The zombie argument Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy co uk
The zombie argument Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk
Substance and properties • A substance is an entity, a thing, that does not depend on another entity for its continued existence. – It has ‘ontological independence’. • Substances are what possess properties. • Properties can’t exist without substances – They depend on substances to exist. • Substances persist through changes in properties.
Substance and property dualism • Substance dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter – Minds can exist independent of bodies – Mental properties are properties of a mental substance • Property dualism: there is just one sort of substance, physical substance – Mental properties are properties of a material substance, but they are fundamentally distinct from physical properties
Physicalism • The fundamental nature of the universe is physical: – the properties identified by physics form the fundamental nature of the universe; • All properties are ontologically dependent on physical properties (identity or supervenience)
Property dualism • Physical properties don’t form the complete fundamental nature of the universe • Chalmers on consciousness – ‘Easy’ problem: explaining functions of consciousness in physical/functional terms – ‘Hard’ problem: explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness – These may not be analyzable in terms of function or physical structure
Possible worlds • A ‘possible world’ is a way of talking about how things could have been. • Propositions describe ‘states of affairs’. – Propositions can be true or false. – A proposition that is true describes the way things are; the actual world. • A proposition that is contingently false describes a possible state of affairs, a way things could be but aren’t.
Possible worlds • Possible worlds are distinct from one another depending on what we are supposing to be true in that world. – Things have different properties in different possible worlds. – Different things exist in different possible worlds.
Philosophical zombies • A zombie, in the philosophical sense, is a physical replica of a person, but with no phenomenal consciousness • Zombies are not possible in the actual world – The laws of nature correlate physical properties with consciousness • Are they possible in a different possible world? – A world that is physically identical to ours, but without consciousness – Are zombies ‘metaphysically’ possible?
The argument • The idea of a zombie isn’t a logical contradiction – so they are conceivable. – If they are conceivable, then they are possible. • If consciousness were ontologically dependent on physical properties, then zombies would be impossible. • Because zombies are possible, consciousness is not ontologically dependent on physical properties, so physicalism is false.
The argument • It is conceivable that there are zombies. • If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies. • If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then, contra physicalism, physical properties do not determine all mental properties. • Therefore physicalism is false.
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