Theory of War Daniel W Blackmon IB HL

Theory of War Daniel W. Blackmon IB HL History Coral Gables Sr. High

Source • Most sections in this lesson are taken from articles published in Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Source • Authors and titles of specific articles are given in the headings. Page references within the outline, unless specifically indicated, all come from this work.

Dynastic to National War • Source: "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow, : From Dynastic to National War, " R. R. Palmer

Dynastic to National War • Dynastic states stood by a balance between monarch and aristocracy

Dynastic to National War • Populations felt little feeling for the monarch • Armies reflected this, being divided internally by class consciousness

Dynastic to National War • Officer corps motivated by honor and class • Long-term enlisted soldiers’ purpose was to make a living, not fight or die.

Dynastic to National War • Armies held together by increasingly good care (food, clothing, etc. ) plus ferocious discipline • Soldiers represented an important investment and could not easily be replaced

Dynastic to National War • Wars tended to be limited: both in aims and means • Maneuver stressed • Battles avoided as much as possible

Dynastic to National War • Frederick II inherited Prussia, a state which owed its existence and identity to the Army. • Must balance economic production and military power

Dynastic to National War • Preserved nobility by forbidding sale of land to peasants or townsmen • . Bourgeois barred from the officer corps

Dynastic to National War • Protected peasant lands as a source of agriculture and for recruit • . Frederick's discipline intended to turn the army into the instrument of his mind and will

Dynastic to National War • Count de Guibert, Essai général de tactique 1772

Dynastic to National War • Distinguished limited from unlimited war • distinguishes war between professional armies and destructive wars of peoples

Dynastic to National War • French Revolution overthrows the absolutist system and fused the government with the people • Political revolution leads to a military revolution

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Source: "Napoleon and the Revolution in War, " Peter Paret

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon – Profited from fusion of social, political, and military changes due to overthrow of the ancien regime – Expanded citizen armies: the levée en masse

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Supply system abandoned; soldiers live off the land (devastating any terrain they cross) • Increase in speed and flexibility • Increase of size

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Changes of tactics, especially in the use of skirmishers

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Armies moved in separate, selfcontained units (corps d'armée), to provide greater speed and operational flexibility

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon sought to be as strong as possible at the point of battle: "God is on the side of the big battalions. "

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • As head of state, Napoleon integrated state policy with the conduct of war • Greatest campaigns advanced his armies deeply to force a major battle

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Campaigns did not have geographic objectives, but aimed at the destruction of the enemy's army

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle tactics – With a superior opponent, wage a frontal battle with natural barriers to restrict opponent's lateral moves

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle tactics – Force the commitment of opponent's reserves, then rupture a weak point with his own reserves (Austerlitz)

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle tactics – With an inferior or equal opponent, attempt to extend the front or attack in flank with a corps, thus taking opponent by two sides

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Classification of battle types (in reverse order of his preference)

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle of strategic penetration: to rupture a long defended line and create confusion which can be exploited. Example is the invasion of Russia in 1812. Strategic penetration by itself does not lead to a decision, but sets up future operations.

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle of Central Position, when he is numerically inferior. • Best known example is Waterloo/Ligny (which, however, he lost. • Another example is Jena/Auerstadt).

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • This requires great skill and nerve on the part of general and soldiers. Napoleon would seize a position between attacking forces.

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • One wing of his army would strike and pin one enemy (at Waterloo-Ligny, it was Wellington at Quatre Bras).

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Then Napoleon would turn the rest of his army against the isolated opponent and destroy him (At Waterloo-Ligny, Blücher at Ligny).

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Having destroyed half of his opponents, he could now redirect his entire army against the remaining enemy (at Waterloo-Ligny, Wellington at Waterloo).

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • (Napoleon lost Waterloo-Ligny because, having defeated Blücher, his pursuit did not see to it that Blücher was unable to regroup and rejoin the battle and because the axis of retreat Blücher took allowed him to reestablish contact with Wellington.

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Histories of Waterloo focus--not unnaturally--on the struggle of the British and the French, but it was the arrival of the Prussians on Napoleon's flank and rear which doomed Napoleon. )

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Soldiers today still study these battles. An example from U. S. history is Chancellorsville.

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • manoeuvre sur les derriere: a strategic penetration around a flank to surround annihilate the enemy. (Example Ulm, Marengo)

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Without question, this is Napoleon's preferred attack; he uses it over 30 times in his career. (Chandler 162178)

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Classic blitzkrieg is a manoevre sur les derriere with the application of the internal combustion engine and caterpillar treads

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Panzer divisions, corps and groups, like Napoleonic divisions and corps d'armees, are all arms formations capable of independent action.

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon's opponents understood tactics as well as he did; the difference is psychological attitude • Master exploiter of time and of human emotions

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • After 1807, Napoleon's focus on decisive battles plus his own psychological need for domination leads him to reject limited wars for circumscribed goals

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Command system broke down under continental strains, especially in Russia and Spain

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon loses a rational, political purpose for his operations in Russia (1812), Germany (1813) and France (1814)

Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Military legacy • Massive accumulation and use of force • Insistence on absolute victory • Rejection of limited wars for limited goals

Clausewitz, • "Clausewitz, " Peter Paret

Clausewitz, • Carl von Clausewitz is the author of On War, 1830 • Professional soldier • Saw combat at age 12

Clausewitz, • Accompanied Scharnhorst in Wars of Liberation • Few Napoleonic officers had as wide ranging an experience Carl von Clausewit • Involved in army reforms, which he saw as a means of social reform

Clausewitz, • Clausewitz believes that theory must meet the test of reality • Thought processes are dialectical: ideas are defined with one-sided clarity, and then balanced by an counter-idea

Clausewitz, • War is a mere continuation of policy by other, means [On War, Bk I, Ch. 1: 24]

Clausewitz, • "War is therefore an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" [On War, Bk I Ch. 1: 2]

Clausewitz, • War is the means to achieve political goals, not the end in itself

Clausewitz, • There is no logical limit to the application of force

Clausewitz, • Two types of war • Objective to overthrow the enemy (unlimited) • Objective merely to occupy some of his frontier districts (limited)

Clausewitz, • Since war is a political act, then ultimately the political leadership should control and direct the conduct of war

Clausewitz, • "There can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it. " [qtd. in Paret, p. 200]

Clausewitz, • Three elements in war

Clausewitz, • Violence and passion: dimension of psychology

Clausewitz, • Uncertainty and chance: friction in war, dimension of leadership, determination and luck

Clausewitz, • Politics: the business of leadership in government

Clausewitz, • "The political purpose for which a war is fought should determine the means that are employed and the kind of degree of effort required.

Clausewitz, • "The political purpose should also determine the military objective. " [qtd. in Paret, p. 206]

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society, " Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Marx and Engels among the ancestors of modern total war • Understood the fourfold nature of modern war:

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • • Diplomacy Economic Psychology Military

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Engels' analyses of Revolution of 1848 are brilliant • Do not start an insurrection unless prepared to face the consequences

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Once begun, always maintain the offensive and initiative • Patience and timing are indispensable for strategy

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Class struggle and war • Societies exist only in relative civil peace between classes

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • During a crisis, class struggles may be projected internationally, when ruling elites declare war on each other

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • War may place too great a strain on the social fabric, catalyzing a revolution

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Engels and the Army • Development of the army essential for social growth

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Favored conscription for strongest defense • Conscription also transforms the nature of the army away from long-serving professionals

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Investigated the impact of technological change on military organization and success

Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society • Understood the interpenetration of political and military factors, of civilian and military spheres

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff, " Hajo Holborn

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Continuous strategic-operational sequence combining – Mobilization – Concentration – Movement and fighting • Leads to Vernichtungsschlacht (battle of annihilation)

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Direct line of thought and influence • Helmut von Moltke the Elder • Graf Alfred von Schlieffen (Chief of Staff 1891 -1906)

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • . Hans von Seeckt (Chief of Staff 1919 -1926) • . Ludwig Beck (Chief of Staff 19331938)

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Heinz Guderian: implementation of combined armored-mechanized forces, spearheaded by tactical air power to achieve strategic envelopment

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Strategic envelopment, particularly in the form of Blitzkrieg, was devastating within limited theaters of operations

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Can be defeated by forcing the offensive to operate over wide distances: trade space for time, and keep ample mobile reserves, that is, the strategy of the Russians 1941 -1945

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Moltke's contribution • Regarded war as inevitable

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • . Student of the American Civil War, which demonstrated that improved firepower, transportation, and communications had changed war

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Frontal attacks prohibitive in cost

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Use superior movement (including mobilization and rail movement) to concentrate armies and engage an opponent's front and flanks simultaneously

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Confined himself to issuing general orders and allowing subordinates to handle details

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Transformed the Prussian General Staff into an instrument combining local flexibility and initiative with conformity to a common operational doctrine • Modern era of staff work

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • "At its best, the Prussian general staff system institutionalized combat efficiency by ensuring that, in a given situation, different staff officers, educated to a common fighting doctrine, would arrive at approximately the same solution for making the most effective employment of available forces. " (301)

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Staff was a highly selected, selfconscious elite whose characteristics were exceptional intellectual ability, hard-work, and dedication

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Swiftly defeated Austria in 1866 • Swiftly defeated France in 1871

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Experience with the Paris Commune was unsettling: indiscriminately arming the population can lead to social revolution

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • After the Franco-Prussian War, his plans envisioned that any attempt at total victory would stiffen resistance, and so Germany should effect a defense that would permit diplomacy to achieve a peace settlement

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • In 1890, in his last public statement, he foresaw that growing Russo-French strength made quick victory imperative, but, with rising national passions, future wars could be long, and shatter social orders

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • German thinkers could not resolve the conflict between the need for swift offensive and the capacity for an entrenched defense to inflict insupportable losses.

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Schlieffen's Contribution • Dominated by need to achieve rapid victory after 1891

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • . Might have looked for diplomacy to reduce Germany's odds, but held himself to planning and answering questions when asked

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Objective of operations is to destroy enemy forces • . Envelopment necessary to avoid prohibitive losses

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Increasingly believed that Germany had to win the initial battle at any cost

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Mobilization plans, once put into effect, were difficult or impossible to change • Initial military decisions therefore had enormous political and diplomatic consequences

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Bismarck's successors made no effort to coordinate strategic planning and foreign policy

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Schlieffen Plan: pivot on Metz, violate Belgian neutrality, and envelop French left

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Serious operational flaws from the beginning, including the assumption of the availability of divisions not in existence; of troop fatigue and supply, especially on the German right; of brushing away any British intervention; with little margin for "friction'

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Original plan had little chance for success

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Helmut von Moltke the Younger • Sought to avoid the post of Chief of Staff • . Inherited the Schlieffen Plan • Improved Schlieffen's logistics

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Strengthened the center without weakening the right • Added greater potential flexibility to the plan

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Failure of the Moltke Plan in 1914 due to the problems of speed, endurance, and command control in an era before vehicles with gasoline engines and caterpillar treads and before radio

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Evaluation” • Both the Moltkes and Schlieffen sought a rapid victory by battles of annihilation

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • By the early 20 th century, national morale, social stability, and economic resources increasingly dominate

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • Resolute governments could suffer a military disaster and continue to fight

Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment • "Any war plan based on military considerations alone had become inadequate, and political-military cooperation of the highest order was now essential. " (325)

American Strategy • "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War, " Russell F. Weigley

American Strategy • American thought a branch of European thought • American emphasis on less restraint in the conduct of war • European and Indian cultures too incompatible

American Strategy • George Washington • Consciously rejected the idea that the American Revolution should be fought by revolutionary means

American Strategy • Nathanael Greene showed great skill at weaving guerilla and regular forces together in campaigns in South Carolina and Virginia

American Strategy • US retained no institutional memory of how to wage guerilla or counterguerrilla war – Second Seminole War 1835 -1841 – Filipino Insurrection 1899 -1903 – Vietnam War 1965 -1973

American Strategy • Civil War • Most striking feature of combat was the tendency to entrench • West Point provided an engineering education which may have contributed to this tendency

American Strategy • Rifled musket now the standard weapon and rifled cannon in use • Increased firepower made frontal assaults usually futile, and even flank attacks very costly • Malvern Hill (1862) or Cold Harbor (1864) examples of frontal attacks • Chancellorsville (1863) or Second Bull Run (1862) examples of flank attacks • Mutual losses made decisive, Napoleonic

American Strategy • Rifled musket now the standard weapon and rifled cannon in use • Increased firepower made frontal assaults usually futile, and even flank attacks very costly

American Strategy • Malvern Hill (1862) or Cold Harbor (1864) examples of frontal attacks • Chancellorsville (1863) or Second Bull Run (1862) examples of flank attacks

American Strategy • Mutual losses made decisive, Napoleonic battles rare, since the winner was too exhausted to exploit and the loser still too intact to effectively pursue • Antietam (1862) and Gettysburg (1863) are examples

American Strategy • Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson • Believed that the South must be aggressive in its defense, not passive, or Northern superiority in material would overcome the South

American Strategy • Recognized the risks of failure • Losses by Gettysburg had reached too heavy a level to sustain • Even Lee's early victories (Seven Days', Bull Run, Chancellorsville were very costly to the South

American Strategy • "The most skillful generalship thus would no longer achieve against resolute enemies armed with rifles sufficiently favorable casualty rates and margins of victory in battle to make the results of any one battle decisive. " (429)

American Strategy • U. S. Grant • At least by 1863, did not share the belief that a single battle could achieve victory

American Strategy • Aimed to capture (not annihilate) Lee's army by turning movements. Lee's skill enabled him to prevent being turned and forced Grant into frontal battles against an entrenched enemy in difficult terrain.

American Strategy • As a result, Grant's intentions have frequently been missed and he has been credited with simple, crude, and effective battering ram tactics.

American Strategy • This is actually unfair to Grant, who was much better than he appears in Virginia. He was, however, perfectly willing to pound away in battles of attrition.

American Strategy • Cost of his summer campaign in 1864 imperiled the political leadership (election of 1864) as a result of heavy losses

American Strategy • William Tecumseh Sherman • Aimed at deep penetration of enemy interior, destruction of resources, and terrorization of the civilian populace of Georgia and South Carolina (18641865)

American Strategy • Nevertheless, his March to the Sea possible only after the elimination of the Army of Tennessee by a long process of attrition

American Strategy • Offensives solutions of both Lee and Jackson on the one hand Grant and Sherman on the other, demanded a new offensive strategy be developed

American Strategy • American soldiers, however, entered the 20 th century believing that the "superior weight of military force that America could bring to bear against almost any rival could be their only sure military reliance. " (440, emphasis added)

American Strategy • Lee, Jackson, Forrest, or even Mosby do not exert real influence on US doctrine: they lost.

American Strategy • Doctrinal stress is on battle and the destruction of the enemies' army

American Strategy • Grant's legacy = Operation Overlord; a direct assault on the enemy aimed at destroying his armed forces.

American Strategy • Sherman's legacy = strategic bombing of Germany and Japan; an attack on civilian will and on material foundations of resistance.

American Strategy • US determination in World War II was that Realpolitik (consideration of the shape of a future Europe, spheres of influence, or balance of power) must not interfere with winning the war--the American people would not tolerate that

American Strategy • The US view prevailed since the US was by far the stronger partner in the Anglo-American alliance

American Strategy • American military thinkers have been weak in their understanding of the interrelationship between politics and war, and in the nature of war as an instrument of statecraft

American Strategy • Americans tend to view wars as moral crusades, intended to punish evil doers

Men Against Fire • "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914, " Michael Howard

Men Against Fire • Technical factors leading to heavier losses in battle • Substitution of smokeless high explosive for gunpowder leads to increased range, accuracy, and camouflage

Men Against Fire • Smaller calibers, brass cartridges, and magazines give infantry a higher rate of fire • recoilless gun carriages, permitting rapid and continuous artillery fire

Men Against Fire • Offensive Formations remained Napoleonic due to the use of largely peasant conscripts

Ivan S. Bloch • The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations (1898) • Russian subject, self-made man, an economist and civilian

Ivan S. Bloch • Conclusions on the future of war: better firearms result in – "the opening of battles from much greater distances; – "loose formation in attack; – "the strengthening of the defense; – "the increase in the area of the battlefield; – "the increase in casualties" [qtd in Ropp, 219]

Ivan S. Bloch • "The first thing every man will have to do. . . will be to dig a hole in the ground. . When you must dig a trench before you can make any advance, your progress is necessarily slow.

Ivan S. Bloch • "Battles will last for days, and at the end it is very doubtful whether any decisive victory can be gained.

Ivan S. Bloch • "Every great State would. . . be in the position of a besieged city, and the factor which always decides sieges is the factor which will decide the modern war. .

Ivan S. Bloch • "The ultimate is in the hand of famine. . I am not speaking so much of the armies, as. . . of the population. . . which is apt to control the policy of which the armies are the executive instrument. . .

Ivan S. Bloch • "Upon this highly excitable, sensitive population you are going to inflict. . . hunger. . . and war. At the same time you will. . . expose your governing. . . classes to more than decimation at the hands of the enemy's sharpshooters.

Ivan S. Bloch • "How long do you think your social fabric will remain stable under such circumstances? " [qtd in Ropp, 219]

Ivan S. Bloch • "War. . . has become impossible except at the price of suicide. " [qtd in Ropp, 220]

The Cult of the Offensive • Ardant du Picq--chief (but by no means the only) advocate of the moral element of war

The Cult of the Offensive • That is, battles are not won by bullets, shells, and bombs, but by the superior will of one side over the other.

The Cult of the Offensive • In World War II, the most notable advocate of this attitude was the Japanese Army. • The ratio of battlefield deaths between Japan and the US was 1: 20

The Cult of the Offensive • French doctrine in particular stressed the idea of attaque à outrance

The Cult of the Offensive • Colonel Louis de Grandmaison was extremely influential in establishing French doctrine:

The Cult of the Offensive • “There exists no other means but attack, immediate and total. . Our conclusion will be that we must prepare ourselves and others by encouraging with enthusiasm,

The Cult of the Offensive • “with exaggeration and in all the infinite details of training everything that bears—however little—the mark of the offensive spirit.

The Cult of the Offensive • “Let us go as far as excess and this will perhaps not be far enough. ” (Ousby 36)

The Cult of the Offensive • "We have to. . . cultivat[e] with passion everything that bears the stamp of the offensive spirit. We must take it to excess" Louis de Grandmaison, 1911 (520)

The Cult of the Offensive • "The French Army, returning to its traditions, recognizes no law save that of the offensive" de Grandmaison, 1913 (520)

The Cult of the Offensive • "All that trash written by M. de Bloch before 1904 about zones of fire across which no living being could pass, heralded nothing but disaster.

The Cult of the Offensive • "War is essentially the triumph, . . . not of a line of men entrenched behind entanglements and fire swept zones over men exposing themselves in the open but of one will over the weaker will. . .

The Cult of the Offensive • "the best defense to a country is an army formed, trained, inspired by the idea of attack. " Sir Ian Hamilton, 1911 (521)

The Cult of the Offensive • Armies went to war in 1914 expecting not only to fight for their country, but to die for it.

The Cult of the Offensive • Strategy of Attrition that results from tactical deadlock following the Marne

The Cult of the Offensive • "The tactical deadlock, in short, was utilized to serve a strategy of attrition, in which the manpower and morale not only of armies but the entire nation was put to the test.