THOMAS NAGEL WHAT ARE YOU LIKE SUBSTANCE DUALISM

THOMAS NAGEL WHAT ARE YOU LIKE? ? ?

SUBSTANCE DUALISM • PLATO, AUGUSTINE, DESCARTES, LEIBNIZ, ETC. , WERE SUBSTANCE DUALISTS • BODY IS A SUBSTANCE, SUBJECT TO CAUSES, FORCES, ETC. • THE MIND IS A DIFFERENT IMMATERIAL, OR SPIRITUAL. SUBSTANCE, WHICH IS • MIND AND BODY INTERACT. • BUT SUBSTANCE DUALISM SEEMS FALSE, AND MERELY WISHFUL THINKING.

SUBSTANCES AND PROPERTIES • NAGEL IS A PROPERTY DUALIST, AS SUCH. • JUST TO CLARIFY, WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUBSTANCES AND PROPERTIES? • WATER, SAY, IS A SUBSTANCE. • BUT BEING YELLOW IS A PROPERTY, SINCE IT SUPERVENES ON A SUBSTANCE. • SUBSTANCES CAN HAVE PRIMARY OR SECONDARY PROPERTIES. • PROPERTIES DO NOT EXIST BY THEMSELVES.

NAGEL ON CONSCIOUSNESS • AS NAGEL SAYS, AS HUMAN BEINGS, WE ARE CONSCIOUS. • SO WE HAVE THE PROPERTY OF BEING CONSCIOUS • BUT AS NAGEL SAYS • WITHOUT CONSCIOUSNESS THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM WOULD BE LESS INTERESTING. WITH CONSCIOUSNESS IT SEEMS HOPELESS. THE MOST IMPORTANT AND CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF CONSCIOUS PHENOMENA IS VERY POORLY UNDERSTOOD. • WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS? • CONSCIOUSNESS, HE SAYS, IS WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE SOMETHING. • BUT AS NAGEL SAYS, WE CANNOT REDUCE WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BEING SOMETHING TO HAVING A BRAIN.

NO REDUCTIONISM PLEASE • NAGEL SAYS THAT REDUCTIONIST ANALYSES OF THE MIND IGNORE CONSCIOUSNESS. • SUCH THEORIES, IT SEEMS, NEGLECT THE SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF THE MIND. • IT IS NOT CAPTURED BY ANY OF THE FAMILIAR, RECENTLY DEVISED, REDUCTIVE ANALYSES OF THE MIND. IT IS NO ANALYZABLE IN TERMS OF ANY EXPLANATORY SYSTEMS OF FUNCTIONAL STATES, OR INTENTIONS ONES, FOR THESE COULD BE ASCRIBED TO ROBOTS OR AUTOMATA THAT EXPERIENCED NOTHING. • YET SUCH SUBJECTIVITY MUST BE EXPLAINED. • REDUCTIONIST ANALYSES, NAGEL SAYS, BARELY TRY TO EXPLAIN SUBJECTIVITY, AND SO ARE INCOMPLETE.

THE INITIAL ARGUMENT • NAGEL, UNLIKE JACKSON, DOES NOT DENY THAT SUBJECTIVE STATES CAUSE BEHAVIOR. • BUT THEY ARE STILL SUBJECTIVE. • NAGEL INSISTS THAT THE REASON WHY REDUCTION OF MIND TO BODY IMPOSSIBLE IS THAT • EVERY SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENON IS ESSENTIALLY CONNECTED WITH A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW, AND IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT AN OBJECTIVE THEORY WILL LEAVE THIS BEHIND. • SO, BY THINKING OF QUALIA IN ANY OTHER TERMS, WE ELIMINATE THEM. • BUT NOTICE HOW CONTROVERSIAL THIS IS. • NAGEL IS SAYING THAT ONLY IN CASES OF MIND AND BODY CAN WE NOT REDUCE THE FORMER.

WHAT BATS ARE LIKE • TO MAKE HIS POINT, NAGEL ALLUDES TO BAT EXPERIENCES, WHICH ARE ALIEN TO US. • BATS ARE CONSCIOUS, BUT ONLY IN THEIR WAY • THE PROBLEM, HE SAYS, IS THAT WE CANNOT IMAGINE THIS. • YET IF TRY TO IMAGINE BAT EXPERIENCES, I AM RESTRICTED TO THE RESOURCES OF MY OWN MIND, AND THOSE RESOURCES ARE INADEQUATE. I CANNOT PERFORM IT EITHER BY IMAGINING ADDITIONS TO MY PRESENT EXPERIENCE, BY IMAGINING SEGMENTS GRADUALLY SUBTRACTED FROM IT, OR BY IMAGINING SOME COMBINATION. • PERHAPS WE CAN IMAGINE GENERAL FEATURES. • BUT THAT IS NOT IMAGINING BAT SUBJECTIVITY, OR QUALIA. • EVEN IF THERE ARE EXPERIENCES WE KNOW OF, WE ALSO KNOW WE CANNOT IMAGINE THEM.

LIMITATIONS • YET AS NAGEL SAYS, THIS BATTY ARGUMENT REVEALS MUCH ABOUT THE MIND BODY PROBLEM. • PERHAPS WE HAVE OUR LIMITS. • IF THE FACTS OF EXPERIENCE- FACTS ABOUT WHAT IT IS LIKE FOR THE EXPERIENCING ORGANISM- ARE ACCESSIBLE ONLY FROM ONE POINT OF VIEW, THEN IT IS A MYSTERY HOW THE TRUE CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCES COULD BE REVEALED BY PHYSICAL INFORMATION. • WHEN IT COMES TO EXPERIENCE, WE CANNOT MOVE FROM APPEARANCE TO REALITY. • DOING THIS, NAGEL SAYS, JUST CHANGES THE SUBJECT.

DISPARATE TERMS • AS NAGEL SAYS, WHILE MIND BODY REDUCTION IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE, WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW. • WHEN THE TERMS ARE DISPARATE, WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW TO CONNECT THEM. • AS DONALD DAVIDSON HAS PUT IT • IT IS A FEATURE OF PHYSICAL REALITY THAT PHYSICAL CHANGE CAN BE EXPLAINED BY LAWS THAT CONNECT IT WITH OTHER CHANGES AND CONDITIONS PHYSICALLY DESCRIBED. IT IS A FEATURE OF THE MENTAL THAT THE ATTRIBUTION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA MUST BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE BACKGROUND OF REASONS, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. THERE CANNOT BE TIGHT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE REALMS IF EACH IS TO RETAIN ALLEGIANCE TO ITS PROPER SOURCE OF EVIDENCE. • NOR DO ANALOGIES, WORK. • INSTEAD, SINCE MIND BODY RELATIONSHIP IS UNIQUE, WE ARE AT A LOSS OF HOW TO PROCEED. • BUT AS NAGEL SEES IT, THAT IS JUST FINE.

OBJECTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY? • NAGEL ENDS BY SPECULATING ABOUT A FUTURE SOCIETY OF PHILOSOPHERS. • PERHAPS WE COULD BUILD UP FROM SIMPLE IDEAS. • EVENTUALLY, WE COULD IDENTIFY COMPLEX BRAIN STATES WITH SUBJECTIVE ONES. • NAGEL SAYS THAT THIS WOULD BE OBJECTIVE. • BUT AS HE SEES MATTERS, SUCH AN OBJECTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY IS GOAL FOR THE FUTURE.