TEMPEST EMISSIONS BY NICK DOWNER OVERVIEW What are
TEMPEST EMISSIONS BY: NICK DOWNER
OVERVIEW • • What are tempest emissions? Detecting tempest emissions Security concerns How to protect against leakage
WHAT IS TEMPEST? “TEMPEST is the name of a technology involving the monitoring (and shielding) of devices that emit electromagnetic radiation (EMR) in a manner that can be used to reconstruct intelligible data. ” -sans reading room
WHAT ARE LEAKAGES OR “EMANATIONS” • Every electronic device gives off some type of electromagnetic signal, or “emanations” • A proper design will limit these emanations but there will always be some level of leakage • Like crosstalk on phone lines • Examples • Shaver • Radio’s from cellphones • Hard Drives (like a fingerprint)
THE EARLY YEARS OF TEMPEST The name TEMPEST has no definite meaning… • Early government code word • Telecommunications Electronics Material Protected from Emancipating Spurious Transmissions • Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation STandard • Also referred to as “Van Eck Phreaking” after the Dutch scientist Wim can Eck
THE EARLY PROOF • Wim can Eck demonstrated that he could easily pick up nearby computer monitor emissions and display them on a TV monitor • Used a normal TV receiver made suitable for the purpose of capturing the emissions • Was able to display video from a computer monitor on a separate TV monitor • May be feasible up to 1 km
THE EARLY PROOF • In his 1986 book, Peter Wright explains how MI 5 spied on messages sent by the French during England’s negotiations to join the European Economic Community (EEG) • They were interested in what the French thought of England entering the EEG • MI 5 tried to break the French diplomatic cypher but failed • However, they noticed the encipher traffic carried a faint secondary signal, and constructed equipment to recover it • It turned out to be plaintext
DETECTING TEMPEST • TEMPEST eavesdropping reconstructs the electromagnetic signals put off by electronics • Equipment needed • Sensitive receivers are used which can capture a wide range of frequencies • Software to turn the raw findings into the original data • Problems that can occur • Can contain other EMR/interference from outside sources
TEMPEST TESTING EQUIPMENT • Codex Data Systems • Produces a device called D. I. R. T (Data Interception by Remote Transmission) • The army buys the $20, 000 units but the company agreed to a Pentagon request to halt sales to anyone else • Allows stealth monitoring of all activity on one or more target computers • No physical access is necessary
IMPACTS OF TEMPEST • Loss of • Integrity • Confidentiality • Availability • Reduces effectiveness of encryption • Can mirror screen
TEMPEST STANDARDS • National Communications Security Committee Directive 4 sets TEMPEST standards • Very costly and classified • Private sector started ZONE • More cost effective but less secure • 3 categories • 1 is extremely secure and only available to US government • 2 is somewhat less secure but still requires US government approval to use • 3 is for general commercial use
HOW TO PROTECT • Covering the device/cabling in a faraday cage • Buy a TEMPEST certified computer • Purchase equipment that meets modern standards for emission • Use only shielded cable for all system interconnections • Keep cable runs as short as possible • Encrypt all information being sent and received from the device
TEMPEST…. FACT OR FICTION • James Atkinson a telecommunications engineer, president of Granite Island Group has worked with TEMPEST for 20 years • Claims TEMPEST is not a spying technology and anyone who says it is is misinformed or lying • Claims todays PC’s are shielded to prevent leakage and disturbing other connections • Says taking a peek at someone else's computer screen from a distance is possible, but its very difficult to do, costly, and often impractical
MORE EVIDENCE • Wayne Madsen from the Electronic Privacy Information Center claims • Todays computers are unlike that of the old cathode-ray tube days • They’re more ruggedized and heavily shielded so these emissions are a lot harder to pick up/detect • TEMPEST isn’t as big of a problem as it once was, but engineers hype the problem
EVIDENCE • John Young a New York architect says he often designs TEMPEST security features into buildings for law firms and banks • He has an interest in tempest and has filed several freedom of information requests with the US government to declassify NSA documents dealing with TEMPEST.
WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN? • There is debate among professionals as to the severity of TEMPEST emanations • Not much is known since most TEMPEST material is classified by the government
SO WHAT CAN WE DO • Use common sense with encryption • Keep cable runs short • Buy highly insulated cables
QUESTIONS? • Any Questions?
RESOURCES • http: //www. sans. org/reading_room/whitepapers/privacy/i ntroduction-tempest_981 • http: //cryptome. org/tempest-fret. htm • http: //users. telenet. be/ws 36178/security/topsecret/tempe st. html • http: //www. wired. com/threatlevel/2008/04/nsa-releasesse/
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