UNCLASSIFIED Headquarters U S Air Force Integrity Service

UNCLASSIFIED Headquarters U. S. Air Force Integrity - Service - Excellence Air Force CONOPS & Capabilities Based Planning Lt Col Nathan Titus Resource Analyses Directorate Air Force Studies & Analyses Agency 19 Mar 04 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED Overview n Capabilities Based Planning Background n Challenges to Implementation n Recent Efforts in Air Force Capabilities-Based Planning n Observations/Recommendations UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Capabilities-Based Planning Background “[P]lanning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice. ” Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation, MR-1513 -OSD n Focus on “possibilities” vs. . “specific validated threats” n Central question must be “What do I need to do to achieve desired effects? ” vs. . “How many of each system do I need? ” n Goal is to plan for robust, flexible forces, capable of meeting a wide variety of threats, rather than an “optimal” force for a narrow set of threats UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Challenges to Implementation n Fundamentals: n Defining terms: Effects and Capabilities n Understanding the role of scenarios n Analytic Issues: n Proficiency vs. Sufficiency n What do we mean by “Risk”? n What does it cost? n Determining priorities n Organizational Challenges UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Fundamentals n Defining effects and capabilities n Effects are associated with a desired Outcome or Result n Capabilities are Non-solution Specific – Describe What must be done to achieve Effects n Fix the level to create common perspective n Avoid overlaps, redundancy n Identify relationships n Role of scenario n Scenarios needed to provide context for capability assessment n Suite of scenarios/vignettes must span the range of potential conflicts in all dimensions (political, geography, intensity, etc) n In resource constrained environment, best solution is robust across all scenarios – not an optimal solution to a point scenario which may never occur UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Fundamentals: Defining Effects and Capabilities Master Capability List Capability 1 Sub. Capability Sub-Sub. Capability Effects Construct Capability 2 Sub. Capability Effect Capability Sub-Sub. Capability § Functional decomposition of capabilities § Collectively Exhaustive and Mutually Exclusive § Provides a “menu” from which all CONOPS can choose required capabilities Effect Capability Sub. Capability § Builds on Master Capability List § Links capabilities to effects § Explicitly identifies crosslinks and interdependencies between capabilities § Highlights “enabler” capabilities Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Analytic Issues: Defining Risk is derived from two independent assessments n Our capability to deal with events or to provide effects (y axis) n n The severity of impact of the event if we fail to provide the capability (x axis) Risk concept not strictly ORM n No attempt to determine the probability of adverse event (no validated data exists, this is left to senior leadership judgement) n Measures capability to achieve required effects Capability n C 8 C 5 C 1 C 6 C 7 C 3 C 2 C 4 Severity of Impact Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Analytic Issues: Capability Proficiency vs. Sufficiency n Answering questions like “How much capability do we have? ” or “How much capability do we need? ” leads to two different looks at capability n Proficiency – “how well” n n e. g. , radar detection range Sufficiency – “how many” n Force Structure n Proficiency n Key scenario elements are adversary and location n Amenable to subjective or objective analysis techniques n Sufficiency n Key scenario elements are time related – how fast to arrive and how long to sustain n Best addressed with an objective, quantitative analysis technique UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Gen Jumper’s “Sight Picture” Concepts of Operations (CONOPS). . . will guide our planning and programming, requirements reform, and acquisition. …Air Staff designed a new review to replace the ‘Quarterly Acquisition Review Program’--we call this new approach a Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA). . make warfighting effects, and the capabilities we need to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do. . shift from a program review to a review of how our programs contribute to warfighting capabilities and effects. Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Using the MCL Example Data Collection Tool Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Using the MCL Example Activity Diagram (Time Sensitive Targeting) Determine Environment Assess Cue(s) Determine Sensor Availability Task Sensor Collect Data Detect Target Track until Stopped Geolocate Target ID Target Update Target List Assign weapon to target Update Mission Plans Issue Execution Order Support Weapon Flyout Deconflict target Task BDI / BHI Collect BDI / BHI Assess BDI / BHI Remove from Target List Integrity - Service - Excellence DDD Target

UNCLASSIFIED Using Value Functions When More is Better More doesn’t matter Good Enough nn Example -–in. More Elicitation unitsis ofbetter the measure Measure: Detection nn Is more of this good or range bad? nn When you do it with Unitscan’t of measure: NMI less? What good enough? Can’tisdo with less than 250 NMI nn When moreis not matter? Gooddoes enough 500 NMI nn n Over 1000 NMI doesn’t matter Can’t do it with less Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Air Force CONOPS Construct Focus for Planning & Programming Global Power Global Reach Global Vigilance Joint Vision USAF Vision Air & Space Expeditionary Forces Global Strike CONOPS Homeland Security CONOPS Global Mobility CONOPS Global Persistent Attack CONOPS Nuclear Response CONOPS Agile Combat Support UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence Space & C 4 ISR CONOPS

UNCLASSIFIED Integrated CRRA Analysis Process Overview Phase 2 B – Analysis (Leveraging Existing Efforts & New Focused Work) Phase 1 - Foundations Define Master Capability Library Define Scenarios Define CONOPS Activity Models Define Metrics Product: Capability Performance Framework Warm Database Mining Product: Focus Areas List Assess Proficiency Assess Sufficiency Assess Impact Phase 2 A – Analysis (Subjective Assessment) Phase 3 – Apply Professional Military Judgment Pair-wise Comparisons Architecture. Based Thread Analyses CONOPSSpecific Analyses Product: Candidate Courses of Action Product: Prioritized Courses of Action CRRA Briefing Trail Phase 2 C – Analysis (Characterization and Optimization of Solutions) Characterization of Resource Constraints Characterization of Warfighting Effects Optimization of Alternatives Integrity - Service - Excellence Product: Planning and Programming Guidance to MAJCOMS (APPG)

UNCLASSIFIED Relationship of Assessments RAT View RAT Teams Global Strike Global Persistent Attack Space & C 4 ISR Nuclear Response Homeland Security Surveillance & Reconnaissance Intelligence Command & Control Communications Force Application Force Projection Protect Prepare & Sustain Create the Force CONOPS View Integrity - Service - Excellence Global Mobility Air Force View

UNCLASSIFIED CONOPS MCL Connection to Joint Functional Concepts Battlespace Awareness Joint Cmd & Ctrl Force Application Protection Focused Logistics 7. 0 Protect 6. 0 Force Projection AF CONOPS Capabilities 1. 0 Surveillance & Reconaissance 3. 0 Command & Control 2. 0 Intelligence 4. 0 Communications 5. 0 Force Application 8. 0 Prepare & Sustain 9. 0 Create the Force Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Observations/ Recommendations n Measuring individual capabilities is not difficult; comparing the value/worth of different capabilities is the hard part n Scenarios are still important! Maybe even more important than in threat-based planning n Difficult to measure DOTLPF solutions vs. M solutions – need techniques to help do this n Definitions are important – build consensus early! n Rigorous application of a framework is necessary but not sufficient for success UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Summary n The USAF is moving forward to establish Capabilities Based Planning as the foundation for how we conduct business in the future n A constant communication between HQ/AF and MAJCOMs essential to understand contributions to warfighter, investment strategies to mitigate shortfalls and capability priorities n Our task: make warfighting effects, and the capabilities needed to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

Back Up Integrity - Service - Excellence

Analytic Issues: Cost n Linking capabilities to cost demands a discussion of solutions – Should you even talk about costs? Decision makers need the input, but leads to other questions: n What cost to use? NPV, LCC, Acquisition, O&M? n How are currently owned systems valued? n Will this approach stifle innovation? n n Bottom line is that we need to analyze solutions and costs, but do the capability analysis up front to ensure we are solving the most important problems Integrity - Service - Excellence

UNCLASSIFIED Analytic Issues: Determining Shortfall Priorities Determining “Importance” of capability shortfalls n How extensive is the shortfall? n What is the impact if not fixed? n How much of the Air Force is affected? n No well-defined set of tools/models exists – need objective & subjective tools as well as military judgment n 0 0 0 C 5 0 0 0 0 C 8 C 1 C 6 C 7 C 3 C 2 C 4 Determine Weights • Sensitivity Analysis • Multiattribute Utility Analysis Prioritized Shortfalls Combine with Risk Assessment Scores Shortfall priority = f(shortfall importance, risk, cost) UNCLASSIFIED Integrity - Service - Excellence

Methodology n Build Master Capability Library for all CONOPS n Each CONOPS describes desired effects and capabilities required to achieve these effects n Capabilities drawn from MCL to facilitate later integration n Interdependencies and linkages between capabilities are explicitly defined in each CONOPS n From CONOPS descriptions (above), effects construct built to aid subjective determination of “effects drivers”: n Effects linked to capabilities, sub-capabilities n Weights associated with the contribution of a capability or subcapability determined by SME or from quick-turn analysis tools n Weights are developed in the context of an overarching scenario n Risk Assessment Charts – Depicts capability assessment vs. . severity of impact for capability in the context of an overarching scenario n Integration is straightforward extension when common capability definitions and overarching scenarios are used – Required additional assumption is that all CONOPS Effects are of equal value Integrity - Service - Excellence

Master Capability List (1 of 2) 1. 0 Data Collection 2. 0 Intelligence 1. 1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 2. 1 Process and Exploit Intel 1. 2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll. ) 1. 3 Collect Weather Related Information 2. 2 Provide Intel Assessments 3. 0 Command & Control 4. 0 Communications 3. 1 Planning 4. 1 Exchange Information 3. 2 Execution Management 4. 2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 3. 3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 4. 3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution Integrity - Service - Excellence

Master Capability List (2 of 2) 5. 0 Force Application 6. 0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 7. 0 Combat Support 8. 0 Mobility 5. 1 Countermeasures 6. 1 Protect the Force 7. 1 Establish Operating Locations 8. 1 Airlift 5. 2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 6. 2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 7. 2 Generate the Mission 8. 2 Air Refueling 7. 3 Support Mission and Forces 8. 3 Space Lift 5. 3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 6. 3 Defensive Information Operations 5. 4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 7. 4 Posture Responsive Forces 5. 5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 7. 5 Sustain Mission and Forces 5. 6 Offensive Information Operations 7. 6 Public Affairs 5. 7 Combat Search and Rescue Integrity - Service - Excellence

Global Mobility CONOPS: Notional Example (1 of 2) 1. 0 Data Collection 2. 0 Intelligence 1. 1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 2. 1 Process and Exploit Intel 1. 2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll. ) 1. 3 Collect Weather Related Information 2. 2 Provide Intel Assessments 3. 0 Command & Control 4. 0 Communications 3. 1 Planning 4. 1 Exchange Information 3. 2 Execution Management 4. 2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 3. 3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 4. 3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution Integrity - Service - Excellence

Global Mobility CONOPS: Notional Example (2 of 2) 5. 0 Force Application 6. 0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 7. 0 Combat Support 8. 0 Mobility 5. 1 Countermeasures 6. 1 Protect the Force 7. 1 Establish Operating Locations 8. 1 Airlift 5. 2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 6. 2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 7. 2 Generate the Mission 8. 2 Air Refueling 7. 3 Support Mission and Forces 8. 3 Space Lift 5. 3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 6. 3 Defensive Information Operations 5. 4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 7. 4 Posture Responsive Forces 5. 5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 7. 5 Sustain Mission and Forces 5. 6 Offensive Information Operations 7. 6 Public Affairs 5. 7 Combat Search and Rescue Integrity - Service - Excellence

Global Mobility Effects Construct Rapid Projection of Joint Power 0. 4 0. 6 7. 0 Combat Support 8. 0 Mobility 0. 1 1. 0 Data Collection 0. 2 0. 1 3. 0 Command & Control 4. 0 Comm 0. 1 1. 0 0. 4 1. 3 Collect Weather Info 3. 1 Planning 0. 4 0. 2 3. 3 Nav, Pos, & Timing 3. 2 Execution Management 0. 1 0. 3 6. 0 FSTR 8. 1 Air Lift 0. 3 8. 2 Air Refueling 0. 4 0. 2 0. 1 8. 3 Space Lift 0. 1 0. 2 0. 6 7. 1 Establish Operating Location 7. 3 Support the Mission 7. 2 Generate the Mission 7. 4 Posture the Force 4. 1 Exchange Information 4. 2 Data Storage 6. 1 Protect the Force Integrity - Service - Excellence 4. 3 Network Damage Assess 5. 1 Defensive Countermeasures

Crosscutting Analysis: Using the Effects Construct • Determination of contribution weights for each Effect node can by A be done. Effect B separate pairwise comparisons or by M&S 0. 8 0. 2 each node • Contributions to 0. 5 sum 0. 5 to one to keep scale consistent Capability 1 1. 0 Sub-Capability 1. 1 Capability 2 Sub-Capability 2. 1 0. 3 0. 1 Capability 4 0. 2 Sub-Capability 3. 1 0. 4 Capability 5 0. 4 Capability 6 0. 4 0. 2 0. 7 Sub-Capability 2. 2 Effect D 0. 4 Capability 3 0. 6 0. 4 Effect C 0. 6 Sub-Capability 4. 1 0. 6 0. 5 Sub-Capability 4. 2 Integrity - Service - Excellence 0. 5 Sub-Capability 6. 1