The Substantive Representation of Gender Equality Using Pitkins

The Substantive Representation of Gender Equality: Using Pitkin’s second way of substantive representation to steer clear of the problems embedded within the concept of women’s interests 2016 MPSA Conference, 04 07 2016 Ph. D. student Mette Marie Stæhr Harder mmharder@ruc. dk University of Roskilde, Denmark Department of Social Science and Business

Today, two very central concepts within the field that looks into gender and parliamentary representation: Women Descriptive Representation (How many females? ) Women Substantive Representation (How are women’s interests represented? ) Both concepts are developed on the basis of Pitkin (1967) “The Concept of Representation”

Today, two concepts are very central within the field that looks into gender and parliamentary representation: Women Descriptive Representation (How many females? ) Women Substantive Representation (How are women’s interests represented? ) Both concepts are developed on the basis of Pitkin (1967) “The Concept of Representation”

Problems facing scholars who set out to measure the representation of women’s interests What are women’s interests? Assumes “a universal women”, but she does not exists. . Can we talk of just two genders - as if they are there, given from above? Do they have different interests?

Solutions of the field: • Stick to the concept of women’s interests and theorize substantive representation as “representation of someone’s interests”, referring to Pitkin. • Be very concerned with how to define and measure these interests, stress the research designs etc. But the overall problems persist: Scholars still struggle with problems caused by the notion of “women’s interest” and how to solve these (Celis et all, 2008 and 2014, Celis and Childs, 2014)

Another solution is possible: If we reopen Pitkin we will see that her concept of substantive representation is not just acting for the interests of someone (of a group). It is dual concept, linked to a dual understanding of interests: • An interest can be the interest of someone, it belongs to someone or to a group of people. • An interest can exist unattached to specific people – it belongs to no one, people may participate in an interest.

Pitkin´s notions of interests and the type of substantive representation each notion generates in the thoughts of Madison and Burke Acting for attached interests (Madison) Acting for unattached interests (Burke) Interest characteristics: Interests are attached to a group or a faction of individuals Interests are unattached. Individuals can participate in an interest. Level of conflict: High. Focus on power relations Input needed for MPs Knowledge of to represent individual’s subjective interests: opinions Low. Focus on deliberation Knowledge of people’s feelings, as they exist objectively Political goal of representatives: To reach the best decision, “politics is the realm of knowledge and reason” Interdependence perspective Classical view of the representativeconstituency relation: To win the power contest, “politics is the realm of pressures and opinion” Mandate perspective Source: Author

Other Solution: • Let’s use Pitkin’s concept of unattached interests – her “second way” of substantive representation • The interest of Gender Equality is unattached. • Only, in specific interpretations of gender equality, does this interest work.

Two ideal types on how to conceive of Substantive Representation of Gender Equality from a Radical Feminist perspective Recognition of interests Objectivity: The interests which people participate in can be established objectively We expect women to participate in the substantive representation of gender equality Women > < Men Potential critical actors Expected line of conflict Substantive Representation of Gender Equality from the perspective of New Liberal Feminism Subjectivity: Only the individual can establish which interest he or she will participate in There is no way of knowing who will participate in the substantive representation of gender equality People who participate in the interest of gender equality > < people who do not participate in the interest of gender equality (but participate in the interest of preserving family values, keeping society as it is etc. )

In sum: In order to steer clear of the problems embedded within the notion of “women’s interests” we may think about using Pitkin’s second way of substantive representation (representation of unattached interests) and combining this with a perspective of gender equality that does not assume any essentialist notions about gender. Thank you