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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USEUSE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Terrorist Threat Overview May 2018 FORPUBLIC RELEASE NOTNOT FOR RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Global Threat Picture • Despite progress in Iraq/Syria, the terrorist threat environment around the globe remains complex, challenging, and geographically expansive • Threats originating in as many places and involving as many individuals as at any time in post-9/11 era • More than 39, 100 estimated fighters—at least 5, 600 from the West—have traveled to Iraq/Syria from at least 110 countries in recent years • Approximately 295 US Persons have traveled or attempted to travel to region to potentially fight or otherwise support the conflict NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 2 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Snapshot of Global Terrorist Violence • The year of 2016 saw approximately 11, 072 attacks in 104 countries (led by Iraq/Syria, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria) • Approximately 25, 621 killed and 33, 814 wounded • This averages to approximately… • • • … 31 attacks per day … 2, 135 deaths and 2, 818 per month Private citizens, businesses, and property—not just governments—remain a top target NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 3 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Terrorists Target Various Sectors Among others… • Aviation • Critical infrastructure • Hotels • Maritime domain • Mass gatherings/events • Public transportation • Schools NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 4 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Evolution of the Global Jihadist Threat Presence of al-Qa’ida and ISIS NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 5 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Evolution of the Global Jihadist Threatresence of al-Qa’ida and ISIS NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 6 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Evolution of the Global Jihadist Threat NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 7 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ISIS: Good News and Bad News Good News: • ISIS shrinking “caliphate” • Decreased official media releases—no Rumiyah since September 2017 • False claims of responsibility may indicate desperation • Declining foreign fighter rates Bad News: • Branches and networks in more than two dozen global locations • Diversifying media, focused on new audiences • Relying on pro-ISIS supporters to amplify messages • Innovation in attack planning/tactics • Redundancies in networks allow for quick succession NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 8 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ISIS Territorial Losses NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 9 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ISIS-Linked Attacks Against Western Interests NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 10

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ISIS Advocating UAS Attacks • Pre-2016: ISIS uses unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance • 2016: ISIS deploys first weaponized UAS in Iraq/Syria • Dropping explosives from UAS • Embedding explosives into UAS to explode when examined • 2017: Pro-ISIS group released image of fighters preparing for a UAS attack against Statue of Liberty NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY –

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ISIS’s Guidance for Operations Outside Iraq & Syria ISIS’ operational philosophy is different than al-Qa`ida’s: • Small-scale attacks acceptable • ISIS members/supporters don’t need to travel to war zone • Command control of attacks not necessary • Even failures considered success Garland 2015 USPER San Bernardino 2015 USPER Orlando 2016 USPER NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 12 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Al-Qa’ida’s Global Network Remains Resilient Al-Qa‘ida’s global network retains intent to carry out attacks against US and other allied interests, varying degrees of capability. • Each affiliate poses at least a regional threat to US/Western interests within their areas of operations, ranging from plotting against military and diplomatic targets to attacking locations used by tourists and carrying out kidnappings. • Al-Qa‘ida’s remaining cadre in Afghanistan/Pakistan is probably no longer capable of launching large attacks, although leaders based there continue to encourage attacks. Despite their degraded state, we are on alert for signs of regeneration. NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 13 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Foreign Terrorist Threat Extends Beyond ISIS & al-Qa’ida • Numerous other Sunni violent extremist groups target US interests. • Shia extremists likewise pose a threat: – Iran remains world’s foremost state sponsor of terror, cultivating a global network of operatives as part of its international attack infrastructure. – Lebanese Hizballah desires to maintain a global attack infrastructure that poses an enduring threat to US interests. NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 14 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Inspired, Enabled, and Directed Attacks in US Since 9/11 NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY –

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Homegrown Violent Extremists and the Homeland • Persistent threat to the West from HVEs who either receive guidance or self-radicalize to conduct attacks • HVEs most immediate and unpredictable threat in Homeland; threats can happen anywhere • High-profile mass shootings/violence in Homeland risk terrorist copycats • Challenge: widespread violent extremist use of encrypted applications • Supplements traditional social media for sharing propaganda to circumvent intel collection and scrutiny by service providers NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 16 PG 2

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE HVE Attackers and Plotters in 2017 NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 17

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Diverse Sources of HVE Inspiration • Historical Sources • Anwar al-Aulaqi lectures • Inspire magazine • Social Media • Official and non-official FTO messaging • Interactions with likeminded individuals • Outreach to violent extremist ideologues • Current Sources • Rumiyah & Dabiq magazine • Inspire magazine NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – USPER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Radicalization and Mobilization • No single factor explains why people radicalize; involves a combination of factors • Process is individualized and non-linear • Individuals can become radicalized but not mobilize to violence • There is no demographic “profile” • Bystanders are usually in a position to witness concerning behavior; but often do not report their observations NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 19

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Importance of Bystanders NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 20

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Bystander Categories • Family (43%) – Parents, step-parents, wives, siblings, cousins, uncles, aunts, fiancées, children • Peers (41%) – Co-workers, school mates, acquaintances, close friends, girl/boy friends • Community Authority Figures (11%) – Work manager, military commander, Imam, college professor, teacher, coach • Strangers (5%) – Walk-ins, internet watchdog groups, commercial company, “See Something Say Something” NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 21

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE What Do Bystanders See? NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 22

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Implications • Ask the right questions to the right bystander categories • Lone actors typically don’t want to act alone • Build awareness among family and peers on how radicalization and mobilization happen – Outreach to Community Authority Figures • Offer bystanders multiple options to report concerns— including anonymously NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 23

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE NCTC Products and Resources NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 24 PG 2

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Andrew Mc. Laughlin NCTC Regional Representative (TX-OK-LA-AR-MS) Based out of Houston 571 -389 -3312 (cell) 713 -936 -7730 (desk) andrejm@nctc. gov (unclassified) NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – 26