USJFCOMJ 9JPPMNE Unclassified Oh what a tangled web

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational Research and Analysis DDA/CFEC ISMOR, UK, Aug 05 UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Life is really simple… but we insist on making it complicated - Confucius Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Outline 1. 2. 3. 4. EBO concept development EBO experimentation EBO in practice Observations and Conclusions The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein, remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada. UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified The Six Flavours of EBO… 1. ‘EBO’ is a planning methodology that links strategy to operations… 2. ‘EBO’ is efficient ‘targeting’ and ‘shock and awe’… 3. EBO consider the application of all available sources of power… 4. EBO involve rapid, decisive operations and rapid dominance… 5. EBO require ‘knowledge’ principles for analysis and support… 6. EBO benefit from Systems of Systems analysis… Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified The Six Fallacies and Flaws of EBO… 1. The Air Force invented it… 2. EBO is too connected to strategy, or, not connected enough to strategy… 3. EBO derives from a position of strength, therefore, close combat is always wrong… 4. Relies on ‘ch’i’ rather than ‘cheng’ – • extraordinary vs. ordinary; • direct vs. indirect 5. We can predict cause and effect… 6. EBO is ‘old wine in new bottles’ Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified The Seventh Fallacy or Flaw of EBO? There is an accepted understanding of EBO Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified An ‘Effect’ Clear statement for each Effect (written and understood): • Identifies who or what is to be ‘influenced’, ‘affected’ • Suggests ‘nested’ or ‘environmental’ Effects • Suggests the desired environmental state as a consequence of an action(s) - measures • Is descriptively written (how and why) • Includes a timeframe (days, weeks, months) • Is assignable, measurable, achievable UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO : Conceptual Requirements EBO incorporates: • Complexity and cause and effect • Systemic knowledge: environment dependencies/links/weaknesses • Multiple levels of conflict • Planning (EBP) process and capable organization • Cognition and decision making in ‘real time’ – tools, models, assessment • Adaptive environment (fluidity of system) • Risk analysis, MOE/MOP and metrics over time and space • Synchronization of actions aligned to capabilities over time and space • Non-military and military planning and assessment construct • Knowledge Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Assessment of the System(s) Academia Nat’l and Int’l Intelligence Vulnerabilities Social and Cultural Political Economic Dependencies Physical Defence OGDs IGOs, NGOs Private Industry nodes + dependencies Strengths Legal, Ethical and Moral Scientific and Technical Weaknesses Military System Understanding Unclassified 17 May 2005 Relationships

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified A Complex Effects-based Environment Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO: the inter-agency perspective • Cultural, social, economic, dependency, humanitarian, developmental issues critical to Effects-based concept • Complex conflict environments favour ad hoc inter-agency command arrangements • Inter-agency coordination group should not formalize its organization, processes, roles • Consideration of development of inter-agency protocol or best practices • HQ consider including liaisons to NGOs, IGOs and vice versa (PACOM) – Inter-agency support is an integral ingredient for a functional Effects-based concept • Relationships? Authority? Strategic vs. operational vs. tactical • Coordination? Direction? Advice? Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified COALITION STRAT OPCDR co-ordination authority OPS TACT Unclassified NATIONS AGENCIES & GOs MNIG IOs & NGOs Nations reps STAFF FCDR National links co-ordination authority COS CTFHQ D/MNIG EMBASSIES & Ho. Ms HEADS of MISSION ACTORS Dep. /CMNIG STAFF CC UNITS UNITS MNIG board 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO MOE/MOP Analysis Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Experimentation: MNE 4 (20 Feb-17 Mar 06) Aim: To explore concepts and supporting tools for Effects Based Operations (Knowledge, Planning, Execution, Assessment) within a coalition environment involving Stability Operations with increasing levels of violence in order to assist the development of future processes, organizations and technologies at the Coalition Task Force (CTF) level of command Unclassified 17 May 2005 Unclassified

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Multinational Experiment 4 Multinational (MN) Effects Based Operations Other Participants Organization Intelligence Analysis Tiger Team Lead Information Operations MN Effects Based Operations Concept of Operations Effects Based Execution Tiger Team Lead Combined Task Force Information Operations Plan Concept of Operations Knowledge Base Development Intelligence Effects-based Plan Implementing Procedures Multinational Interagency Group Implementing Procedures Concept of Operations Effects Based Tools Concept of Operations Combined Task Force Intelligence Plan Implementing Procedures Tools Implementing Procedures Unclassified Concept of Operations Technical Demo Concept of Operations Combined Task Force Strategic Guidance Combined Task Force Political-Military Plan National Political-Military Plan Multinational Information Sharing Multinational Experiment 4 Strategic Context Knowledge Management Unclassified 17 May 2005 15

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Relationships among the Four Components of EBO for MNE 4 Unclassified Knowledge Base (Development) Effects-Based Planning Effects-Based Execution Effects-Based Assessment time T=0 Unclassified T=1 17 May 2005 16

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO in practice (CJTF 180) • Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) - synchronization of lethal and non-lethal effects - ‘targeting’ board (J 2/J 3) - Intelligence, Info Ops, Mil Ops provide assessments - quantitative and qualitative • Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG) - weekly staff coordination - JEWG briefs JECB - Based on Commander’s Intent - Develops supporting effects • Targeting Battle Rhythm - OPORD establishes 3 week battle rhythm resulting in weekly FRAGOs - Changes are incorporated into decision making process = Results in production of (refined) Commander’s desired Effects Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE EBO in Practice: (Operation Iraqi Freedom) Unclassified • Finding: ‘Based on initial understanding of the enemy, integrated kinetic and non-kinetic actions and multiple, high-tempo lines of operation were unleashed to achieve enemy disintegration and regime collapse; when execution exceeded capacity to understand change, operations reverted from an effects to attrition focus’. Desired Objectives Effects • Why it happened: – Difficulty gaining knowledge to identify appropriate effects, desired Maturing actions, & cascading or 2 d & 3 d order effects. – Limited collection on non-kinetic actions, notably IO Least – Over focused on measures of performance, rather than measures of Mature effectiveness and merit Assess Least Most – Insufficient interagency, joint and Service integration hindered execution Enabled Mature, / support of effects-based action Routine • What should be done: – Enhance C 2 and C 2 I technology, procedures, & organizations to deal with war’s new character/conduct Out. Actions – Create routine joint and function integration via training & organization; comes extend jointness to the lowest levels possible – Inculcate EBO via world-class experiment & training venues Source: US Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned Unclassified 17 May 2005 Tasks

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO in Practice (NATO ISAF) • ISAF ‘targeting’ and assessment cycles - NO defined methodology • PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) • ESC Working Group (Indicators and MOEs) • MOEs on Security, Governance and Development Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO in Practice vs. Theory • Little integration between CJ 2, CJ 3/7, CJ 5, CJ 9 • Task over process vs. process-driven • Sporadic inter-agency coordination • Immature analysis techniques • Confusion over MOE and MOP • Military vs. non-military planning and assessment constructs Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Observations and Conclusions • Prescription vs. guidance • Operational ‘redux’ (levels are archaic) • Knowledge and technology • Culture • ‘Inter-agency’ includes the military • Doctrine vs. concepts • Don’t break what isn’t broken • Complexity + complicatedness = confusion… Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Questions? grossman-vermaas. rj@forces. gc. ca 1 613 990 7436 Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Effects Based Operations ‘Operations designed to influence the long- or short-term state of a system through the achievement of desired physical or psychological effects. Operational effects are sought to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of all applicable instruments of hard and/or soft power. Desired effects, and the actions required to achieve them, are concurrently and adaptively planned, executed, assessed (and potentially altered) within a complex and adaptive system’ CA working definition Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE 21 st Century Conflict: Towards an Effects-based Policy? 1945 to 1990 1991 to 2001 • Linear System • Limited Dimensions • Sequential operations • Reacting to Threats • Attritional Forces • Focus on Attack and Defence • Single service focus • Civilian vs Military • Mass/Directed weapons Unclassified • Asymmetric System • Increasing Dimensions • Rapid reaction operations • Coping with Threats • Response Forces • Focus on Outcomes/Exits • Joint/Coalition Focus • OOTW and Civ-Mil Ops • Small/Light Weapons Unclassified 2002 to ? • Complex Adaptive System • Unlimited Dimensions • Complex operations • Mitigating Threats • Agile Forces • Focus on Effects • ‘Collaborative’ Focus • Inter-Agency Direction • Advanced Technology and WME Source: Robert Vermaas, Future Perfect: Effects Based Operations, Complexity and the Human Environment (Operational Research Note, Department of National 17 May 2005 Defence Canada, Ottawa, CA, 2004)

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO Relationships (UK JDCC) Strategic Aim Obj Obj Strategic Level E E E As Obj E E E Operational Level A A Obj E Tactical Level E E A A Unclassified A A A Obj E E A A A 17 May 2005 A A A

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Hierarchy of Effects Scale Psychological Large Uncertainty High Systemic Medium Physical Small Unclassified Low 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Example of Operational Objective: Establish freedom of movement in Qandahar region R 1 A’ 1 N 2 E 1 E 2 d. T N 3 Example of Effect¹: ISAF Force (R 1) patrols (A 1) ensure freedom of movement of relief convoys (E 1) along Supply Route (N 1) Example of Undesired Effect 2, but Warlords ambush (A’ 1) open routes (N 2) resulting in civilian casualties (E 2) and animosity, leading to negative press coverage (E 3) in international news media (N 3). UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified CA EBO Experimentation • EBO Concept Development for Experimentation (DDA/CFEC) vs • EBO Concept Development thru Experimentation (USJFCOM; CFEC) • Feasibility Exploration vs. ‘Jumping on the Band Wagon’ EBO (CA and multinational) a. C 2 and inter-agency perspective (Strategic and Operational) b. Systems and Network Analysis concept and technologies as enabler to EBO UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Canadian EBO concept Campaign Plan • Support optimization of existing CA/NATO operational planning process in light of emerging CA effects-based approach • Provide functional solutions (based on experimentation) to support optimized CA planning processes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and modified CA command organizations (methodologies - analysis; risk; modelling; ) • Influence and learn from development of US/NATO multinational EBO processes, C 2 organizations and technologies (inter-agency perspective; hard/soft power; long-term effects) • Inform development of subsequent campaign plans to address later horizons (where should CF/DND focus in 2020? ) • Inform development of CF/DND doctrine based on concept development and experimentation of EBO Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified CA EBO Initiatives • National Security Policy, 2004 - Integrated 3 D security approach (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) • CDS Vision – ‘integrating effects’ • Multinational concept and policy statements (US; UK) • Integrated Operating Concept (IOC), 2005 - EBO as an Integrating Concept - DDA/ACD lead development of concept • Joint Force Development and Joint Vision, 2005 - Employment of Effects-based approach • Experimentation and Integration – CFEC - MNE series • CF/DND; FAC; CIDA; academia Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Effects Analysis by MOE Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified Weighting of Multi-dimensional EBO MOE Unclassified 17 May 2005

USJFCOM/J 9/JPP/MNE Unclassified EBO in practice (CJTF 180) • Main ‘combat’ objective: ‘Deny terrorist operatives sanctuary and eliminate all foreign-sponsored Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin anti-Coalition forces’ (measurable) • Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) employed a method for synchronizing joint fires and effects • Model for military and non-military integration throughout CENTCOM – Joint Fires Element • Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) – with NGOs Unclassified 17 May 2005