The Causal Theory of Reference Explaining Reference n

The Causal Theory of Reference

Explaining Reference n Kripke: a name refers to a thing if there is the right sort of causal link between the thing and the use of the name This causal link is equivalent to Frege’s sense n It is explicable in purely physicalist terms n

Baptism n The event that fixes the reference of a term is a baptism or dubbing Point at dog and say ‘this is Fido’ n Establishes a causal link between term and thing n Causal link exists for all witnesses of this act n

Borrowing n Those who don’t witness baptism have to ‘borrow’ reference They are causally linked to other users who have the referencing ability n Ultimately all referencing depends on causal connections to witnesses of the baptism n n We can talk about Napoleon because we are causally connected in the right way to someone who saw Napoleon, and to the one who named him.

Advantages n It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ n The sense of ‘Venus’ is different from the sense of ‘Phosphorus’ because the causal chain that links Venus to ‘Venus’ is different from that which links Venus to ‘Phosphorus’

Advantages n It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ n Sense determines reference, and the causal chain determines reference by being linked to the relevant thing

Advantages n It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ To understand the meaning of a word is to grasp the sense n The causal chain from use of a term to the thing itself must pass through the brain n n It depends on some causal features in the brain n Which is why not all brains can have the right causal links n n Animals, for example Those causal features are the grasping of the sense

Advantages n Solves the ‘puzzles’ of reference How do Venus is the evening star Venus is Venus have different meanings though their referents are identical? n Because the meanings are constructed out of senses and the senses/causal links are different for ‘Venus’ and the ‘evening star’ n

Advantages n Solves the ‘puzzles’ of reference n How can we talk about things that don’t exist? n There n can’t be causal links to non-existent things Consider how the name ‘Pegasus’ is introduced n Described as a horse with wings n The terms ‘horse’ and ‘wing’ both refer n Those terms have causal chains n Therefore ‘Pegasus’ has a causal chain

Advantages n Solves the ‘puzzles’ of reference n How can we say that things don’t exist? n There n can’t be causal links to non-existent things The ‘Pegasus’ solution works here too

Problems n Change of reference Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth undeniably be the case that the man universally known as ‘Jack’ is so called because a woman dubbed some other baby with the name.

Problems n Change of reference n There are multiple chains between terms and referents n Every introduction forms another chain from Bob to ‘Bob’ Some may link the referent and different terms, Others may link the same term to different referents n If too many link a referent and a different term then that term becomes the name of the n

Problems n Quâ-problem n I point at a dog and say ‘Fido’ n Why have I named the particular dog and not the species, or the dog’s nose, or an air molecule at the end of my finger, or the idea of the dog, or … n It’s the intention of the grounder to name the dog n The intention must be a describable one n So descriptions are again required

Problems n Natural kind terms n The solution to the quâ-problem requires descriptions of natural kind terms n They have all the same problems as in pure description theories n Modal Problem n “Tigers are wild striped felines” n There’s a possible world where they don’t have stripes n Because there are no Freemasons n They are still tigers

Problems n Natural kind terms n The solution to the quâ-problem requires descriptions of natural kind terms n They have all the same problems as in pure description theories n Necessity Problem n You don’t need to be able to describe an elm in order to be able to refer to it

Problems n Natural kind terms n The solution to the quâ-problem requires descriptions of natural kind terms n They have all the same problems as in pure description theories n Sufficiency Problem n Pegasus is the winged horse n But if we find a winged horse created by Freemasons in Tibet by gene-splicing, that wouldn’t be Pegasus

Problems Twin-Earth is a planet just like Earth except water there is not H 2 O, but XYZ n ‘Water’ as said by a twin-Earthling does not mean the same as ‘water’ said by an Earthling n Yet everything is the same. n Descriptions can’t give the meanings of terms n Meanings just ‘ain’t in the head’ n