Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms the

Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms: the BWC and its evolving role Richard Lennane Head, BWC Implementation Support United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch) BWC IMPLEMENT UNITED NATIONS ATION SUPPOR T UNIT OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

BWC strengths and weaknesses • Strengths: – Clear, comprehensive ban: no exceptions, few loopholes – Strong international norm, never publicly challenged – Futureproof (so far. . . ) • Weaknesses: – No organisation or implementing body – No systematic monitoring of implementation or compliance – No systematic assessment of needs or provision of assistance – Uneven national implementation – No mechanism for investigating alleged violations – Conceived to deal with state-based BW programs: covers bioterrorism only indirectly Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Chemical Weapons Convention Biological Weapons Convention International Atomic Energy Agency Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ? Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Biothreats: the 21 st Century view • Government biological weapons programs • Non-state actors: bioterrorism • Naturally-occurring, emerging and re-emerging disease • Rapidly growing biotech capabilities, shrinking costs, and widely expanding interest, participation, availability and access – Unintended consequences, experiments gone wrong – Accidents, leaks, mistakes – or deliberate misuse or sabotage (bio-terror vs. bio-error) – Awareness and management of risks lagging far behind Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The Spectrum of Biological Risk Natural disease outbreak Unintended consequences Accidents WHO Vandalism, sabotage Negligence Deliberate use of BW BWC “We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006 Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Strengthening the BWC: the new way • Focus on improving and coordinating national implementation of BWC • Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise • Range of different actors and organisations involved • Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity • Renewed focus on CBMs, universalization Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

New BWC approach: a network model BWC INTERPOL OIE WHO SCR 1540 FAO State Professional associations Work Program ISU Industry Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC State Scientific organisations Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Security vs. Development? Art I / III Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Art X Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Security vs. Development? Art X Art I / III Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Security vs. Development? Art I / III Art X Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

A new vision of the BWC Art. I / III Art. X Mutual reinforcement: cooperation reduces risks; reducing risks encourages cooperation. Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The new vision: examples • Kofi Annan (2006): “Building public health capacities can strengthen safeguards against bioterrorism. And being better prepared to deal with terrorism can mean better public health systems overall. Similarly, the availability of training and technology is crucial to improving laboratory safety and security, and making labs safe and secure encourages cooperation and creates opportunities for development. ” • USA (2009): “In order to implement our Article X commitments, it is critical that we work together to achieve, sustain and improve international capacity to detect, report and respond to outbreaks of disease, whether deliberate, accidental or natural. . . Greater cooperation and technical assistance are key to achieving and sustaining the capabilities we need to prevent biological weapons use and to combat infectious diseases. ” Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Strengthening the regime BWC National implementation Non-state partners International/collective Legislation/regulations Professional bodies Organization? Biosafety/biosecurity Science & academia Monitoring/assessment? Enforcement capacity Industry? Investigations? Export controls Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of BW: The Role of the BTWC Beijing, China, 4 -6 November 2010 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction