The Knowledge Argument Frank Jackson What Mary Didnt

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The Knowledge Argument Frank Jackson. ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’

The Knowledge Argument Frank Jackson. ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’

What Mary doesn’t know • Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated

What Mary doesn’t know • Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black and white television…She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of ‘physical’ which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. • If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise, that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.

Argument against Physicalism • The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience involves

Argument against Physicalism • The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical facts. • It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about the world might yet lack knowledge about what conscious experience is like ‘from the inside’.

What the Argument is Not • Not an argument for the Empiricist doctrine that

What the Argument is Not • Not an argument for the Empiricist doctrine that ‘all knowledge comes from experience’ • Not an argument assuming the intensionality of knowledge – The argument does not rest on assuming falsely that, if S knows that a is F and if a = b, then S knows that b is F…on being let out, she will not say ‘I could have worked all this out before by making some more purely logical inferences. • Not an argument for Substance Dualism or the possibility of post-mortem survival

The Structure of the Argument • The Knowledge Intuition – Conscious experience is ‘knowing

The Structure of the Argument • The Knowledge Intuition – Conscious experience is ‘knowing what it is like…’ – Knowing all the physical facts about experience (from the 3 rd person perspective) is not enough to know ‘what it is like’ to have that experience • The Knowledge Intuition entails the falsity of physicalism.

The thesis that all properties supervene upon base physical properties PHYSICALISM AND SUPERVENIENCE

The thesis that all properties supervene upon base physical properties PHYSICALISM AND SUPERVENIENCE

Physicalism • The thesis that everything is physical, a. k. a materialism • A

Physicalism • The thesis that everything is physical, a. k. a materialism • A complete physics will explain all facts about the world • psychological or biological or social features of the world supervene on physical facts about the world.

Lewis on Supervenience • A dot-matrix picture has global properties … yet all there

Lewis on Supervenience • A dot-matrix picture has global properties … yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. • The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. • They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whethere is or there isn't a dot

Supervenience • What these hedges are like at the leaf-and-branch level determines what the

Supervenience • What these hedges are like at the leaf-and-branch level determines what the topiary looks like • But hedges that were different at the leaf-and-branch level could have the same topiary look

More Supervenience • Supervenience entered philosophy initially in ethics. • Moral properties were said

More Supervenience • Supervenience entered philosophy initially in ethics. • Moral properties were said to supervene upon non-moral properties • In general, value is supervenient • So, supervenience isn’t just a matter of spatially largescale properties depending on spatially small-scale properties.

Physicalism: a fact about our world? • Physicalism is true at a possible world

Physicalism: a fact about our world? • Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff any world which is a physical duplicate of w is a duplicate of w simpliciter. • Physicalism is usually taken to be a matter of contingent fact • There are worlds at which there are non-physical facts but (according to physicalists) ours isn’t one of them.

Physicalism: Pro • Naturalism as an aggressor hypothesis – E. g. explaining life in

Physicalism: Pro • Naturalism as an aggressor hypothesis – E. g. explaining life in naturalistic terms • The reducibility of psychological, biological and other explanations to physical explanations • The elimination of irreducible agency explanations

Physicalism: Con QUALIA!

Physicalism: Con QUALIA!

Physicalism cannot capture the ‘what it is like’ of experience AGAINST PHYSICALISM

Physicalism cannot capture the ‘what it is like’ of experience AGAINST PHYSICALISM

The History of an Intuition • C. D. Broad’s Archangel • Feigl’s Martian •

The History of an Intuition • C. D. Broad’s Archangel • Feigl’s Martian • Thomas Nagel’s Bat

Broad’s Archangel He would know exactly what the microscopic structure of ammonia must be;

Broad’s Archangel He would know exactly what the microscopic structure of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable to predict that a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia does when it gets into the human nose…[H]e could not possibly know that these changes would be accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or he had smelled it for himself. NH 3

Feigl’s Martian Could a Martian, entirely without sentiments of compassion and piety, know about

Feigl’s Martian Could a Martian, entirely without sentiments of compassion and piety, know about what is going on during a commemoration of the armistice? …[He could] predict all responses, including the linguistic utterances of the earthlings in the situations which involve their visual perceptions, their laughter about jokes, or their (solemn) behavior at the commemoration. But ex hypothesi, the Martian would be lacking completely in the sort of imagery and empathy which depends on familiarity (direct acquaintance) with the kinds of qualia to be imaged or empathized

Nagel’s Bat • Nagel in ‘What It Is Like to Be a Bat’ argues

Nagel’s Bat • Nagel in ‘What It Is Like to Be a Bat’ argues that some facts can only be captured ‘from a subjective perspective’ and uses his example of bats to illustrate the point • Even if we knew everything there is to know ‘from an objective perspective’ about a bat's sonar system we still would not know ‘what it is like’ to perceive a given object with a bat's sonar system.

Inconclusive • These examples just pump the ‘knowledge intuition’ but are inconclusive • It

Inconclusive • These examples just pump the ‘knowledge intuition’ but are inconclusive • It is debatable whether these archangels or Martians are missing something in the first place • We can’t imagine what it’s like to be a bat because we’re physically very different--lack of imagination doesn’t show anything. • The crucial feature of the Knowledge Argument is that Mary learns something.

Jackson’s next step • To make the case against physicalism we need to show

Jackson’s next step • To make the case against physicalism we need to show that – An individual that knows all the physical facts – Might still be lacking knowledge of some facts • This would show that the physical facts are not all the facts there are.

Mary in the black and white room Mary is a brilliant scientist who is…forced

Mary in the black and white room Mary is a brilliant scientist who is…forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires…all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes…and use terms like ‘red’…

Mary gets out! • [W]hen Mary is released from her black and white room…It

Mary gets out! • [W]hen Mary is released from her black and white room…It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. • But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. • But she had all the physical information. • Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.

The Knowledge Argument • Mary knows all the physical facts concerning human color vision

The Knowledge Argument • Mary knows all the physical facts concerning human color vision before her release. • But there are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before her release. • So, there are non-physical facts concerning human color vision.

Objections to Jackson’s argument AGAINST THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT

Objections to Jackson’s argument AGAINST THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT

Objections to the Argument • The success of the argument hinges on whether Mary

Objections to the Argument • The success of the argument hinges on whether Mary acquires new propositional knowledge. • So we ask: – Is it new knowledge and – Is it propositional knowledge, as distinct from, e. g. know-how or ‘knowledge by acquaintance’

Objection Mary becomes acquainted with what she initially only knew by description • Knowledge

Objection Mary becomes acquainted with what she initially only knew by description • Knowledge by description and by acquaintance – e. g. I know, by description, everything about Florence —geographical, architectural, historical, etc. – But becoming acquainted with Florence by being there is another thing • When one becomes acquainted with something one knew by description one does not acquire new knowledge. • When Mary gets out, she doesn’t acquire new knowledge —there’s nothing additional to know.

Response to Description/Acquaintance Objection • ‘What is immediately to the point is not the

Response to Description/Acquaintance Objection • ‘What is immediately to the point is not the kind, manner, or type of knowledge Mary has, but what she knows. What she knows beforehand is ex hypothesi everything physical there is to know, but is it everything there is to know? ’ • Churchland’s argument is question-begging: he assumes that everything physical is all there is to know so that after getting out Mary just comes to know by acquaintance what she already knew by description.

Propositional Knowledge • Knowing that as distinct from knowing how, knowing who, etc. •

Propositional Knowledge • Knowing that as distinct from knowing how, knowing who, etc. • Expressed by ‘x knows that ______’ where a proposition fills the blank. • This is knowledge of facts…and that’s what we need for the argument to go through since the claim is that there are non-physical facts about the world.

Objection Mary acquires know-how rather than know-that • Knowing that is neither necessary nor

Objection Mary acquires know-how rather than know-that • Knowing that is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowhow – I know lots about music theory and about theory of piano playing but I can’t play – I’m a fluent native English speaker but can’t explain the grammar • After getting out of the room, Mary acquires new skills – As I would if I practiced! • But she doesn’t acquire any new factual knowledge.

Response to the Know-How Objection • Now it is certainly true that Mary will

Response to the Know-How Objection • Now it is certainly true that Mary will acquire abilities of various kinds after her release…But is it plausible that is all she will acquire? • I grant that I have no proof that Mary acquires on her release, as well as abilities, factual knowledge…My claim is that the knowledge argument is a valid argument from highly plausible, though admittedly not demonstrable, premises.

Objection The Argument Proves Too Much • Suppose that prior to her release Mary

Objection The Argument Proves Too Much • Suppose that prior to her release Mary is a Dualist who knows all there is to know about ‘ectoplasm’ • Mary still learns something so • The argument cuts against dualism as much as it does against physicalism

Response to the Proves Too Much Objection • Neither Mary, nor anyone else, knows

Response to the Proves Too Much Objection • Neither Mary, nor anyone else, knows anything, much less everything about ‘ectoplasm’ • We aren’t defending Cartesian Dualism here or arguing for the existence of ‘ectoplasm’ • Even if there were ectoplasm, and Mary knew all about it but learns something new after getting out, then that wouldn’t be to the point

Objection The Failure of Imagination • Before getting out, Mary couldn’t even imagine what

Objection The Failure of Imagination • Before getting out, Mary couldn’t even imagine what it would be like to, e. g. see red. • So she didn’t really have all the information about the physical facts of the matter, contrary to the assumption.

Response to the Failure of Imagination Objection • Failure of imagination is neither here

Response to the Failure of Imagination Objection • Failure of imagination is neither here nor there • This is really a return to the what it is like to be a bat argument • The point is that she didn’t know what it was like

Objection If we reject Physicalism we’re stuck with Epiphenomenalism • The physical world is

Objection If we reject Physicalism we’re stuck with Epiphenomenalism • The physical world is a closed system so • If there are non-physical events/states they make no difference they’re causally idle • Which is to say, we’re stuck with Epiphenomenalism

Jackson’s Response c. 1993 Epiphenomenalism is fine by me.

Jackson’s Response c. 1993 Epiphenomenalism is fine by me.

And then… • Jackson changed his mind • The argument, he said, contained no

And then… • Jackson changed his mind • The argument, he said, contained no obvious fallacy and yet its conclusion--that physicalism is false--must be mistaken. • Since the conclusion is false, there must be something wrong with the argument--something we know not what!

One person’s modus ponens--is another man’s modus tollens If it’s not worth doing well

One person’s modus ponens--is another man’s modus tollens If it’s not worth doing well it’s not worth doing at all • If the Knowledge Argument is sound then Physicalism is false • But Physicalism is not false, therefore the Knowledge Argument is not sound--for whatever reason. • Giving up Physicalism is too high a price to pay to accommodate our intuitions about qualia.

Should we be Physicalists? • Benefits: modern science has within it a certain picture

Should we be Physicalists? • Benefits: modern science has within it a certain picture of the world…best distilled as thesis of physicalism…[and]it is a methodological mistake to suppose that philosophy itself should revise science. • Costs: Physicalism apparently is counter to our intuitions about values, free-will, experience and a variety of other issues.

Sometimes our intuitions are just lousy George Wilson warning us that intuitions are not

Sometimes our intuitions are just lousy George Wilson warning us that intuitions are not decisive

How high are the costs? • Even if we ditch our ‘intuitions’ about values,

How high are the costs? • Even if we ditch our ‘intuitions’ about values, experience, free-will, etc. we can still: – Make moral and aesthetic judgments – Talk about feelings and emotions – Distinguish intentional from unintentional actions and hold people responsible • We just cash out these claims differently • Philosophy is analysis: it is concerned with cashing out such claims--not with revealing truths about the universe or the human condition.

The End

The End