USMC OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF

USMC OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF MARFOR KATRINA STAFF LESSONS LEARNED SEPT 2005

OUTLINE • INTRODUCTION – Present preliminary after action from USMC participation in Hurricane Katrina relief operations – Focus on lessons from MARFOR KATRINA STAFF – Should fold in lessons learned from, 24 th and 11 th MEUs for a complete after action report • BACKGROUND • COMMON THEMES – Threads found across sections – The bottom line up front • KEY RECOMMENDATIONS – Broad actions to apply to the future today • SECTION SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED – Includes summaries and recommendations of individual section experiences

BACKGROUND • On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina makes landfall on the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi • New Orleans suffers significant flooding and damage – Other cities along the Gulf Coast also report flooding, destructive effects of 150 mph winds • Title 10 and Title 32 forces called in to help search and recovery operations in the JOA which includes LA, MS, TX, & other states • USMC Forces – – – – – CG, 4 th MAR DIV 24 th Marine Regiment 11 th MEU (MEU CE, 1/4 CO, MSSG 11) 24 th MEU (MEU CE, 1/8 BLT, MSSG 24) Comm CO, 4 th MAR DIV Det 8 th Comm Det 4 th AAVs AT BN (-) Reinforced AVN assets • HMH 772, HMLA 773, HMH 464, HMH 461, HMM 365, MAG 42, MWSG 47, MACG 48

COMMON THEMES • Reserve and active duty forces were able to quickly close on the AO in order to rapidly respond to devastation • Lack of developed communications plan and severe handicaps with regard to available communications assets hampered C 2 and other staff activities • Title 10/32 Force restrictions prevented USMC forces from saving even more lives • Some formal USMC processes hamper ability to respond quickly and work effectively in this type of environment • USMC needs to develop SOP or playbook for HA/DR operations to facilitate effective planning and execution of such operations in the future

CG/COS/DEP CO • TPFDD PROCESS • BACKGROUND: The TPFDD process has become the focus of effort, not the efficient, rapid movement of personnel. 24 th Mar does not have a JOPES/TPFDD planner on its T/O (nor does any USMC Regt). If I would have waited for the TPFDD process to work, I never would have been able to get to the AO. Also, the process is slow, cumbersome and actually inhibits all that it is intended to do. • RECOMMENDATION: The TPFDD/JOPES process must be reformed.

CG/COS/DEP CO • NAMING CONVENTIONS FOR DEPLOYED FORCES • BACKGROUND: There were too many changes to the names of Headquarters and Task Forces. This became so confusing, that it took a long time to figure out who was doing what and who belonged to whom n the AO. Also, Task Forces, conceptually, are better suited to existing commanders tailored to the mission, rather than based on functions or geography • RECOMMENDATION: Need to minimize name changes forces to mitigate confusion.

CG/COS/DEP CO • TITLE 10/TITLE 32 FORCE RESTRICTIONS • BACKGROUND: A number of civilians were allowed to die because of Title 32/10 restrictions and the restrictions on secondary searches. Over the last few days, the civilian SAR teams pulled several citizens out of attics or rubble who were alive. • RECOMMENDATION: If some restrictions would have been eased by the civilian authorities, we could have saved many more who instead slowly suffocated, starved or dehydrated to death in attics across the 9 th Ward and probably in St Bernard as well.

CG/COS/DEP CO • • CLOSING FORCES TO THE AO IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME DISCUSSION: 24 th Marines was asked for a feasibility study after the hurricane wrt deploying a BN(-) from one of its battalions to assist in the HA/DR ops (WEEK OF AUG 30). 24 th Mar responded and included a study for possible deployment of the Regt command element to support the CG, MARFOR Katrina if needed. Focus of planning effort was directed to deploying a BN (-) to the AO. However, verbal warning order was given on Friday 2 Sept and a verbal execute order was given on Monday 5 Sept. While 24 Mar engaged in rapid planning, a PDSS was sent to the AO on 7 Sept, the ADVON arrived (with CO 24 th Mar) on 10 Sept an the main body 12/ Sep, with all 24 Marine Forces closed in on AO by 14 Sept. The only outside assistance required by the regiment in deploying to the AO was for MILAIR transportation executed on short notice by VMGR 234. Additionally, because 24 th Marines is a reserve regiment with a small active duty cadre, a request for volunteers to fill out the required billets to operate a regimental command element was sent out to the H&S CO of 24 th Marines as well as the other battalion (24 Mar Truck platoon, TOW Plt and other dets are in or have been activated for OIF, leaving the command element short of mechanics, drivers, and others who could have been available to participate in the mission). In any case, the response from the reserve Marines to participate was significant as many of these men had returned not long ago to their HTC's from full combat tours in Iraq. Additionally, 24 th MEU and 11 th MEU also rapidly closed to the AO and the support capability provided by MSSG 24 was absolutely critical to success in enabling the affected areas to begin to return to normalcy

CG/COS/DEP CO • EMPLOYMENT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP (CAG) • BACKGROUND: Use of CAG was absolutely critical to enhance our ability to implement enablers for recovery beyond the search and rescue effort. Experienced CAG officers, used to working with a stressed civilian leadership (people who are in the survival mode), are invaluable assets. • RECOMMENDATION: Continue to use CAG for these types of operations.

G 1 • • • TASK ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND: Due to the nature of this operation, the task organization was in a constant state of change. Because of this, it was very difficult to understand all of the command relationships. It was particularly challenging to establish reporting procedures and to maintain situational awareness. RECOMMENDATION: That contingency plans be developed to provide a framework for federal forces disaster relief. Key components can be organized and special capabilities can be added as needed. Operational phases can be predetermined. For example, search and rescue, search and recovery, enabling etc. General reporting procedures and task organization can be pre-established which would greatly reduce the confusion.

G 1 • • • ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES BACKGROUND: Administrative procedures need to be established prior to deployment. RECOMMENDATION: – Order writing authority with money already established and put into a built PID within ROWS for the operation. This will allow Marines to leave the home training center (HTC) with orders and alleviate any pay problems. – Higher admin needs to be identified prior to the operation if possible. For example, 24 th Marines is the higher reach back admin and should have the ability to run unit diary entries on everyone within the AOR to stop any potential pay problems for Marines within the AOR. – All the admin procedures should have been adhered to in the admin LOI. This LOI covered every admin aspect that needed to be accomplished prior to and during this operation and it was not followed.

G 2 • • • INTERNET ACCESS BACKGROUND: Internet access is critical in the G-2. The section must be able to research information and download products from the Internet. The bandwidth available from the USS Shreveport was not adequate. When the ship was in port, internet access was continuous, but very slow. While at sea, internet access would be lost for varying periods of time. Loss of the internet forced the G-2 section to rely on CNN reports obtained from the ships satellite television. The satellite constantly lost the signal while at sea. In heavy seas, the ship lost the signal and the G-2 section only had intermittent and time delayed e-mail or Iridium phone to obtain information. RECOMMENDATION: Increase the digital bandwidth for ships intended for use by command control staffs. Command elements should embark on platforms with adequate command control/communications/internet capabilities or have the means to expand bandwidth to meet their requirements.

G 3 • • • WATCH OFFICERS BACKGROUND: Managing information coming into a command operation center (COC) is always a time consuming and challenging process. The staff can easily be overwhelmed and/or distracted by all the information coming in. Efficiently sifting through all the information that comes in is one of the keys to a successful COC. A minimum of two to four individuals are normally used to collect this information and then disseminate it to the proper staff section for action. Due to manning constraints and/or other higher priority billets or missions that needed to be filled, the G-3 section was unable to have a dedicated Senior Watch Officer and Watch Officer assigned solely to this important function. RECOMMENDATION: That future Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs) ensure they have enough officers assigned in order to man the COC 24 hours a day with a minimum of two watch officers. It is better to have four officers who can be split into two man teams (Senior Watch Officer and Watch Officer) that work 12 hours on and 12 hours off in the event that 24 hour operations are necessary. These watch officers’ sole function is to collect information and then pass it on to the appropriate staff section so the appropriate actions can be taken. This process allows the primary and special staff to focus on the big picture and do some advance planning; diverting their attention away from these important tasks only when the current situation dictates.

G 3 • • • LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS BACKGROUND: Communications aboard naval shipping are always limited and challenging to get and maintain. There is never enough bandwidth for the number of personnel embarked. In this case, we were limited to the ship’s e-mail initially. The MARFOR Katrina command element then acquired an Air Force Mobile Communications team that attempted to install a communications system that was partially broken and not designed for employment on a ship. After spending about four days fixing the gear and tweaking the setup, we finally established effective communications to command control our Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). Unfortunately, we ended up setting sail two days later and the AF Mobile Communications system had to be taken down because we could not use it on the move in its current configuration. RECOMMENDATION: That future SPMAGTFs plan to embark the senior command element on the ship with the best communications capabilities so that they can effectively command control their subordinate units. Embarking a regimental headquarters or higher level command element on the oldest and least capable ship available and then expecting them to be able to effectively command control is a bridge too far. If this option is not feasible, then the Marine Corps needs to have some kind of deployable communication system (other than JTF-E) that can be setup on any naval vessel that allows us the ability to communicate while underway with enough bandwidth and redundant communication assets.

G 3 • • • ADVANCE PARTY-MAIN BODY SEPARATION BY TIME BACKGROUND: The Advance Party for MARFOR Katrina departed Kansas City for New Orleans on a Saturday morning. The Main Body departed Kansas City that next Monday. This essentially made the Advance Party a Quartering Party, and gave it less than 48 hours to find a suitable Command Control location, determine gear and equipment requirements, and report these requirements back to the Main Body. For its part, the Main Body had less than 48 hours to receive these requirements and embark the recommended equipment necessary to ensure effective Command Control capabilities. As a result, the Regimental Headquarters, which is not currently equipped to function as a Warfighting Command Control Element, was not able to bring all the equipment necessary to provide optimal Command Control capabilities. Had there been a greater time separation between the Advance Party and the Main Body (ideally 7 -10 days, but even five would have helped), perhaps additional equipment requirements could have been identified, sourced, and brought to New Orleans. The main, and understandable, constraint on this was the time-critical nature of sending Marine forces to New Orleans for HA/DR. RECOMMENDATION: That whenever the mission constraints allow, send the Advance Party forward with a minimum of seven days separation from the Main Body. This will allow the Advance Party to not only scout suitable locations for billeting and operations, it will also allow the Main Body to react and tailor the equipment package to be brought into the AO.

G 3 • • • HANDOVER OF COMMAND CONTROL FUNCTIONS BACKGROUND: When the Main Body of what was to become the MARFOR Katrina Command Element arrived in New Orleans, they were billeted and directed to work aboard the USS Shreveport (LPD-12). Command Control capabilities on this ship would barely suffice for an infantry battalion, let alone a CG-level headquarters. The 24 th MEU Command Element, which was also functioning as the MARFOR CE at the time of the Main Body’s arrival, was operating from JRB New Orleans, a 40 -minute drive from the USS Shreveport. With few opportunities to travel between the ship and the JRB, this distance separation had a significant negative impact on the ability of the Main Body Staff to become oriented to the AO, observe the daily procedures and Battle Rhythm of the 24 th MEU Staff, and conduct an effective turnover of MARFOR CE responsibilities. Having an understanding of the daily procedures of the 24 th MEU in particular would have had a positive benefit for the Main Body, as this was a hastily constructed CG-level staff which had no time to work together before deploying. RECOMMENDATION: That in future HA/DR operations, a relieving headquarters be physically co-located as closely as possible to the headquarters to be relieved.

G 3 • MEETINGS/BRIEFS • BACKGROUND: Having as many staff members present during meetings ensured the widest dissemination of information at one time. Except for occasions were the CG or COS needs to pass specific commanders guidance to primary staff officers, all hands briefs were great and need to continue. • RECOMMENDATION: Despite space limitations, having as many staff members present during briefs should continue.

G 3 • • • E-MAIL ASSIGNMENTS/ACCOUNTS BACKGROUND: After we arrived in the AO, e-mail accounts were established by individuals using various computer assets. There were not enough computers for all staff officers to use and getting e-mail accounts established depended on the individual’s effort working through both G-6 and the host site’s staff. Distribution lists were not made for the staff. RECOMMENDATION: G-6 needs to create billet/unit accounts vice individual accounts. The billet accounts can be based on a generic format for a Regimental staff. Accounts for other special and joint billets can be created as needed. Liaison officers attached to higher commands need to create a standard e-mail account for that billet with no individual names placed on the account. Distribution lists need to be made for quick and thorough dissemination and easily accessible to all staff.

G 3 • • • VIP LIFTS BACKGROUND: On several occasions requests for MARFOR Katrina helicopters to lift VIPs came from outside of MARFOR Katrina approved the lift – essentially approving the use of helicopters as a means of transportation. But there were many missing pieces that are necessary to make the VIP lift successful. Most notably was a plan to get the VIP(s) to the pick-up LZ and then return them to the departure LZ. The requesting units/agencies many times expected that once the lift was approved all coordination would be done by MARFOR Katrina. But MARFOR Katrina did not have the assets to affect this. RECOMMENDATION: That future MARFORs make it clear to the requesting unit/agency what information is necessary for a lift. Also that we make it clear what will be accomplished by MARFOR Katrina and what will not be accomplished by MARFOR Katrina. We need to encourage the appointment of a guide to assist the VIP(s) in the movement to and from the helicopter as well.

G 3 • • • COMPUTER ASSETS BACKGROUND: Early identification of computer assets is necessary. The MARFOR Katrina Air Officer did not have a consistent computer to use. Plus some of the computers did not allow the use of thumb-drives. This resulted in receiving electronic media but no effective way to use it. Once a computer was assigned, the G-6 would re-assign the computer to someone else. Folders and files would then be lost. This continued for a couple of weeks. RECOMMENDATION: That computers be assigned before deployment. We also need to identify which computers can use thumb drives. Once these computers are assigned, do not allow them to be re-assigned unless full coordination has been completed with the original user.

G 4 • • • SUPPLIES BACKGROUND: Lack of adequate supplies to keep us organized and running efficiently negatively impacted our ability to quickly perform our assigned tasks. Some of the supplies that we did not have were: map boards, stapler, duct tape, 2 -hole punch, binders and folders and other similar supplies. Another problem we encountered was lack of communication with other units and/or ships when underway. Lack of communications (one computer with working email) and having only two computers with the ability to print. RECOMMENDATION: We need to have a back up plan for communication and other ways to access email besides the ships server. We also need to identify a list of supplies that are needed or might be needed before deployment and find a different way to support all personnel with email and printing abilities in similar situations.

G 6 • • • BACKWARDS COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING BACKGROUND: Not enough information provided in the warning order. We were forced to create a network with the assets we had available and attempted to mold the command subordinate elements into it. This proved ineffective as the command subordinate elements continuously changed on a daily basis. This resulted in us not being able to accurately identify potential shortfalls. RECOMMENDATION: Comm Plans are designed around a pre-established command structure. There are essential questions that need to be answered before we can brief supportability and identify shortfalls. Who is talking, who do they want to talk to, where are they talking, and how do they want to talk.

G 6 • • • NETWORK PLANNING BACKGROUND: At no time during this operation did all the key players in the communications field get together to put together the network. To many times during the operation, non-communicators attempted to tasks out or communications assets and personnel. RECOMMENDATION: Even during a pick up game like this one, more emphasis need to be put on getting all the key players together to put plan a network. Many plans work put on paper (or white board) but rapidly changed as the mission did. Also different elements were getting different information thus resulting in them planning a network in a different direction.

G 6 • • • Comm Co, 4 th MARDIV was deployed without being given the support needed to self sustain a stable network. BACKGROUND: Comm Co had enough assets available to adequately support a Command Element and two distant sites except for one key link. We do not have the assets that will allow us the capability to draw services from a DISA Step Site (i. e. no GMF assets). We came with three SMART-Ts but now GMF assets. We had a plan that included elements of 6 th Comm BN out of Brooklyn, NY. They had at their location an LMST that would draw service from a step site, push them to us through one of their SMART-Ts to one of our SMART-T in the AOR and thus provide us with our outside world link. We had the plan that would allow everyone to take to whoever they would have wanted to. RECOMMENDATION: If Comm Co is deployed again; supportability from 6 th Comm BN needs to be considered in order for proper supportability to occur. By 6 th Comm BN not being included or added to the force tasking list, it severely hamstrung our capabilities. Also any attempt we made to acquire the GMF assets from another location (8 th Comm Bn), they were pulled out from underneath of us by 11 th MEU showing up to the AOR.

G 7 • • • ANIMAL RESUCE – PART I BACKGROUND: A group of veterinarians, animal rescue workers, and lay people created a shelter for stray dogs and cats from the lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish. The CG directed that MARFOR Katrina assist them in finding a more suitable structure away from the area of operations. We found a large warehouse with a concrete deck across the Industrial Canal on Dauphine Street. While the warehouse was unsuitable for its normal business use, it sufficed as a temporary animal shelter. The warehouse owner could not be located before we moved the animals in. As part of the relocation, Soldiers then cut 5 holes in a wall for cross ventilation. This damage to private property came to the attention of the warehouse owner who met with the G 7. The owner was assured that the shelter intended to lease the building and that the damage would be repaired. RECOMMENDATION: Advise the staff to refrain from any alteration or damage to buildings without prior approval or plan to pay for such alterations.

G 7 • ANIMAL RESCUME – PART II • BACKGROUND: When it comes to animal rescue (in the wake of a disaster) the Parish and the military should consider the following: – Stray pets are not merely a nuisance but a serious public health hazard – Stray animals clutter the operational space of the HA/DR effort – Finally, stray pets are private property and returning citizens have a right to recover them, if possible. The return of lost pets to owners has an intrinsic psychological value to humans. For citizens returning to find their homes destroyed, the recovery of their pet dog or cat may be the only saving grace of this experience. • RECOMMENDATION: Animal rescue has humanitarian value to humans as well as animals. The psychological value of such an operation cannot be overestimated.

G 7 • • • ANIMAL RESCUME – PART III BACKGROUND: Several Marines, SSgt Daigle of 4 th CAG most notably, assisted in the administration of the shelter. This allowed the veterinary staff to concentrate on animal care. Since civilians are not trained in expeditionary or contingency operations, Marines are especially useful in establishing an efficient operational rhythm. RECOMMENDATION: In the future: – Identify the animal problem immediately; – Identify the local animal control and volunteer animal rescue personnel; – Help disparate groups to consolidate their efforts. – Advise the local government and military task force of the importance of animal rescue/control/return. – Identify fund sources to support temporary shelters. – Allocate civil affairs personnel to jump start animal control operations. – Plan for complete handover of operations to civilian staff.

4 TH MLG • • • DISASTER RELIEF PLANNING BACKGROUND: Marines have been used to help relief efforts many times in the past as in Hurricane Andrew and the Tsunami in Asia. Many Marine installations have disaster relief plans for internal use such as their own installation. The Marine Corps is now being balled upon more regularly to conduct disaster relief operations outside bases and installations. When the President ordered military to the region there was a rush to get Marines to the area without a clear mission or end state. Marine leaders had to try to interpret and initiate various missions and end states from many directions to include NORTHCOM, FEMA, state and local officials. This took time and put every member of the resource effort in a situation where leaders had to guess at the best possible plan for the operation. There were equipment and skill sets brought to the area that were not fully employed while other equipment and skill sets not brought to the area could have been employed in a way that helped the recovery effort more efficiently. RECOMMENDATION: Have a disaster relief operational plan for use in future similar events. A possible course of action is to take a look at similar situations and determine which skill sets and equipment supported the relief. Create a table of equipment, a table of organization and an operational plan. Have this plan on the shelf to review every time a disaster occurs.

4 TH MLG • DISASTER RELIEF PLANNING • BACKGROUND: The Marine Corps has no MARFOR level disaster relief exercise. Disaster relief operations are time sensitive events that require detailed planning, with the utmost attention to detail. Marines operate well in an environment of limited information and guidance, however, an annual relief exercise would help Marines become more knowledgeable of various requirements, types of relief organizations and dealing with both Title 32 forces and civilian authorities. These exercises would make relief operations more responsive and more effective. • RECOMMENDATION: Incorporate a Force level disaster relief command post exercise in MARFORRES annual training plan.

MEDICAL • HAZMAT IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE KATRINA IN ST. BERNARD PARISH • BACKGROUND: Preventive medicine issues involved HAZMAT, not normally within the purview of medical officers. Creating “go – no go” zones for the Marines conducting operations ashore involved engaging the industrial hygiene expertise and testing capabilities of the Forward Deployed Preventive Medicine Unit (FDPMU). This capability addressed shortages by civilian agencies (FEMA, EPA) and other military services, and allowed operations to continue. The FDPMU also provided general preventive medicine assessments and on-site services to the ground forces. • RECOMMENDATION: An active duty or reserve FDPMU be deployed whenever Marines deploy into potential HAZMAT contaminated areas.

MEDICAL • • COMMUNICATIONS AMONGST MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ASSETS BACKGROUND: The MAGTF was not fully aware of what medical assets and capabilities were deployed by the various services and civilian agencies in the New Orleans area. The MAGTF Surgeon spent approximately the first 48 hrs. collecting information via visits to various units. Most MARFOR medical assets did not have access to the Internet, and relied upon personal cell phones for communications. Cell phone coverage was incomplete and sporadic in the AO. Confusion existed as to who aboard the USS Iwo Jima (Primary Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ship [CRTS]) was performing medical regulating (e. g. bum scoop was put out). • RECOMMENDATION: A military medical liaison cell should be established at the largest Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the AO, so that the various military medical units can share information concerning their assets, locations, capabilities, and medical surveillance information, in order to optimize medical care for service members, recognize disease trends early, and maximize assistance to civilian medical clinics and hospitals. The primary medical regulator aboard the CRTS should be identified by the military medical cell at the EOC and this information promulgated to all Naval assets in the AO. Iridium phones at the MAGTF Surgeon’s cell and the various MEU and Task Force Surgeons would be helpful in coordinating medical services, and facilitating medical evacuation of service members.

SJA • • • DETERMINE AND DELINEATE LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF RELIEF ACTIVITIES UNDER THE STAFFORD ACT BACKGROUND: Under the Stafford Act (Title 42 USC 5121 b) Federal agencies to include Do. D may on the direction of the President, provide assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster. The assistance can be provided to state and local governments for their distribution or directly to those in need. This assistance can be used on public or private lands or waters and can encompass any work or services essential to saving lives and protecting and preserving property or public health and safety. Such assistance does have its limits, the key being that it is provided only to meet immediate threats to life and property. It does not include providing; routine medical care; work on private property unless needed for community safety or health, nor routine maintenance on public property. Ground level Marines have reported incidents of their participation in; non-emergency services, private property clean up, and more routine types of assistance. Incidents of this type seemed to be limited and occurred more as the relief effort matured. However, use of relief assistance beyond those essential needs is a misuse of Do. D personnel and Stafford Act aid. RECOMMENDATION: Clear guidelines as to what type of assistance should and should not be provided, needs to be published and reviewed by the local Marine Commanders whose units are providing the assistance. Tasks requested and assigned should be carefully screened by the local commands providing the assistance. The goal should be to avoid misuse of federal resources and allow for proper allocation of needed aid.

SJA • Clarification of specific activities Title X personnel may conduct w/o violating Posse Comitatus Act, DODDir 3025. 15 (Mil Assist to Civ Auth), or DODDir 5525. 5 (Coop with Civ Law Enfor). Specifically, may Title X personnel conduct presence or deterrent ops under the Stafford Act, and what limitations are imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and Do. D Directives. • BACKGROUND: All unit operations should be in direct support of humanitarian relief as listed in the Commander's priorities and in an existing FEMA Mission Assignments (MA). None of these authorities should include "security" or "law enforcement" in sector. The exception is that the commander may always emplace security and force protection of JTF units in military enclaves/FOBs, etc based on the Military Purpose Doctrine. They may also establish security of JTF personnel who are operating outside of their FOBs. They may not perform security patrols or checkpoint operations outside of those necessary force protection as defined in item 2, above. They may not conduct joint patrols with Title 32 or law enforcement forces in order to "secure" or provide a "presence" in a sector. What is permissible is moving with Title 32 and law enforcement personnel in the conduct of search and rescue or recovery operations. • RECOMMENDATION: Staff Judge Advocates should provide guidance to their respective planners. The goal is to avoid engaging in presence or deterrent type conduct that may be characterized as "neighborhood watch" or law enforcement type activities. These types of activities can violate limitations that are imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and Do. D Directives.

CIVIL AFFAIRS presented in three slides • • Establishment of doctrinal organizations to execute domestic support operations for Hurricane Katrina. (Ref. Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations, JP 3 -57, and Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, JP 357. 1) BACKGROUND: Joint doctrine defines organization and command relationships to execute civil-military operations (CMO) for disaster relief efforts and other military operations other than war. This doctrine specifically applies to domestic support operations in emergencies such as hurricane relief. CMO organizational structure is situation dependant. Joint doctrine defines five types of organizations for coordination of civil-military operations in the humanitarian relief context. They are: Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC); Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC); Executive Steering Group (ESG); Civil-Military Coordination Board; and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The function of each organization generally is the same: coordination of relief efforts across agencies and functional areas. The table on the next slide summarizes the authority, function and composition of these CMO organizations. In practice at the operational and tactical level these organizations are to be tailored to effect coordination, regardless of the name. The main point is that at each level of command, there must a coordinating forum comprised of military, governmental, and relief agencies. Moreover, these forums must be vertically linked. For example, Federal agency, PVO, and military representatives at a tactical level CMOC should coordinate with their respective higher headquarters (HHQ) counterparts, who are themselves participants in an operational or JTF-level CMOC. In Hurricane Katrina, MARFOR Katrina, in conjunction with TF Colorado, and Parish Government officials, established a CMOC / ESG and related functional area working groups in St Bernard Parish. As discussed in detail below, this organization effectively established horizontal coordination of relief and recover efforts. There was, however, no vertical integration of CMO efforts through an analogous CMOC organization at the HHQ level. In this context, HHQ may refer to the JTF, Primary Federal Official, or the Adjutant General of Louisiana. It might be that lack of clearly defined command relationships impeded establishment of a doctrinal coordinating body at these levels of command control. In this context, note that joint doctrine provides: When the U. S. Military responds to domestic emergencies, it will normally be in support of other Federal agencies (e. g. , FEMA). ” JP 3 -57. 1, emphasis in original). Whatever the reason, an opportunity to facilitate close coordination was missed by the failure to establish a CMOC-type organization at the JTF level, to direct establishment of additional CMOCs at the tactical level, and functionally link these organizations.

CIVIL AFFAIRS Establishment of doctrinal organizations to execute domestic support operations (CONT’D) Organization Establishing Authority Function Composition Authority HOC Affected Nation Gov’t Agency Coordinate overall relief strategy Host nation, U. S. Coordination; no Embassy / Agency, C 2 authority JTF, UN HACC Combatant Commander Strategic coordination; temporary until HOC and / or JTF CMOC established Combatant Command, NGOs, PVOs, Regional organizations ESG Any Commander Formulating / As directed by promulgating local Commander or theater policies CMCB JTF ESG at JTF level As directed by JTF Coordination; no Commander C 2 authority CMOC JTF and below Coordination of civil-military operations with affected government, NGOs, etc. Military, Federal agencies; local gov’t; PVOs, NGOs Coordination; no C 2 authority

CIVIL AFFAIRS • • Establishment of doctrinal organizations to execute domestic support operations CONT’D RECOMMENDATION: (1) Review Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs and Civil Military Operations, and associated mission-essential task guidance. As necessary enhance or clarify applicability to domestic emergencies. (2) Execute the doctrine, focusing on the requirement to establish coordinating organizations such as the CMOC and ESG in all domestic crisis situations.

CIVIL AFFAIRS • • Measures of Effectiveness and Transition Criteria BACKGROUND: In Katrina relief operations, the focus of effort was on consequence management; and recovery and restoration activities. Consequence management in an domestic disaster continues until survivors have been evacuated; the threat of further casualties has been minimized; humanitarian / relief assistance is proceeding, and local public safety has been re-established. (JP 3 -57 at III-37. ) For MARFOR Katrina, consequence management efforts primarily consisted of urban search and rescue operations, and support to public safety agencies. Recovery and restoration activities included debris clearing, levee repair, government building rehabilitation, medical support, refueling operations, and public works support. In each of these project areas, contractors or private service providers began to arrive on the scene within 10 days after the storm. By Katrina + 14, contractors were providing services in all of these project areas except medical services. In a domestic disaster response by Title 10 forces, it is important that clear measures of effectiveness be incorporated into planning, that transition guidance be promulgated, and that criteria for termination of the mission be clear. In Katrina, MOEs were not formally promulgated for a variety of reasons, including the rapid build-up of forces which were immediately committed to the fight, often (and necessarily) on a piecemeal basis. Moreover, Hurricane Rita led to re-taskings. MOEs are necessarily situation dependent. Based on Katrina / Rita experience, it would be useful to capture proposed or sample MOEs for Title 10 forces in HA / domestic disaster situations. In this operation, an appropriate formal measure of effectiveness and transition criteria for search and rescue operations would be 100% primary search of residential structures. An example of an appropriate measure of effectiveness and transition criteria for recover operations would be: civilian contractors on site with mobility and heavy equipment capabilities equal to or exceeding those of the MARFOR combat service support element. • RECOMMENDATION: In domestic disaster (and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance) situations, promulgation of MOEs and transition criteria must be established, in order to ensure that Marine forces are utilized effectively and efficiently in accordance with their capabilities.

CIVIL AFFAIRS • • Environmental Hazards Assessment and Information BACKGROUND: It is likely that any disaster relief operation involving Marine forces, regardless of cause, will result in risk of environmental heath hazards to military forces and the civilian populace. In Katrina, the catastrophic failure of an oil tank at a refinery in St Bernard Parish resulted in release of 50, 000 barrels of crude oil over a large residential area. In addition, heightened levels of e. coli bacteria were widely reported. Several local, state, and Federal agencies, the oil refinery, and private contractors sampled, monitored, and assessed the affected area. Information management in this context was challenging. Commanders and local government officials alike appeared to have difficulty determining the personnel risks associated with their respective operations. In this and future HA / DR ops, it is likely that some level of confusion and misinformation about environmental risk may be unavoidable, given the technical nature of the data and the disparate organizations gathering and processing it. The 7 th Civil Support Team (WMD), Army National Guard has the mission and capability to assess risk due to environmental exposures to toxics. The CST also acted as a single point of contact for military forces and information clearinghouse for complex monitoring data. The CST developed a report on exposure risks that could be relied upon by commanders and government officials. (A copy is available from Col. Brian Tucker, 3 rd Civil Affairs Group, brian. tucker@wg. srs. com) • RECOMMENDATION: Disaster relief operations by Marine Corps forces must incorporate environmental hazard risk assessment capabilities such as those provided by the Army CSTs. If these capabilities are not organic to the Marine Corps in sufficient density, they should be developed. At a minimum, Marine Corps forces faced with a Katrina-type mission (domestic or foreign) should identify requirements for CST support early in the mission planning process.