access to evidence-based treatments for children and adolescents who present with disruptive and aggressive behaviors?
Keys to Safety • Persistent active steps for positive student and family engagement with school and staff • Consistent attention to more common forms of student misconduct, esp. bullying and persisting peer group conflicts whether they occur on campus, off-campus or electronically • Balanced, fair and transparent disciplinary policies that avoid over- and under-reaction
Keys to Safety • Implementing solid capacity for Student Threat Assessment, graduated responses, and access to timely and skilled assessment of BH needs, risk management needs • Clarity in advance regarding roles and responsibilities of all involved in response, risk management, safety planning, and implementation of plans/interventions • Collaborative relationships with local law enforcement, mobile MH crisis teams, other first responders
Keys to Safety • Collaboration with community mental health and social services providers, consider policies supporting in-school MH services • Collaboration with community resources that can provide positive youth development experiences: recreation, vocational, volunteer, artistic, faith communities
In conclusion: • Keep up the very good work you do every day • Remember, most kids—even the ones in most trouble—will figure it out, most often because an adult communicates concern, caring, alternatives • Know your youth, know their peer culture • Engagement, engagement! • Document your observations • Communicate your concerns • NEVER WORRY ALONE!!! 56
References (Slide courtesy of Marilyn Rosenberg) Blueprints | Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence | CUBoulder. (n. d. ). University of Colorado at Boulder. Retrieved October 18, 2010, from http: //www. colorado. edu/cspv/blueprints/ Borum, R. (2006). Assessing Risk for Violence Among Juvenile Offenders. In Forensic mental health assessment of children and adolescents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cornell, D. & Sheras, PL (2006). Guidelines for responding to student threats of violence. Dallas, TX. Sopris West Educational Services Flannery, D. J. , Vazsonyi, A. T. , Liau, A. K. , Guo, S. , Vesterdal, W. , & Embry, D. (2003). Initial behavior outcomes for the Peace. Builders universal school-based violence prevention program. Developmental Psychology, 39(2), 292 -308. doi: 10. 1037. 00121649. 39. 2. 292
References, (Cont. ) Frey, K. S. , Nolen, S. B. , Van Schoiack-Edstrom, : . , & Hirschstein, M. K. (2005). Effects of a school-based social competence program: Linking Children's Goals, Attributions, and Behavior. The Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 26, 171 -200. Greenberg, M. T. , Kusche, C. A. , & Riggs, N. (2004). The PATHS Curriculum: Theory and research on neurocognitive development and school success. In Building academic success on social and emotional learning: what does the research say? New York: Teachers College Press. Mc. Kay-Brown, L. , & Warner, D. (n. d. ). Peace. Builders: A prevention process for schools and their communities. Eltham College - Home Page. Retrieved October 18, 2010, from http: //www. elthamcollege. org. uk/
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