The Hubris Hypothesis The Downside of Comparative Optimism

The Hubris Hypothesis: The Downside of Comparative Optimism Displays Marie Helweg-Larsen, Dickinson College With Vera Hoorens (University of Leuven), Carolien Van Damme (University of Leuven), and Constantine Sedikides (University of Southampton)

The benefits of optimism • Compared to pessimists, optimists • are happier and better adjusted (Taylor & Brown, 1988) • approach challenges more energetically and constructively and cope better with adversity (Peeters, Czapinski, & Hoorens, 2001) • recover faster from surgery and experience less pain from chronic illness (Rasmussen et al, 2009) • make more money, have better psychological and physical health (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010) • But optimists might become disappointed when their rosy expectations are not met (Krizan & Sweeny, 2013). Or might be viewed by others as naïve or arrogant (Sedikides et al, 2007)

Views of optimistic vs pessimistic people • We generally like optimists over pessimists. • People (“observers”) view other people (“claimants”) more favorably when they express optimistic than pessimistic beliefs about their own futures (Helweg. Larsen et al. , 2002). • In the current research we did (in Exp 1) compare how pessimistic and optimistic people (claimants) were viewed. We found that compared with pessimistic people, optimistic people were viewed more positively (warm and competent) and observers were more interested in spending time with them.

Hubris hypothesis • But even if we like optimists over pessimists might there be downsides to some expressions of optimism? • Hubris hypothesis: people (observers) will respond less favorably to directly comparative self-superiority claims (“I’m better than others”) than to other types of selfsuperiority claims: “I am a good, ” “I am as good as others, ” or “I am better than I used to be” (Hoorens et al, 2012). • The mechanism of dislike is that the self-superiority claimant is seen as viewing others negatively especially the observer (Hoorens et al, 2012).

Present research • Hubris hypothesis has been supported with one type of self-superiority belief namely the betterthan-average effect contrasting comparative (“I’m a better friend than others”) vs. absolute (“I am good friend”) descriptions (Van Damme et al, 2016). • Here we tested it with likelihood ratings of 4 events (for undesirable events) contrasting comparative (“I have a much lower chance than others”) with absolute (“I have a very low chance”) claims. The claimant was always showing optimism.

Predictions 1. We predicted that observers (participants) would view claimants (ostensibly another student) more negatively when the claims were comparative vs. absolute. 2. The negative views would entail seeing the claimant as less warm (but not necessarily less competent) and show lower desire for affiliation. 3. We predicted that the reason lies in the observer thinking the claimants’ views reflected negatively on the observer’s future.

Participants • Participants: 161 undergraduate students (117 women, 44 men), aged between 17 and 51 years (M = 19. 16, SD = 3. 04), who fulfilled a course option. • We presented participants with likelihood ratings that an unnamed student had allegedly made for four undesirable events on a questionnaire about future expectations. • Participants were randomly assigned to a comparative or an absolute likelihood condition.

Comparative likelihood condition Instructions: Some time ago a group of students completed a questionnaire about future expectations. They estimated the probability that they would experience a series of events compared to the average student of their age and gender. For each event they circled a rating on a scale from -5 (my chances are much smaller) to +5 (my chances are much greater). Here are some answers given by one of the students. Look at them carefully, because you’ll answer questions about them later.

Comparative likelihood condition My chance of dying young is … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 much lower chance My chance of an unhappy love life is … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 much lower chance My chance of a boring life … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 much lower chance My chance of being poor is … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 much lower chance 4 5 much higher chance

Absolute likelihood condition My chance of dying young is … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 very low chance My chance of an unhappy love life is … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 very low chance My chance of a boring life … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 very low chance My chance of being poor is … -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 very low chance 4 5 very high chance

Dependent Variables • The claimant was rated on 14 traits (1 = not at all, 7 = completely); Peeters, 1997 • Warmth (communion): helpful, trustworthy, honest, loving, just, respectful, tolerant (alpha =. 79) • Competence (agency): ambitious, confident, decisive, energetic, resourceful, sharp, willful (alpha =. 87) • Affiliation preferences: Fun to hang out with, go to a campus party, have person on sports team, have as a friend, work together on a class project, like to meet (1 = definitely would not, 7 = definitely would); alpha =. 87; Helweg-Larsen et al. , 2002

Mediational variables • Participants estimated how likely these 4 events were. They rated what they thought the claimant would think (1 = not likely, 8 = extremely likely): 1. Of claimant’s own life 2. Of participant’s own life • The 4 events were worded in the opposite direction (e. g. , instead of “dying young” it asked participants to estimate the likelihood of “living a long life”).

Figure 1: Evaluations of an absolute versus comparative optimism claimant for warmth and competence. Absolute Comparative Mean evaluation (1 -7) 5. 5 5. 16 5 5. 22 4. 5 4. 27 4 4. 03 3. 5 3 Warmth Comptetence

Figure 2: Evaluations of an absolute versus comparative optimism claimant for affiliation preference. Absolute Comparative 5. 5 Mean evaluation (1 -7) 5 4 3. 5 4. 14 3. 74 3 Affiliation Preference

Figure 3: Likelihood estimates for positive events as observer perceives claimant’s view Absolute Comparative 6. 5 Mean likelihood rating (1 -8) 6 5. 91 5. 99 5. 36 5. 5 5 4. 22 4 3. 5 3 Of claimant him/herself Of participant

Mediation Analysis • Hayes’ PROCESS macro: Bootstrapping with 5000 re-samples, 95% confidence intervals. • In the relationship between Condition (absolute vs. comparative) and Warmth we examined the mediator (Claimant-views-of-Participant: what the participant thought the claimant thought about the participant). The mediation was significant. Indirect effect: B = 0. 28, CI [0. 46, 0. 14]. • Similarly in the relationship between Condition and Affiliation we examined the Claimant-views-of-Participant as a mediator. Again the mediation was significant. Indirect effect: B = 0. 43, CI [0. 69, 0. 24],

Conclusion • Claimant was seen less positively when optimism was expressed comparatively instead of absolutely. • Why: because participants assumed the claimant would view the participant’s chances of the negative events as higher.

Discussion • We found that optimism loses some of its appeal when it is expressed in a comparative than an absolute manner because comparative expressions of optimism lead observers to assume that the claimant views the observers’ future gloomily. • The effect is noteworthy because people are overwhelmingly comparatively optimistic (see their own risks as less than others) but this research shows they are less enthusiastic about comparative optimism in other people (compared to absolute optimism). • Also, social comparison is implied in absolute estimations as well as directly comparative estimation (Alicke, 2007).

Future directions • People know that they should be optimistic instead of pessimistic to be viewed favorably. But we are bound by reality: Tyler and Rosier (2009) found that comparative optimism changes as a function of how accountable people are to the truth (less accountable = more comparative optimism). • Future research: What happens when the claims are about health risks? And are made in an interpersonal context where impression management is more salient. • Do people know that others view them less favorably when they make comparative optimistically claims as opposed to just optimistic claims?

Thanks Questions?

Figure 1 a: Evaluations of an absolute versus comparative pessimism, neutral, or optimism claimant on warmth in Experiment 1.

Figure 1 b: Evaluations of an absolute versus comparative pessimism, neutral, or optimism claimant on competence in Experiment 1.

Figure 2: Affiliation preferences with an absolutely versus comparatively pessimism, neutral, or optimism claimant in Experiment 1.

Figure 1: Evaluations of an absolute versus comparative optimism claimant on warmth and competence.

Figure 4: Likelihood estimates for positive events in Experiment 2.