The problem of other minds Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophy

The problem of other minds Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy. co. uk

The threat of solipsism • How can we know that other minds exist? • We experience our minds directly, but it seems that we can only know of other people’s behaviour – This may be a particular problem for substance dualism – is a mind ‘attached’ to the body? • Solipsism: my mind is the only mind (or thing) that exists

The argument from analogy • I have a mind. • I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour. • Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations. • Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour, viz. mental states. • Therefore, other people have minds.

Objection • You cannot make an induction based on one case – Cp. This dog has three legs. Therefore, all dogs have three legs.

Analogy II • • This behaviour has a mental cause. That third behaviour (etc. ) has a mental cause. Therefore, many behaviours have a mental cause (I know this from my own experience). • Other people exhibit the same types of behaviour as cited above. • Therefore, those behaviours also have mental causes. • Therefore, other people have minds.

Clarification • The behaviour isn’t picked out as mine, but as a type of behaviour, e. g. raising an arm – Science generalizes from cases we have observed to ones we haven’t – This isn’t analogy, but causal inference • It is possible that the behaviour we infer from is exceptional. But the argument isn’t meant to be a proof • Objection: the belief that other people have minds isn’t a hypothesis at all

On ascribing mental states • What is necessary for us to be able to ascribe mental states to ourselves? • We must be able to ascribe them to others as well – Children can only learn to name and report their mental states through interaction with others – Other people must therefore be able to identify the expression of mental states in our behaviour – The child learns how to ascribe mental states to itself and others at the same time

Implications • The problem of other minds dissolves: there can be no knowledge of oneself as a mind without presupposing that there are other minds • Our knowledge of other minds isn’t inferred from knowledge of what causes our own behaviour • Substance dualism ascribes mental states to a different substance from physical states – but we have to be able to ascribe mental states to people