The zombie argument objections Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co
The zombie argument: objections Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk
The argument • It is conceivable that there are zombies. • If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies. • If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then, contra physicalism, physical properties do not determine all mental properties. • Therefore physicalism is false.
Zombies are not conceivable • We cannot assume that physicalism is false. But if it is true, then zombies are not conceivable. • A zombie is a physical duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness, but without phenomenal consciousness. • A physical duplicate is a functional duplicate. • Therefore, a zombie is a physical and functional duplicate of a person, but without phenomenal consciousness.
Zombies are not conceivable • Phenomenal properties are physical properties realising particular functional roles. • Therefore, a physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness has phenomenal consciousness. • A physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness cannot both have and lack phenomenal consciousness. • Therefore, zombies are inconceivable.
Objection • We cannot assume that there is a complete physical and functional analysis of consciousness – Phenomenal properties of consciousness are ‘qualia’ – intrinsic, non-representational properties of experience • We can know all about something’s physical structure and function without being able to explain consciousness – so we can conceive the same physical thing as having consciousness or not
Zombies are conceivable, but not possible • This objection requires us to get clearer on possibility • It is not an analytic truth that water is H 2 O. • People can meaningfully ask ‘Is water H 2 O? ’ • It is conceivable that water is not H 2 O
Zombies are conceivable, but not possible • However, water is H 2 O. And identity is necessary. – Identity is a relation between something and itself. Being H 2 O is what makes water what it is. – In every possible world in which water exists, water is H 2 O. • It is possible that water in the oceans is fresh, that water never falls as rain, etc. But it isn’t possible for water not to be water, i. e. H 2 O.
Zombies are conceivable, but not possible • If phenomenal properties just are certain physical and/or functional properties, then you can’t have these physical/functional properties without consciousness. • So if physicalism is true, zombies are impossible. • The second premise fails: just because zombies are conceivable, that doesn’t show they are possible.
Reply • There is a disanalogy between water and phenomenal properties. • The concept of ‘water’ is a concept of something with a particular structure and causal role; likewise H 2 O – Identical structure and causal role entails identical property
Reply • Concepts of brain function are also concepts of structure and function • But the concept of, e. g. , ‘pain’ is a concept of how a sensation feels, not what it does – The essence of pain is its feeling • So there is no reason to think that certain brain properties cannot exist without the feeling
Possibility and reality • Suppose zombies are possible. How does that show that property dualism is true in the actual world, rather than some other possible world? • Because identity is necessary. Phenomenal properties cannot be physical-functional properties in this world and not be the same properties in another world. – So if phenomenal properties are not physicalfunctional properties in some other possible world, they are not physical-functional properties in this world.
Possibility and reality • Physicalism defends supervenience: any two things that are exactly alike in their physical properties cannot have different mental properties – Cp. aesthetic properties: two paintings that are physically identical must be aesthetically identical – Once all the physical properties are fixed, the aesthetic properties are fixed
Possibility and reality • Likewise, once all the physical properties are fixed, the mental properties are fixed. • The zombie argument attacks this claim – once the physical properties of our world are fixed, something further (e. g. an additional law of nature) is needed to fix the mental properties.
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